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Using empirical data to evaluate strategies to improve women's health 
 
Abstract 
 
My three papers evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of clinical and policy 
strategies to improve women’s health, focusing on human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination in 
the U.S. and maternal health care in a developing country context.  
Paper 1 presents a claims-based econometric analysis of the U.S.’s Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act provision requiring the elimination of cost-sharing for recommended 
preventive care. I evaluate the effect of this value-based insurance design intervention on HPV 
immunization rates among girls and young women enrolled in private insurance plans. My 
regression approach uses variation in the intensity and timing of the intervention across plans to 
distinguish policy effects from background trends. I find that the policy was associated with 
modest increases in age-specific vaccination rates. Increases in vaccination per dollar reduction 
in cost-sharing were notably larger among beneficiaries in socioeconomically disadvantaged 
areas. Nevertheless, vaccination rates under free preventive care were well below federal targets, 
highlighting the need for additional interventions to increase HPV vaccine coverage.  
In Paper 2, I undertake a comparative effectiveness analysis of HPV vaccination by dose 
level within a U.S. cohort of adolescent girls and young women. Rates of screening-detected 
cervical abnormalities in claims are compared among recipients of zero, one, two, or three doses, 
using a marginal structural model approach to adjust for a broader set of potential confounders 
  iv 
than would be possible with conventional regression methods. Findings from these analyses 
complement prior evidence from immunogenicity trials, and although protective effects appear 
greatest with three doses, support the value of HPV vaccination even when incomplete. Vaccine 
effect estimates are largest with respect to high-grade lesions that are precursors to cervical 
cancer.  
Using primary data from a randomized experiment, Paper 3 examines the cost-
effectiveness of pay-for-performance interventions among obstetric care providers in rural 
Karnataka, India. I construct a decision analytic model to quantify incremental costs and life 
years under alternative policy scenarios, combining obstetric complication outcomes and 
program expenditures from the trial with published evidence on complication-related mortality 
and medical costs. Results suggest that an incentive program based on input quality is not cost-
effective in its current form, but could become economically attractive if program activities can 
be adjusted to reduce costs while maintaining similar health effects. Performance data collection 
costs were substantial in this resource-limited setting and represent a key barrier to cost-
effectiveness. 
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Paper 1: 
 
Effects of a large-scale value-based insurance design intervention on HPV 
immunization rates: Evidence from U.S. health reform !  
! !2 
INTRODUCTION 
As of September 23, 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires all non-
grandfathered commercial health insurance plans to fully cover a range of highly recommended 
preventive services with zero cost-sharing to patients. Among other types of preventive care, the 
reform extends to annual wellness visits and routine vaccinations for children and adults within 
the affected health plans. My paper evaluates the effectiveness of this large-scale value-based 
insurance design intervention targeting preventive care use, focusing specifically on rates of 
human papillomavirus (HPV) immunization among age-eligible girls and young women (9 to 26 
years old) enrolled in private insurance plans. I also examine sources of heterogeneity in 
individuals’ responsiveness to the cost-sharing reductions, which will suggest the policy’s likely 
effect on socioeconomic disparities in vaccine uptake.  
 
HPV vaccines and barriers to uptake 
HPV is the most common sexually transmitted disease in the United States (Weinstock 
2004), and is responsible for approximately 18,000 new cancer cases per year among U.S. 
women (CDC 2012). The quadrivalent and bivalent HPV vaccines prevent infection with the two 
types (HPV-16 and HPV-18) that cause the majority of cervical and other HPV-associated 
cancers (CDC 2012). In trials, the vaccines have shown high efficacy in preventing 16/18-related 
precancerous lesions when administered prior to infection (Lehtinen 2012; Kjaer 2009). 
Consequently, since 2007, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) has 
recommended routine HPV vaccination for girls and women aged 9 to 26 years, with a target age 
of 11 to 12 years (Markowitz 2014). Decision models have consistently found routine HPV 
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vaccination programs to be cost-effective among target-age girls, especially if high coverage can 
be achieved (Kim & Goldie 2009; Elbasha 2007; Chesson 2008). 
However, HPV vaccine coverage in the U.S. remains low relative to other vaccines 
recommended for adolescents (Reagan-Steiner 2015). In 2013, only 54.6% and 36.4% of 13 to 
17 year-old girls had initiated and completed the three-dose HPV vaccine series, respectively 
(Stokley 2014). Individual-level barriers to HPV vaccination reportedly include misconceptions 
about HPV risk and the value of vaccination (Holman 2013; Williams 2013; Jain 2009). The 
perception that HPV vaccines are only needed for sexually active individuals may lead parents 
and vaccine-eligible young women to refuse or delay vaccine initiation (Stokley 2014; Williams 
2013). Concerns about cost are another commonly reported reason for vaccine refusal in surveys 
of parents, patients, and health care providers (Laz 2013; McCave 2010; Anhang 2011). 
Completing the recommended three-dose series requires multiple interactions with the health 
care system and (depending on insurance generosity) out-of-pocket costs of up to $400 plus 
administration fees. In one survey study, 30% of unvaccinated young women replied that they 
would accept HPV vaccination if it were provided for free or at low cost, but would not be 
willing to pay the full price out-of-pocket (Anhang 2011). 
At the state level, school immunization mandates for HPV vaccines have largely stalled 
due to political resistance and budgetary concerns (NCSL 2014). Given the difficulty of 
implementing strong public health interventions to increase HPV immunization in the U.S., 
researchers have aimed to identify more incremental policy levers for promoting uptake (Dunne 
2014). 
 
Value-based insurance design in U.S. health reform 
! !4 
Value-based insurance design (VBID) is one approach that has been proposed to 
encourage utilization of cost-effective services. Interventions based on VBID seek to align 
patients’ financial incentives with evidence-based care by selectively modifying patient cost-
sharing requirements (Fendrick 2012; Fendrick 2002). Recently, the ACA instated a large-scale 
VBID intervention through a provision requiring all non-grandfathered commercial health 
insurance plans to fully cover preventive services rated “A” or “B” by the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force or the ACIP (KFF 2011). The list of covered services includes routine 
vaccinations and annual wellness visits (during which vaccines may be offered and 
administered). The removal of cost barriers for HPV vaccination under health reform may 
incentivize higher rates of vaccine acceptance among parents and age-eligible patients.  
The impact of ACA-mandated cost-sharing reductions on HPV immunization is of 
substantive interest, given the vaccines’ potential to prevent most HPV-associated cancers if 
used optimally. HPV vaccination is also a good test case in that it represents a type of care that 
has rarely been examined in prior evaluations of VBID: Although existing evidence suggests that 
patients respond to cost-sharing reductions with respect to essential health services, most of this 
evidence comes from initiatives by a single employer or insurer targeting prescription drug 
adherence for chronic conditions (Fendrick 2012). A few studies have looked at the effects of 
cost-sharing exemptions on the use of preventive services (Rowe 2008; Busch 2006; Reed 2009) 
but did not focus on pediatric or adolescent populations, which may respond differently to cost-
sharing changes. 
To examine the effect of vaccine-specific cost-sharing reductions on uptake, I use 
historical claims data from a sample of commercial health plans that existed during years before 
and after the ACA (2009-2013). The ACA’s VBID intervention gives rise to a natural 
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experiment among study plans: A portion of plans retained grandfathered status through 2011, 
2012, or 2013 and were therefore exempt from the cost-sharing rule for all or part of the post-
ACA period; meanwhile, among non-grandfathered plans, the intensity of the VBID intervention 
varied depending on the baseline (pre-ACA) cost-sharing scenario. Within plans, the study 
sample includes repeated age-specific cross-sections of still-unvaccinated girls and women in 
each year from 2009 to 2013. I use Cox proportional hazards models to estimate the effect of 
cost-sharing reductions on vaccination rates, taking advantage of within-plan variation in cost-
sharing levels over time and/or cross-sectional variation in cost-sharing across plans that had 
similar pre-ACA cost-sharing levels.!The models adjust for complex underlying trends in uptake, 
and include group-level fixed effects to protect against the most likely sources of time-constant 
omitted variable bias. 
 
METHODS 
Policy setting and data source 
ACA preventive care provisions  
Section 2713 of the ACA requires that any new or non-grandfathered commercial health 
plan eliminate cost-sharing for recommended preventive services that are provided in-network. 
There are several caveats to the requirement. For example, plans have the flexibility to use 
“medical management” techniques such as limiting the types of providers that patients can visit 
to receive a particular service for free (Dept. of the Treasury 2010 July 19). Additionally, if the 
provider bills for the office visit and the preventive service separately, cost-sharing may be 
imposed for the office visit portion (Dept. of the Treasury 2010 July 19).1 Of particular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The intent of this separate billings caveat was to prevent patients from receiving unrelated services for free by 
asking for a preventive service during the same visit. 
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relevance for the multi-dose HPV vaccine, federal regulations have only recently clarified that 
insurers must fully cover any additional well-woman visits required to complete a recommended 
preventive service (effective for policy years starting on or after August 1, 2012) (Dept. of HHS 
2012). Due to these caveats, real-world out-of-pocket costs for included services may not be 
strictly zero in affected health plans, especially during the early years of ACA implementation. 
The preventive care provisions apply starting in the first policy year on or after 
September 23, 2010 in which a health plan no longer has grandfathered status (which for most 
plans, would be no earlier than January 1, 2011). Plans may claim grandfathered status if 
reductions in benefit generosity and employer premium contributions since March 23, 2010 (the 
ACA’s enactment date) do not exceed pre-specified thresholds (Dept. of the Treasury 2010 June 
17). Although grandfathered plans are exempt from the rule, some may have voluntarily 
complied by fully or partially reducing cost-sharing for these services.  
 
Claims data  
MarketScan Commercial Claims & Encounters (2007-2013) is a de-identified, individual-
level database containing health care claims from over 100 employers and insurers. Although not 
nationally representative, the database provides a large convenience sample with enrollees in all 
U.S. states and 33 million covered employees and dependents in 2007. Claims are integrated 
from all outpatient, inpatient, and pharmacy providers that submitted for reimbursement through 
the enrollee’s health plan. Enrollment files contain basic person-level demographics and plan 
information, as well as socioeconomic measures based on enrollees’ 5-digit ZIP code of 
residence. 
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Although the grandfathered status of MarketScan plans is not observable through claims, 
it is possible to empirically estimate HPV vaccine-related cost-sharing levels by plan and 
calendar year. For a subset of plans, additional information is available through a supplemental 
database (the 2010-2013 MarketScan Summary Plan Description Extractions) to help validate 
empirical cost-sharing estimates. The Extractions database is prepared by Truven Analytics using 
standardized keyword searches of plan materials, and contains extracted statements relating to 
preventive care benefits (including vaccinations and wellness visits specifically) and 
grandfathered status. 
 
Overview of approach 
I use a repeated cross-sectional design with plan-level fixed effects to identify the per-
dollar impact of cost-sharing reductions on HPV vaccination rates. Within each plan-employer 
group, my analysis compares vaccination rates among still-unvaccinated 9-26 year-old female 
beneficiaries in each year of the pre- and post-ACA periods. Cost-sharing policy is modeled as a 
continuous time-varying variable that is updated once per plan per year. This approach exploits 
variation in the intensity and timing of cost-sharing reductions across different plan-employer 
groups to distinguish policy effects from temporal trends in vaccination that are unrelated to the 
intervention. !Plans with relatively little change in cost-sharing levels (e.g., grandfathered plans 
and plans that already featured zero/low cost-sharing) serve as controls for estimating these 
background time trends. 
 Plan-employer fixed effects are included to adjust for any observed or unobserved time-
constant group characteristics associated with both HPV vaccine cost-sharing and uptake. 
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Of particular concern is the possibility of confounding by overall benefit generosity, which is 
likely to be correlated with vaccine-specific cost-sharing level in a given plan/year. Without 
adjusting for generosity, two types of confounding are likely to arise: First, individuals with 
greater propensity to seek health services may tend to select into more generous plans. Second, 
overall generosity itself could be an important driver of HPV vaccination decisions, an effect that 
must be disentangled from the effect of vaccine-specific cost-sharing. In the absence of a 
validated measure of actuarial value in MarketScan, I indirectly adjust for generosity by focusing 
on within-plan changes in vaccination rates from year to year, with the assumption that plans’ 
overall generosity stays roughly constant during 2009-2013.  
For this identification approach to be valid, the timing and extent of preventive care cost-
sharing changes should not be correlated with other changes in benefits that could have impacted 
vaccination rates. Thus, one limitation of my approach is the potential for bias due to changes in 
generosity that trigger a loss of grandfathered status. However, if reductions in preventive care 
cost-sharing are concurrent with a substantial loss of other plan benefits, the resulting bias would 
likely make the policy effect estimate more conservative. The maximum allowable changes for 
grandfathered status are also stringent2, so any concurrent changes in a plan’s generosity may not 
have been large enough to appreciably affect the composition or vaccination behavior of 
beneficiaries in the short term. In sensitivity analyses, I use alternative model specifications with 
varying levels of covariate adjustment to assess the robustness of the primary specification and to 
provide an upper limit for the policy effect.  
The complexity of background trends in HPV vaccination poses another analytical 
challenge. Rates of vaccination widely vary across the vaccine-eligible age range (9-26 years), as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For example, a plan can lose grandfathered status due to an increase in any copay requirement by an amount 
exceeding the greater of: (i) 15 percentage points above medical inflation; or (ii) $5 increased by medical inflation 
(Dept. of the Treasury 2010 June 17). 
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HPV vaccines are primarily targeted to young adolescents prior to sexual debut. Moreover, due 
catch-up vaccinations among older adolescents and young women in the early years of vaccine 
availability, calendar year trends in vaccination rates are also likely to be age-specific.3 
Statistical analyses are therefore conducted using semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard 
models, which conveniently adjust for background trends in vaccination rates that occur along 
the dimensions of age, calendar time, and cohort (i.e., age/calendar time interactions). The main 
model’s time scale is linked to attained age to account for changes in the hazard of vaccination as 
a subject ages and remains unvaccinated. Models also include interactions between time-varying 
dummy indicators for each calendar year and attained age, thereby allowing calendar year trends 
to vary by age. 
  
Sample selection 
Plan-employer groups are included in the main study sample if they continuously 
contributed data to MarketScan from 2009 until 2011 or later. In sensitivity analyses, I either 
place further restrictions on the set of included plans (e.g., requiring plans to be continuously 
present in the database from 2009 through 2013) or expand the sample to all plans existing for 
any portion of 2009-2013. 
 Within plans, I identify female beneficiaries who were vaccine-eligible in the study 
timeframe, including those who: (i) newly reached the age of vaccine eligibility during 2009-
2013; or (ii) were older but still unvaccinated as of 2009. The former group includes enrollees 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The first HPV vaccine became widely available in 2007. So, for example, unvaccinated 15 year-olds in 2009 have 
only had a two-year window of opportunity to initiate vaccination. Due to the catch-up vaccination effect, they may 
have higher vaccine initiation rates than unvaccinated 15 year-olds in 2010, who have already had an extra year to 
initiate vaccination but did not do so. Conversely, unvaccinated 10 year-olds in 2009 and those in 2010 have had the 
same length of time to initiate vaccination (i.e., 1 year). Background calendar year trends in vaccination are 
therefore likely to be different for 9 year-olds than for 15 year-olds.!
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who were 9 or 10 years old as of January 1 in each year from 2009 to 2013. (When possible, girls 
are followed from age 9; otherwise, they are followed from age 10 and assumed to have not been 
vaccinated previously, since vaccine initiation rates were found to be very low among 9 year-old 
females in MarketScan.) The latter group includes enrollees 11-26 years old as of January 1, 
2009 who had been continuously enrolled in the MarketScan database since January 1, 2007 (or 
at least since January 1, 2008 for 11-year-olds), and had not initiated the HPV vaccine series 
during that time.  
By following these individuals over time until vaccination or censoring, I obtain repeated 
cross-sections of unvaccinated girls and women at each vaccine-eligible age for each year from 
2009 to 2013. 
 
Variable measurement 
Estimates of plan-level cost-sharing by year 
Among affected plans, the intensity of the VBID policy effect varies depending on the 
pre-ACA cost-sharing scenario. The main analysis therefore uses a continuous measure of cost-
sharing level that varies by calendar year in each plan. Alternative functional forms of the policy 
variable are also considered in sensitivity analyses. 
To empirically estimate HPV vaccine-related cost-sharing levels, I extract all in-network 
outpatient claims associated with HPV vaccine procedure codes in which the patient is female 
and 9-26 years old on the service date. I then identify claims for outpatient visits in which the 
vaccine was administered, including any outpatient record on the same date with procedure 
codes for vaccine administration and/or well-child or well-woman preventive care visits 
(Appendix A.1). All forms of cost-sharing (copay, coinsurance, and/or deductible) are summed 
for each vaccination event (i.e., per dose), and then averaged by plan/year. Amounts are 
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inflation-adjusted to 2013 USD using the medical care component of the Consumer Price Index. 
For the regression analyses, cost-sharing amounts are divided by 10 to obtain effect estimates per 
$10 change in cost-sharing level. 
 Large changes in vaccine cost-sharing requirements were not expected during the pre-
ACA period. Therefore, to assess the precision of empirical cost-sharing estimates, I analyze the 
concordance between cost-sharing estimates for the same plans in 2009 versus 2010. Based on 
scatterplots and correlation tests, the concordance between cost-sharing estimates is high among 
study plans (sample size-weighted correlation=0.912), especially in large plan-employer groups 
that contribute the bulk of the individual-level sample (Appendix A.2). These tests do not 
confirm concordance across plans with the same true cost-sharing level; however, the primary 
regression approach only relies on absolute within-plan differences in cost-sharing across 
calendar years. 
Additional validations are performed using the subset of study plans that appear in the 
Extractions database for any policy year(s) during 2010-2013 (Appendix A.3). Empirical cost-
sharing estimates are consistently low in plans that stated zero cost-sharing for routine 
vaccinations and annual wellness visits (under $5 per dosage for the average plan; !$10 for 96% 
of plans). Estimates are generally higher in plans that stated cost-sharing requirements (mean: 
$27.75; percent !$10: 44%), especially in plans with incomplete coverage of both vaccination 
itself and associated visits (mean: $94.40; percent !$10: 25%). In post-ACA years, there is also 
strong differentiation between plans that did versus did not claim grandfathered status in plan 
materials. 
 
Time to HPV vaccine doses 
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The primary endpoint of interest is time to vaccine initiation (dose 1), measured in years 
from age-qualification (i.e., time zero ≡ January 1st when the beneficiary was 9 years old). 
However, subjects have delayed entry into the risk set if they reached age 9 before 2009, or if 
they were followed from age 10. For example, an 11 year-old in 2009 would enter the risk set at 
the two-year mark. By linking the time scale of the survival analysis to attained age rather than 
calendar time, it is possible to estimate the policy effect using within-plan variation across 
calendar years (i.e., by comparing vaccine initiation rates between plan beneficiaries with the 
same attained age in different years). In a sensitivity analysis, I instead measure time to vaccine 
initiation in years from January 1, 2009; under this model, enrollees in the same plan face the 
same cost-sharing level at every time t, and the cost-sharing effect can only be estimated using 
across-plan variation. 
Secondary endpoints include times from age-qualification to receipt of the second and 
third vaccine dose. In order to directly examine the influence of cost-sharing changes on multi-
dose compliance, I also analyze times to two-dose and three-dose completion in terms of months 
from the preceding dose (conditional on receiving the preceding dose).  
In all analyses, subjects are censored at the earliest of: (i) end of continuous enrollment in 
MarketScan; (ii) December 31, 2013; or (iii) December 31st for those at age 26 years. 
 
Individual- and plan-level covariates 
Models adjust for beneficiary and plan characteristics likely to be correlated with both 
cost-sharing level and background vaccination rates. Time-constant individual-level covariates 
include census division of residence and the following socioeconomic indicators corresponding 
to 5-digit ZIP code, derived using American Community Survey 5-year estimates: quartiles for 
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percentage white race/ethnicity; quartiles for percentage of adult residents without a high school 
education; and categories of median 4-person family income (!200%, 201-300%, 301-400%, or 
>400% federal poverty level for a 4-person family). In subgroup analyses by attained age, I also 
adjust for employee (versus dependent or spouse) status among beneficiaries with an attained age 
"18 years. In specifications without plan-employer fixed effects, I include covariates for health 
plan type and data contributor type (insurer or large employer), which are time-constant at the 
plan level.  
 
Statistical analysis 
Primary specifications  
The primary set of analyses use Cox proportional hazards models with fixed effects for 
plan-employer group. In Cox models, fixed effects are implemented by stratifying the baseline 
hazard function. The models assume that each stratum has a unique baseline hazard function 
(i.e., different background rates of HPV vaccine uptake), but constrain hazard ratios to be equal 
for all groups. Thus, the hazard rates associated with two different cost-sharing scenarios are 
assumed to be proportional within, but not necessarily across, strata. 
 
Time to HPV vaccine receipt  
Let hip(t) be the hazard rate of HPV vaccine initiation for individual i in plan p at time t 
years from age-qualification. The hazard at time t refers to the instantaneous rate of vaccine 
initiation (i.e., initiations per person-years) that applies during the age interval (9+t, 9+t+1] for a 
still-unvaccinated beneficiary. It is approximately equal to the conditional probability of 
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vaccination by age 9+t+1 given that a beneficiary is still unvaccinated at age 9+t. With plan-level 
fixed effects, hip(t) is modeled by the following regression: 
 !!" ! ! !!" ! !!"# !!!"!" ! ! !!!!! ! !!!"#!!"#$! !  !!" ! ! !!" ! !!"# !!!"!" ! ! !!!!! ! !!"!"#$!" ! ! !"#!!"!!! !
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In this equation, h0p(t) is the baseline hazard function for plan p, corresponding to a 
beneficiary with zero or reference values for all covariates. The policy variable, csip(t), is a time-
varying continuous variable for HPV vaccine cost-sharing that individual i faces in plan p at time 
t. There is no variation in the values of csip(t) among plan p enrollees who reach time t in the 
same calendar year (i.e., those from the same birth year cohort). Zi is the set of time-constant 
variables for individual- and ZIP code-level characteristics, while Age_Yeari(t) denotes a series 
of interaction terms to control for age-specific trends in vaccine initiation across calendar years 
(e.g., 9-year-olds in 2009, 2010, 2011 or 2012 vs. 2013). (Because the risk set at a given time t 
only includes vaccine-eligible individuals with the same attained age, there is no need to include 
age as a main effect in the model.) 
This formulation non-parametrically controls for background vaccine initiation rates by 
attained age within each plan. The plan-specific baseline hazard function absorbs all observed 
and unobserved plan-level factors that affect rates of vaccine initiation by age, provided that they 
remain constant over calendar time. Meanwhile, the linear component of the model specifies 
that, in the absence of cost-sharing or other covariate changes, all plans would have the same 
proportional changes in age-specific hazard rates across different calendar years. Similarly, plans 
face the same proportional change in hazard rates per $10 change in cost-sharing. Inference is 
based on relative within-plan changes in age-specific hazard rates from year to year in plans 
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subject to varying intensities of the VBID policy. To the extent that a plan maintains steady cost-
sharing levels during the study timeframe, it serves as a control group for estimating background 
time trends. 
The parameter of interest is the hazard ratio of vaccine initiation per $10 reduction in 
cost-sharing, equal to 1/exp{B1}. Thus, (1/exp{B1} – 1) gives the percentage change in the 
hazard of vaccine initiation per $10 reduction. To facilitate comparisons with prior studies that 
estimated the price sensitivity of demand for health services, I also estimate the price elasticity of 
demand for the HPV vaccine, i.e., the percentage change in the hazard rate per 1% change in 
price. For elasticity calculations, I use the average vaccine-related cost-sharing levels in 2009 
and 2013 as the starting and ending price points, respectively. 
Analogous methods are used to estimate the policy effect on times from age-qualification 
to receipt of the second and third vaccine doses. 
 
Time gap between doses (conditional models)  
The conditional models of two-dose and three-dose compliance are estimated among 
beneficiaries who had received the previous dose in the HPV vaccine series. The time origin in 
these analyses is the previous dose date.  
Let hip(t*) be the hazard rate of receiving the second (third) dose for individual i in plan p 
at time t* months from receiving the first (second) dose. With plan-level fixed effects, 
 !!"# !! ! !!" !! !!"# !!!"!" !! ! !!!!! ! !!!"#!!"#$"%$&'!! ! !!!!"#$!!"#$"%$&'!  !!"# !! ! !!" !! !!"# !!!"!" !! ! !!!!! ! !!!"#!!"#$"%$&'!" ! ! !!!"#$!!"#$"%$&'!"!"#!!!!""#
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where h0p(t*) is the baseline hazard function for plan p, and Age_PriorDosei and Year_PriorDosei 
are vectors of time-constant dummy variables indicating individual i’s age and calendar year at 
the time of receiving the previous dose. The variables csip(t*) and Zi, are defined as before. 
 
Sensitivity testing 
Testing non-linear functions of cost-sharing 
The proportional hazard models include vaccine-related cost-sharing as a linear predictor. 
This functional form assumes a constant percentage increase in vaccination rates per dollar 
reduction regardless of the starting price, implying a larger percentage increase in rates per 1% 
reduction in price at higher starting prices. There is empirical support for this assumption, as 
studies have consistently found greater price elasticity of health care demand at higher cost-
sharing levels (Newhouse & Phelps 1974; Rosett & Huang 1973; Newhouse 1993). However, I 
also assess model fit using nonlinear functions of cost-sharing, including a log-transformation of 
cost-sharing plus $1 (which assumes a more stable price elasticity of demand across the range of 
prices) or a quadratic function of cost-sharing (which can either stabilize or further increase price 
elasticity at higher price points). Additionally, I test a dichotomous policy variable (“free/near-
free” vs. “not free”) defined by cost-sharing level below or above a low threshold ($10); as 
discussed in Appendix A.4, this specification yields a very conservative estimate of the overall 
VBID policy effect among study plans. 
 Based on changes in the -2 log L statistic (Collett 2003), model fit does not significantly 
improve when a squared cost-sharing term is added to the model, and worsens when the linear 
variable is replaced with a log-transformation or binary cost-sharing variable (Appendix A.4). I 
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therefore conclude that demand for HPV vaccination is adequately modeled using a linear price 
variable and use this functional form throughout the analyses. 
 
Alternative model specifications 
Alternative specifications with varying levels of covariate adjustment are tested to 
examine the potential range of effect sizes and to assess robustness. The most parsimonious 
model includes age*year covariates only, without group-level fixed effects; this naïve model 
arguably provides an upper limit for the per-dollar impact of cost-sharing reductions, as it uses 
cross-sectional variation in vaccine-related cost-sharing across plans with potentially very 
different generosity levels and beneficiary characteristics. To gauge the potential for omitted 
variable bias in the main specification, I compare the incremental effect of adding individual-
level covariates to the naïve model versus adding them to a model containing age*year 
covariates and plan-level fixed effects only. If adjusting for important individual-level 
confounders has little impact when combined with plan-level fixed effects, it would mitigate 
concerns about time-varying confounding due to within-plan changes in beneficiary 
composition.   
Lastly, I try a different fixed effects strategy with stratification by 2009 cost-sharing level 
c ($0-10, >$10-25, >$25-50, or >$50), with the assumption that differences in overall benefit 
generosity are negligible among plans with similar pre-ACA cost-sharing. For example, the 
regression model for vaccine initiation is: 
 !!"# ! ! !!" ! !!"# !!!"!" ! ! !!!!! ! !!!!! ! !!!"#!!"#$! !  !!"# ! ! !!" ! !!"# !!!"!" ! ! !!!!! ! !!!!! ! !!"!"#$!" ! ! !"#!!"!!! !
!"#!
!!!""#  
 
! !18 
where hipc(t) is the hazard rate of HPV vaccine initiation for individual i in plan p with pre-ACA 
cost-sharing level c at time t years from age-qualification, and Xp is the set of time-constant plan-
level covariates. This model utilizes both within-plan variation in cost-sharing over time and 
across-plan variation within each 2009 cost-sharing stratum.  
 
Sensitivity analyses using different sampling schemes 
I re-estimate the primary regression model using a variety of alternative plan selection 
criteria to examine potential information and attrition biases. To test the impact of measurement 
error in the policy variable, I restrict the analysis to large plan-employer groups, in which cost-
sharing levels appear to be precisely estimated (Appendix A.2). To test the impact of 
measurement error with respect to vaccine receipt, I separately estimate the policy effect in 
groups with ! or >$50 cost-sharing in 2009. Unobserved vaccinations should be infrequent in 
this privately-insured population, but could be more common among beneficiaries facing the full 
out-of-pocket cost of HPV vaccination: Children up to 18 years old may receive free vaccines 
through the federal Vaccines For Children (VFC) program if their insurance excludes coverage, 
although there are important caveats to VFC eligibility for the underinsured (see Discussion 
section). Lastly, I explore the impact of plan attrition from the study sample by focusing on plans 
existing in MarketScan for "4 years (2009-2012+) or all 5 years (2009-2013), and by broadly 
including all MarketScan plans present for any part of 2009-2013. (The latter analysis is 
conducted both with and without plan-level fixed effects, given the lack of multi-year continuity 
for some plans in the expanded sample.) 
 
Alternative study design 
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In an additional sensitivity test, I use an alternative longitudinal study design in which the 
time scale of the survival analysis is linked to calendar time rather than attained age. 
Unvaccinated women 9-26 years old in 2009 are followed from January 1, 2009 (the new time 
origin) until vaccine receipt or censoring from the database. In this way, all subjects enter the 
risk set at the time origin, rather than some having delayed entry depending on starting age in 
2009. 
 The Cox regression models of years from January 2009 until vaccine receipt are stratified 
by each unique combination of starting age in 2009 and pre-ACA cost-sharing category ($0-10, 
>$10-25, >$25-50, or >$50). The hazard ratio associated with cost-sharing changes is estimated 
solely using cross-sectional variation in cost-sharing among plans with similar baseline cost-
sharing. As noted earlier, this alternative design is not compatible with plan-level fixed effects, 
since the risk set within a plan faces the same cost-sharing level at every time step. However, this 
specification is useful because it varies the common trends assumption in the main specification. 
Namely, hazards are allowed to vary non-parametrically by attained age*calendar time within 
each grouping of plans. Thus, background changes in vaccination rates from year to year are no 
longer assumed to be the same across all plans. 
 
Subgroup analyses  
To separately estimate the policy effect within different age ranges, I re-run the primary 
model of time to vaccine initiation with interactions between csip(t) and dummy indicators for 
categories of attained age at time t. I similarly examine heterogeneity in beneficiaries’ sensitivity 
to the cost-sharing changes across ZIP code-level socioeconomic subgroups. This set of analyses 
will suggest the likely impact of the VBID intervention on reported disparities in HPV vaccine 
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uptake (initiation and/or completion) by income, education, and race/ethnicity (Reagan-Steiner 
2015; Rahman 2013). I conduct socioeconomic subgroup analyses for both vaccine initiation and 
multi-dose compliance, given evidence that disparities by race/ethnicity mainly occur with 
respect to vaccine completion among those who initiate. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Beneficiary and plan characteristics 
The primary study sample includes 1,680,608 unique beneficiaries from 1,764 plan-
employer groups, with a total of 3,950,885 person-years of enrollment across 2009-2013 (Tables 
1.1-1.2). The majority of subjects were enrolled in plans featuring low or moderate in-network 
cost-sharing for HPV vaccines in 2009 (78% with cost-sharing !$25 per dosage). However, 
3.1% of the individual-level sample (52,168 beneficiaries with 122,362 person-years of 
enrollment) came from plans with cost-sharing levels over $50 per dosage in 2009.  
On average, vaccine-eligible girls and young women were 13.3 years old in their first 
year of follow-up during 2009-2013. Plan-employer groups with varying levels of pre-ACA cost-
sharing had comparable age distributions of beneficiaries, but differed substantially in terms of 
geographic distribution and plan characteristics. For example, plans in the lower cost-sharing 
stratums were more likely to be health maintenance organization types and less likely to be 
preferred provider organization types. Beneficiaries in plans with more generous pre-ACA 
vaccine coverage also tended to reside in ZIP codes with higher median family income. 
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Table 1.1: Beneficiary characteristics 
 
  All study  plans 
By pre-ACA (2009) cost-sharing 
$0-10 >$10-25 >$25-50 >$50 
N 1,680,608 500,348 815,787 312,305 52,168 
Age at first year in risk set      Mean (SD) 13.3 (5.0) 13.3 (4.9) 13.2 (5.0) 13.3 (5.1) 13.6 (5.2) 
Age group, %      9-12 years 59.0 57.9 59.7 59.3 56.5 
13-17 years 19.0 19.3 19.0 18.0 20.3 
18-26 years 22.1 22.9 21.2 22.7 23.2 
      Census division, %      East North Central 23.9 19.7 32.1 7.3 35.7 
East South Central 5.2 4.7 6.4 2.7 5.6 
Middle Atlantic 7.4 13.4 6.2 1.8 3.4 
Mountain 5.6 4.5 6.2 5.9 7.0 
New England 2.9 4.5 2.7 1.2 0.9 
Pacific 10.4 23.4 6.0 2.3 3.2 
South Atlantic 16.1 16.8 19.1 8.3 9.9 
West North Central 4.6 4.0 5.0 2.7 14.3 
West South Central 23.7 8.6 16.3 67.7 20.0 
Unknown 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 
      
Insurer data contributor type  
(vs. employer)b, % 55.2 26.8 60.9 87.9 42.2 
Plan type, %      Comprehensive 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.6 3.7 
Exclusive provider organization 1.0 2.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Health maintenance organization 13.3 25.9 10.4 2.9 0.5 
Point-of-service (non-capitated) 8.4 9.6 6.1 13.8 0.7 
Preferred provider organization 70.1 53.4 76.7 76.7 88.8 
Point-of-service (with capitation) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Consumer-driven health plan 2.5 5.1 1.6 1.2 0.5 
High deductible health plan 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.8 1.3 
Unknown/other 1.8 0.3 2.1 3.0 4.6 
      SES measures by zip codec, %      Median 4-person family income      !200% FPL 10.2 9.2 9.1 14.2 14.5 
201-300% FPL 25.9 24.1 25.2 29.4 32.5 
301-400% FPL 27.4 27.4 27.9 26.7 24.4 
>400% FPL 34.2 37.0 35.7 26.9 26.4 
Quartiles, % adults without high school 
completion      
1 (highest completion rate) 30.3 30.7 32.7 24.1 26.8 
2 23.8 25.5 24.5 19.6 21.8 
3 23.4 21.6 23.9 24.8 23.9 
4 20.3 19.9 16.9 28.8 25.4 
Quartiles, % white race      1 (lowest % white) 19.0 23.0 18.2 15.5 13.5 
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2 27.0 26.9 26.3 29.9 20.0 
3 28.8 25.2 29.4 32.2 31.3 
4 23.0 22.5 24.0 19.6 33.1 
Missing socioeconomic measures 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.1 
 
Type of MarketScan data contributor (insurer vs. employer) is a proxy for enrollment in smaller- versus larger-group 
health plans, respectively. Categorical socioeconomic measures at the 5-digit zipcode level are based on American 
Community Survey 5-year estimates. 
FPL, federal poverty level; SES, socioeconomic. 
 
Table 1.2: Cost-sharing per HPV vaccine dose in study plans by year (2009-2013) 
 
Year Number of plans 
Subjects 
enrolled 
Average (SD)  
plan cost-sharing 
Percentiles 
1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
2009 1,764 1,113,701 19.92 (20) 0 9 19 24 133 
2010 1,764 863,212 19.23 (22) 0 10 16 23 163 
2011 1,764 821,702 13.59 (18) 0 6 11 16 147 
2012 1,289 739,959 12.14 (19) 0 6 10 12 151 
2013 982 412,311 7.54 (6) 0 4 6 11 27 
 
Dollar amounts are inflation-adjusted to USD 2013. To compute the cost-sharing statistics shown above, plan-level 
cost-sharing amounts are weighted by the number of subjects enrolled in the specified year. Above, the number of 
enrollees includes all years of enrollment among study subjects, before or after the vaccination events of interest. 
Subsequent tables report person-years at risk, which does not include years after an individual has the event. 
 
Trends in vaccine cost-sharing & uptake 
Table 1.2 and Figures 1.1-1.2 describe trends in HPV vaccine-related cost-sharing during 
the study timeframe. Average cost-sharing across all plans decreased from $19.92 in 2009 to 
$7.53 in 2013, a -62% (-$12.38) change. The proportion of plans featuring low or no cost-
sharing for HPV vaccination ($0-10 per dosage) increased from 31% in 2009 to 75% in 2013. 
Within all strata of pre-ACA cost-sharing, cost-sharing levels declined during the post-ACA 
period (2011-2013) after being relatively steady in pre-ACA years (2009-2010). The decreases in 
cost-sharing are larger in strata with higher pre-ACA cost-sharing levels. 
Unadjusted trends in HPV vaccine initiation by year (2009-2013) are plotted in Figure 
1.3 for repeated cross-sections of still-unvaccinated women, stratified by attained age range. The 
! !23 
hazard probability of initiation decreased from 2009 to 2010 for all ages above 9 or 10 years old, 
consistent with an ongoing catch-up trend among girls and women who were past the minimum 
eligible age at vaccine introduction. Nevertheless, vaccine initiations increased in the post-ACA 
period for most age groups, and exceeded 2009 levels by 2013 for all ages !17 years. 
Figure 1.4 plots changes in age-adjusted vaccine initiation rates over time within each 
pre-ACA cost-sharing stratum (% change vs. 2009, by year). This plot illustrates the divergence 
in yearly vaccination trends between groups of plans that, on average, were subject to varying 
intensities of the VBID policy  (As seen in Figure 1.2, the VBID policy had more “bite” in plans 
with higher baseline cost-sharing levels.) The groups had similar decreases in vaccination rates 
from 2009 to 2010, but groups with higher baseline cost-sharing generally had larger increases in 
vaccination in post-ACA years (with the exception of the >$25-50 group in 2011 and 2012).  
 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of cost-sharing per HPV vaccine dose in study plans by year  !
 
 
To compute cost-sharing statistics, plans are weighted by the number of study subjects enrolled in the specified year. 
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Figure 1.2: Average cost-sharing for HPV vaccination among study plans (2009-2013), 
stratified by 2009 cost-sharing level 
 
 
To compute cost-sharing statistics, plans are weighted by number of study subjects enrolled in the specified year. 
 
Figure 1.3: Unadjusted 1-year probabilities of HPV vaccine initiation in repeated cross-
sections of unvaccinated subjects, by category of attained age !
 
Each line corresponds to repeated cross-sections of still-unvaccinated beneficiaries with the same attained age range 
but in different calendar years. 
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Figure 1.4: Changes in HPV vaccine initiation rates from 2009, stratified by 2009 cost-
sharing level 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. In this figure, pre-ACA cost-sharing level serves as a proxy for the 
average intensity of the vaccine-related cost-sharing reductions. For each pre-ACA cost-sharing stratum, the within-
stratum changes in vaccine initiation rates are calculated using a Cox model with dummies for each calendar year 
only. This descriptive model implicitly adjusts for any within-stratum imbalances in age across calendar years, since 
the risk set at a given time t only contains beneficiaries with the same attained age (i.e., age 9+t years). 
 
Multivariate results 
Policy effect on overall vaccination rates 
The main specification with plan-employer fixed effects estimates a 4.1% (95% CI: 3.3-
4.9%) increase in the hazard rate of vaccine initiation per $10 reduction in cost-sharing from 
2009 (p<0.001) (Table 1.3). Effect sizes are similar in corresponding models of time from age-
qualification to receipt of the second dose (3.6%; 95% CI: 2.6-4.6%) and third dose (4.3%; 95% 
CI: 2.9-5.6%) (both p<0.001). Coefficients on the age*year covariates indicate sizable increases 
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in vaccination rates during the post-ACA period, beyond the increases explained by variation in 
intensity of the VBID policy among study plans. 
Based on the same models, Figure 1.5 presents adjusted cumulative vaccine initiation and 
completion by attained age under various cost-sharing scenarios ($100, $50, $25, or $0 per 
vaccine dose). The curves are predicted based on average beneficiary characteristics and 2013 
vaccination rates for each attained age. By the end of vaccine eligibility at age 27 years, 
cumulative vaccine initiation/completion under each scenario is 68%/44% (free vaccination), 
64%/41% ($25/dose), 61%/38% ($50/dose), and 54%/32% ($100/dose). Median age at vaccine 
initiation ranges from 16 years under free vaccination to 22 years under $100 cost-sharing. 
The finding of a statistically significant policy effect is robust to changes in the model 
specification, plan selection criteria, and study design (Tables 1.4-1.6). In alternative 
specifications with varying levels of covariate adjustment, the percent increase in vaccine 
initiation rates per $10 cost-sharing reduction ranges from 7.5% (naïve model with age*year 
covariates only) to 4.2% (plan fixed effects model with age*year covariates only) (Table 1.4a). 
Adding time-constant plan- and individual-level covariates to the naïve model reduces the 
magnitude of the effect size by 28% (columns [iv] vs. [v]); however, individual-level covariates 
have little impact when added to a model that already contains plan-employer fixed effects 
(columns [i] vs. [ii]). The pattern of results is similar in analogous specifications of time from 
age-qualification to the second dose and third dose (Table 1.4b-c). 
In sensitivity analyses using different plan selection criteria (Table 1.5), the effect sizes 
only slightly increase when restricting the sample to large plans only (e.g., HR of vaccine 
initiation per $10 reduction: 1.041 vs. 1.050; row [i] vs. [ii]). Effect estimates also do not 
appreciably change when focusing on plans with pre-ACA cost-sharing levels !$50 or >$50 
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(rows [iii] and [iv]), or when requiring plans to have "4 years or all 5 years of data from 2009 
(rows [v] and [vi]). In the expanded sample of all MarketScan plans present for any part of 2009-
2013, the HR of vaccine initiation per $10 cost-sharing reduction is 1.042 (95% CI: 1.036-1.048) 
with plan fixed effects and 1.057 (95% CI: 1.054-1.059) without fixed effects (rows [vii] and 
[viii]), similar to corresponding analyses of the main study sample (Table 1.4, columns [i] and 
[iv]). 
Lastly, in the sensitivity analysis using an alternative study design (Table 1.6), which 
counts time to each vaccine dose in years from January 1, 2009, the HR (95% CI) per $10 cost-
sharing reduction is 1.054 (1.049-1.060) for vaccine initiation. This estimate is comparable to the 
HR of 1.048 (1.043-1.052) obtained from the primary study design when using fixed effects for 
pre-ACA cost-sharing strata (Table 1.4, column [iii]). 
Table 1.7 summarizes effect sizes and price elasticities of demand for HPV vaccine 
doses, based on the overall change in vaccine-related cost-sharing levels among study plans. The 
average cost-sharing reduction of 62% ($12.38 per dose) corresponds to a 5.0% increase in 
vaccine initiation rates among still-unvaccinated beneficiaries. The price elasticity of demand for 
the first HPV vaccine dose is estimated at -0.08 (95% CI: -0.07, -0.10; sensitivity analysis range: 
-0.07 to -0.15), implying that a 10% decrease in price would generate a 0.8% increase in vaccine 
initiation rates among the unvaccinated. 
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Table 1.3: Plan-employer fixed effects specifications: Impact of cost-sharing reductions on 
HPV vaccination rates 
 
Dependent variables: Years from age-qualification to receipt of vaccine doses 
Covariate 
Dose 1 
(Initiation) 
Dose 2 
 
Dose 3 
(Completion) 
HR (95% CI) HR (95% CI) HR (95% CI) 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 
1.041  (1.033, 
1.048)*** 
1.036  (1.027, 
1.046)*** 
1.043  (1.029, 
1.057)*** 
    Census division    East North Central 1.20  (1.18, 1.23)*** 1.25  (1.22, 1.28)*** 1.25  (1.20, 1.29)*** 
East South Central 1.11  (1.08, 1.14)*** 1.10  (1.07, 1.14)*** 1.11  (1.06, 1.17)*** 
Middle Atlantic 1.22  (1.19, 1.26)*** 1.28  (1.25, 1.32)*** 1.32  (1.27, 1.37)*** 
Mountain 1.19  (1.16, 1.23)*** 1.15  (1.10, 1.19)*** 1.07  (1.02, 1.13)** 
New England 1.37  (1.32, 1.42)*** 1.42  (1.36, 1.48)*** 1.46  (1.38, 1.54)*** 
Pacific 1.41  (1.37, 1.45)*** 1.39  (1.34, 1.43)*** 1.35  (1.30, 1.41)*** 
South Atlantic 1.12  (1.09, 1.14)*** 1.13  (1.10, 1.16)*** 1.13  (1.09, 1.17)*** 
Unknown 1.07  (0.95, 1.21) 1.12  (0.97, 1.30) 1.03  (0.84, 1.26) 
West North Central 1.31  (1.27, 1.35)*** 1.35  (1.30, 1.39)*** 1.37  (1.31, 1.43)*** 
West South Central 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
ZIP code SES factors    Median family income (4-
person)    
!200% FPL 0.89  (0.87, 0.90)*** 0.80  (0.78, 0.82)*** 0.73  (0.71, 0.76)*** 
201-300% FPL 0.88  (0.87, 0.90)*** 0.83  (0.82, 0.85)*** 0.80  (0.78, 0.82)*** 
301-400% FPL 0.94  (0.92, 0.95)*** 0.91  (0.89, 0.92)*** 0.88  (0.87, 0.90)*** 
>400% FPL 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Quartiles, % adults without 
high school completion    
1 (highest completion rate) 1.11  (1.09, 1.13)*** 1.17  (1.15, 1.20)*** 1.24  (1.20, 1.28)*** 
2 1.03  (1.01, 1.05)*** 1.06  (1.04, 1.09)*** 1.10  (1.07, 1.14)*** 
3 0.99  (0.97, 1.00) 1.01  (0.99, 1.02) 1.02  (1.00, 1.05) 
4 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Quartiles, % white race    1 (lowest % white) 1.11  (1.09, 1.13)*** 1.05  (1.03, 1.07)*** 1.04  (1.01, 1.06)** 
2 1.12  (1.10, 1.13)*** 1.09  (1.08, 1.11)*** 1.09  (1.07, 1.12)*** 
3 1.09  (1.08, 1.10)*** 1.08  (1.07, 1.10)*** 1.09  (1.07, 1.11)*** 
4 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Missing socioeconomic 
measures 1.02  (0.98, 1.06) 0.97  (0.92, 1.01) 0.95  (0.90, 1.01) 
    Current age x year       9 years x 2009 1.01  (0.91, 1.13) 0.97  (0.82, 1.15) 0.96  (0.67, 1.37) 
9 years   x 2010 0.86  (0.77, 0.96)** 0.78  (0.65, 0.93)** 0.70  (0.48, 1.03) 
9 year s  x 2011 0.88  (0.79, 0.99)* 0.86  (0.73, 1.02) 0.86  (0.60, 1.24) 
9 year s  x 2012 0.88  (0.78, 0.98)* 0.87  (0.73, 1.04) 1.05  (0.73, 1.50) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
10 years * 2009 0.55  (0.53, 0.57)*** 0.56  (0.53, 0.59)*** 0.54  (0.49, 0.61)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.58  (0.55, 0.60)*** 0.58  (0.55, 0.61)*** 0.70  (0.63, 0.79)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.69  (0.67, 0.71)*** 0.69  (0.65, 0.72)*** 0.72  (0.64, 0.80)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.80  (0.77, 0.83)*** 0.79  (0.75, 0.83)*** 0.92  (0.83, 1.02) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
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11 years x 2009 0.62  (0.60, 0.64)*** 0.50  (0.47, 0.52)*** 0.24  (0.23, 0.26)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.58  (0.56, 0.60)*** 0.58  (0.56, 0.60)*** 0.63  (0.60, 0.67)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.70  (0.68, 0.73)*** 0.71  (0.68, 0.73)*** 0.72  (0.68, 0.76)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.81  (0.79, 0.84)*** 0.81  (0.78, 0.84)*** 0.86  (0.81, 0.90)*** 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
12 years x 2009 0.65  (0.62, 0.68)*** 0.45  (0.43, 0.48)*** 0.17  (0.15, 0.18)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.60  (0.57, 0.62)*** 0.57  (0.54, 0.60)*** 0.61  (0.58, 0.65)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.73  (0.70, 0.76)*** 0.71  (0.68, 0.74)*** 0.69  (0.66, 0.73)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.79  (0.76, 0.82)*** 0.81  (0.77, 0.84)*** 0.79  (0.75, 0.83)*** 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
13 years x 2009 0.76  (0.73, 0.80)*** 0.54  (0.51, 0.57)*** 0.22  (0.20, 0.24)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.64  (0.61, 0.68)*** 0.59  (0.56, 0.63)*** 0.57  (0.53, 0.61)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.77  (0.73, 0.80)*** 0.76  (0.72, 0.80)*** 0.71  (0.67, 0.75)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.84  (0.81, 0.88)*** 0.85  (0.81, 0.90)*** 0.86  (0.81, 0.91)*** 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
14 years x 2009 0.81  (0.77, 0.85)*** 0.54  (0.50, 0.57)*** 0.20  (0.19, 0.22)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.69  (0.65, 0.73)*** 0.65  (0.61, 0.69)*** 0.64  (0.60, 0.69)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.81  (0.77, 0.86)*** 0.77  (0.72, 0.82)*** 0.71  (0.66, 0.76)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.83  (0.78, 0.87)*** 0.84  (0.80, 0.89)*** 0.83  (0.78, 0.88)*** 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
15 years x 2009 0.87  (0.81, 0.92)*** 0.58  (0.54, 0.63)*** 0.22  (0.20, 0.24)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.68  (0.64, 0.73)*** 0.65  (0.61, 0.70)*** 0.66  (0.61, 0.71)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.79  (0.74, 0.85)*** 0.79  (0.74, 0.85)*** 0.76  (0.70, 0.82)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.82  (0.77, 0.88)*** 0.86  (0.80, 0.92)*** 0.87  (0.81, 0.94)*** 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
16 years x 2009 0.97  (0.90, 1.04) 0.70  (0.64, 0.75)*** 0.30  (0.27, 0.34)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.73  (0.67, 0.78)*** 0.73  (0.68, 0.79)*** 0.76  (0.70, 0.83)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.82  (0.76, 0.89)*** 0.84  (0.78, 0.91)*** 0.82  (0.75, 0.89)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.83  (0.77, 0.90)*** 0.89  (0.82, 0.96)** 0.95  (0.87, 1.04) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
17 years x 2009 1.08  (1.01, 1.15)* 0.78  (0.72, 0.84)*** 0.38  (0.35, 0.42)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.80  (0.74, 0.86)*** 0.78  (0.72, 0.84)*** 0.82  (0.75, 0.90)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.86  (0.80, 0.93)*** 0.86  (0.80, 0.93)*** 0.81  (0.74, 0.89)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.92  (0.85, 0.99)* 0.93  (0.85, 1.01) 0.93  (0.84, 1.02) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
18 years x 2009 1.22  (1.11, 1.34)*** 0.76  (0.68, 0.84)*** 0.30  (0.26, 0.34)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.84  (0.76, 0.93)** 0.81  (0.73, 0.90)*** 0.90  (0.81, 1.00)* 
26 years x 2011 0.89  (0.80, 0.98)* 0.83  (0.75, 0.93)*** 0.81  (0.73, 0.91)*** 
9 year s  x 2012 0.90  (0.81, 1.00)* 0.90  (0.81, 1.01) 0.95  (0.86, 1.07) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
19 years x 2009 1.60  (1.41, 1.82)*** 0.91  (0.80, 1.04) 0.41  (0.35, 0.49)*** 
26 years x 2010 1.07  (0.94, 1.22) 0.94  (0.82, 1.07) 1.10  (0.94, 1.28) 
26 years x 2011 1.05  (0.91, 1.20) 0.94  (0.82, 1.08) 0.90  (0.77, 1.05) 
9 year s  x 2012 1.05  (0.92, 1.21) 0.94  (0.81, 1.08) 0.95  (0.81, 1.12) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
20 years x 2009 1.78  (1.56, 2.03)*** 1.16  (1.00, 1.34)* 0.56  (0.47, 0.67)*** 
26 years x 2010 1.10  (0.96, 1.27) 1.04  (0.89, 1.21) 1.09  (0.92, 1.29) 
26 years x 2011 1.05  (0.91, 1.22) 0.97  (0.83, 1.13) 0.84  (0.70, 1.01) 
9 year s  x 2012 1.06  (0.91, 1.23) 0.95  (0.81, 1.12) 0.91  (0.76, 1.09) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
21 years x 2009 1.64  (1.43, 1.88)*** 1.05  (0.90, 1.22) 0.59  (0.48, 0.72)*** 
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26 years x 2010 1.15  (0.99, 1.33) 1.13  (0.97, 1.32) 1.38  (1.14, 1.66)*** 
26 years x 2011 0.97  (0.84, 1.13) 0.94  (0.80, 1.11) 1.18  (0.97, 1.43) 
9 year s  x 2012 0.99  (0.85, 1.16) 0.95  (0.80, 1.12) 0.94  (0.77, 1.16) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
22 years x 2009 1.27  (1.09, 1.47)** 0.91  (0.76, 1.08) 0.48  (0.38, 0.59)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.96  (0.81, 1.12) 1.03  (0.86, 1.23) 1.09  (0.89, 1.34) 
26 years x 2011 1.03  (0.87, 1.21) 1.11  (0.92, 1.33) 1.05  (0.85, 1.29) 
9 year s  x 2012 1.13  (0.96, 1.33) 1.05  (0.87, 1.27) 0.92  (0.74, 1.15) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
23 years x 2009 1.50  (1.24, 1.81)*** 0.91  (0.74, 1.13) 0.56  (0.42, 0.73)*** 
26 years x 2010 1.17  (0.95, 1.44) 0.98  (0.78, 1.22) 1.31  (1.01, 1.70)* 
26 years x 2011 1.42  (1.16, 1.73)*** 1.18  (0.95, 1.46) 1.10  (0.85, 1.43) 
9 year s  x 2012 1.33  (1.10, 1.61)** 1.13  (0.93, 1.39) 1.09  (0.85, 1.40) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
24 years x 2009 1.20  (0.97, 1.48) 0.96  (0.76, 1.22) 0.50  (0.37, 0.67)*** 
26 years x 2010 0.76  (0.59, 0.97)* 0.78  (0.59, 1.02) 0.74  (0.53, 1.02) 
26 years x 2011 0.98  (0.77, 1.24) 1.05  (0.81, 1.37) 0.87  (0.63, 1.20) 
9 year s  x 2012 1.03  (0.82, 1.30) 1.11  (0.86, 1.42) 1.11  (0.83, 1.48) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
25 years x 2009 1.24  (0.91, 1.69) 0.95  (0.68, 1.34) 0.54  (0.37, 0.79)** 
26 years x 2010 0.87  (0.63, 1.22) 1.02  (0.71, 1.46) 1.06  (0.72, 1.55) 
26 years x 2011 0.72  (0.50, 1.05) 0.64  (0.43, 0.97)* 0.66  (0.42, 1.04) 
9 year s  x 2012 0.73  (0.51, 1.06) 0.64  (0.43, 0.97)* 0.58  (0.37, 0.91)* 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
26 years x 2009 0.88  (0.35, 2.17) 0.81  (0.29, 2.23) 0.33  (0.13, 0.84)* 
26 years x 2010 0.48  (0.19, 1.21) 0.80  (0.29, 2.22) 0.67  (0.27, 1.70) 
26 years x 2011 0.50  (0.19, 1.29) 0.79  (0.28, 2.23) 0.74  (0.29, 1.90) 
9 year s  x 2012 0.60  (0.22, 1.66) 0.77  (0.25, 2.36) 0.53  (0.19, 1.51) 
9 year s  x 2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
    Plan-employer fixed effects Y Y Y 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed 
effects N N N 
Person-years at risk 3,661,077 3,762,297 3,852,750 
 
Results are from Cox proportional hazards models with stratification by plan-employer group (fixed effects). All 
models adjust for attained age through the baseline hazard function. The reference category for the attained 
age*calendar year interaction terms is the age*2013 because the risk set at a given time t only contains beneficiaries 
with the same attained age. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 1.5: Adjusted cumulative initiation and completion of HPV vaccine series under 
varying cost-sharing scenarios  
 
a. Vaccine initiation by attained age (2013 rates) 
 
 
b. Vaccine completion by attained age (2013 rates) 
 
 
Using the primary regression models with plan-level fixed effects, cumulative vaccine initiation and completion by 
age is predicted under four different cost-sharing scenarios ($0, $25, $50, or $100 per HPV vaccine dose). For each 
cost-sharing scenario, curves are constructed based on 2013 vaccination rates for each attained age and the average 
values of time-constant covariates (census division and ZIP code socioeconomic factors) in the overall sample. The 
curves are first estimated separately for each plan-employer group and then pooled across groups using a weighted 
average. 
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Table 1.4: Specifications with varying levels of covariate adjustment: Impact of cost-
sharing reductions on overall HPV vaccination rates 
 
a. Dose 1 (Initiation) 
Variables 
Hazard ratio (95% CI), by model specification 
(i) 
Plan fixed 
effects; 
all covariates 
(ii) 
Plan fixed 
effects; 
age-year 
covariates only 
(iii) 
Pre-ACA cost-
sharing fixed 
effects;  
all covariates 
(iv) 
No fixed 
effects; 
all covariates 
(v) 
No fixed 
effects; 
age-year 
covariates only 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 
1.041*** 1.042*** 1.048*** 1.054*** 1.075*** 
(1.033, 1.048) (1.034, 1.050) (1.043, 1.052) (1.050, 1.057) (1.072, 1.079) 
      Age-year trends Y Y Y Y Y 
Plan-employer fixed effects Y Y N N N 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed 
effects N N Y N N 
Plan and data contributor type N N Y Y N 
Census division of residence Y N Y Y N 
ZIP code SES factors Y N Y Y N 
Person-years at risk 3,661,077 3,661,077 3,661,077 3,661,077 3,661,077 
 
 
b. Dose 2 
Variables 
Hazard ratio (95% CI), by model specification 
(i) 
Plan fixed 
effects; 
all covariates 
(ii) 
Plan fixed 
effects; 
age-year 
covariates only 
(iii) 
Pre-ACA cost-
sharing fixed 
effects;  
all covariates 
(iv) 
No fixed 
effects; 
all covariates 
(v) 
No fixed 
effects; 
age-year 
covariates only 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 
1.036*** 1.039*** 1.060*** 1.065*** 1.088*** 
(1.027, 1.046) (1.029, 1.049) (1.055, 1.066) (1.061, 1.069) (1.084, 1.092) 
      Age-year trends Y Y Y Y Y 
Plan-employer fixed effects Y Y N N N 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed 
effects N N Y N N 
Plan and data contributor type N N Y Y N 
Census division of residence Y N Y Y N 
ZIP code SES factors Y N Y Y N 
Person-years at risk 3,762,297 3,762,297 3,762,297 3,762,297 3,762,297 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
 
 
c. Dose 3 (Completion) 
Variables 
Hazard ratio (95% CI), by model specification 
(i) 
Plan fixed 
effects; 
all covariates 
(ii) 
Plan fixed 
effects; 
age-year 
covariates only 
(iii) 
Pre-ACA cost-
sharing fixed 
effects;  
all covariates 
(iv) 
No fixed 
effects; 
all covariates 
(v) 
No fixed 
effects; 
age-year 
covariates only 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 
1.043*** 1.046*** 1.075*** 1.075*** 1.101*** 
(1.029, 1.057) (1.033, 1.060) (1.067, 1.083) (1.069, 1.081) (1.095, 1.107) 
      Age-year trends Y Y Y Y Y 
Plan-employer fixed effects Y Y N N N 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed 
effects N N Y N N 
Plan and data contributor type N N Y Y N 
Census division of residence Y N Y Y N 
ZIP code SES factors Y N Y Y N 
Person-years at risk 3,852,750 3,852,750 3,852,750 3,852,750 3,852,750 
 
All models adjust for attained age through the baseline hazard function. Specifications with plan-employer fixed 
effects do not include time-constant plan-level covariates but implicitly control for these variables.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
  
! !34 
Table 1.5: Sensitivity analyses with different plan selection criteria: Impact of cost-sharing 
reductions on overall HPV vaccination rates 
 
Plan population 
Person-years 
 at risk 
(Dose 1 model) 
Hazard ratio per $10 cost-sharing reduction (95% CI) 
Dose 1 
(Initiation) Dose 2 
Dose 3 
(Completion) 
Main sample:  
   
(i) Plans with 3+ years of data (2009-2011+) 3,661,077 
1.041*** 1.036*** 1.043*** 
(1.033, 1.048) (1.027, 1.046) (1.029, 1.057) 
Subsets of main sample:     
(ii) Plans with N "1000 in 2009 2,820,916 
1.050*** 1.046*** 1.051*** 
(1.038, 1.061) (1.032, 1.060) (1.032, 1.070) 
(iii) Plans with cost-sharing  !$50 in 2009 3,544,302 
1.040*** 1.035*** 1.039*** 
(1.028, 1.053) (1.021, 1.050) (1.019, 1.060) 
(iv) Plans with cost-sharing  >$50 in 2009 116,775 
1.037*** 1.031*** 1.055*** 
(1.025, 1.050) (1.015, 1.048) (1.032, 1.079) 
(v) Plans with 4+ years of data (2009-2012+) 3,351,402 
1.043*** 1.040*** 1.047*** 
(1.034, 1.051) (1.030, 1.051) (1.032, 1.062) 
(vi) Plans with 5 years of data (2009-2013) 1,938,232 
1.038*** 1.038*** 1.039*** 
(1.029, 1.048) (1.027, 1.050) (1.023, 1.055) 
Expanded sample:     
 
Plans with any year(s) of data 
during 2009-2013:  
   
   
(vii) Plan fixed effects;         all covariates 6,807,466 
1.042*** 1.039*** 1.037*** 
(1.036, 1.048) (1.031, 1.047) (1.026, 1.048) 
(viii) No fixed effects;         all covariates 6,807,466 
1.057*** 1.067*** 1.076*** 
(1.054, 1.059) (1.064, 1.071) (1.071, 1.081) 
 
In this set of sensitivity analyses, the primary regression specification is re-run using different study plan selection 
criteria. All Cox proportional hazard models (aside from row [viii]) include plan-level fixed effects and adjust for 
attained age, age-specific calendar year trends, census division, and ZIP code socioeconomic factors. The plan-level 
fixed effects are omitted in row [viii] because some plans in the expanded sample are only present in MarketScan for 
a single calendar year. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
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Table 1.6: Sensitivity analysis using alternative study design: Impact of cost-sharing 
reductions on overall HPV vaccination rates 
 
Dependent variables: Years from January 2009 to receipt of vaccine doses 
Covariate 
Dose 1 
(Initiation) Dose 2 
Dose 3 
(Completion) 
HR (95% CI) HR (95% CI) HR (95% CI) 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 1.054  (1.049, 1.060)*** 1.069  (1.062, 1.076)*** 1.082  (1.073, 1.091)*** 
    
Census division    
East North Central 1.18  (1.16, 1.20)*** 1.25  (1.22, 1.27)*** 1.30  (1.27, 1.33)*** 
East South Central 1.03  (1.00, 1.06)* 1.07  (1.04, 1.10)*** 1.14  (1.10, 1.19)*** 
Middle Atlantic 1.19  (1.16, 1.22)*** 1.26  (1.23, 1.29)*** 1.33  (1.29, 1.38)*** 
Mountain 1.07  (1.05, 1.10)*** 1.05  (1.02, 1.09)*** 1.03  (0.99, 1.07) 
New England 1.50  (1.46, 1.54)*** 1.56  (1.51, 1.61)*** 1.62  (1.56, 1.69)*** 
Pacific 1.26  (1.23, 1.28)*** 1.21  (1.18, 1.24)*** 1.16  (1.13, 1.20)*** 
South Atlantic 1.01  (1.00, 1.03) 1.04  (1.02, 1.07)*** 1.07  (1.04, 1.10)*** 
Unknown 1.11  (0.99, 1.24) 1.22  (1.07, 1.38)** 1.12  (0.94, 1.35) 
West North Central 1.37  (1.34, 1.41)*** 1.41  (1.37, 1.46)*** 1.49  (1.43, 1.54)*** 
West South Central 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
ZIP code SES factors    Median family income (4-person)    
!200% FPL 0.82  (0.80, 0.84)*** 0.74  (0.71, 0.76)*** 0.69  (0.66, 0.71)*** 
201-300% FPL 0.82  (0.81, 0.84)*** 0.77  (0.76, 0.79)*** 0.74  (0.72, 0.76)*** 
301-400% FPL 0.89  (0.88, 0.90)*** 0.86  (0.85, 0.87)*** 0.84  (0.82, 0.86)*** 
>400% FPL 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Quartiles, % adults without high 
school completion    
1 (highest completion rate) 1.17  (1.14, 1.19)*** 1.24  (1.21, 1.27)*** 1.31  (1.27, 1.36)*** 
2 1.03  (1.01, 1.05)** 1.07  (1.05, 1.09)*** 1.12  (1.09, 1.16)*** 
3 0.98  (0.97, 1.00) 1.00  (0.98, 1.02) 1.03  (1.00, 1.06) 
4 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Quartiles, % white race    1 (lowest % white) 1.08  (1.06, 1.10)*** 1.01  (0.99, 1.03) 0.99  (0.96, 1.01) 
2 1.10  (1.09, 1.12)*** 1.08  (1.07, 1.10)*** 1.08  (1.06, 1.11)*** 
3 1.08  (1.07, 1.10)*** 1.08  (1.07, 1.10)*** 1.09  (1.07, 1.11)*** 
4 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Missing socioeconomic measures 0.97  (0.94, 1.01) 0.92  (0.88, 0.97)*** 0.92  (0.87, 0.98)* 
    Plan-employer fixed effects N N N 
Birth year*pre-ACA cost-sharing  
level fixed effects Y Y Y 
Person-years at risk 2,774,097 2,863,854 2,945,977 
 
In this sensitivity analysis, the time origin of the survival analysis is January 1, 2009 (rather than age-qualification 
for the vaccine). Thus, each model's time scale is linked to calendar time rather than attained age, and all subjects 
enter the risk set at the time orgin ("time zero"). The sample is restricted to female beneficiaries 9-26 years old in 
2009 (N=1,178,016). Models include fixed effects for each unique combination of birth year and pre-ACA cost-
sharing level ($0-10, >$10-25, >$25-50, or >$50 in 2009). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
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Table 1.7: Summary of effect sizes and price elasticities of demand for HPV vaccine doses 
 
Endpoint 
Percent increase in vaccination rates with 
$12.38 cost-sharing reduction   
Price elasticity  
of vaccination rates 
Main estimate 
(95% CI) 
Sensitivity analysis 
range 
Main estimate 
(95% CI) 
Sensitivity analysis 
range 
Dose 1 (initiation) 5.0% 4.6%  to  9.4% 
 
-0.08 -0.07  to  -0.15 
 
(4.1, 6.0) 
  
(-0.07, -0.10) 
 Dose 2 4.5% 3.9%  to  11.0%   -0.07 -0.06  to  -0.18 
  (3.3, 5.7)     (-0.05, -0.09)   
Dose 3 (completion) 5.4% 4.6%  to  12.6% 
 
-0.09 -0.07  to  -0.20 
  (3.7, 7.1)     (-0.06, -0.11)   
 
Main estimates are based on the primary model specification with plan-level fixed effects. Elasticity is the percent 
increase in vaccination rates divided by the percent change in cost-sharing per HPV vaccine dose from 2009 to 2013 
(i.e., 62%). 
 
Policy effect on multi-dose compliance 
Models with plan-employer fixed effects do not find a significant policy effect on two-
dose or three-dose compliance among beneficiaries who had accepted the previous dose (Table 
1.8). However, when using less stringent modeling assumptions with either fixed effects for pre-
ACA cost-sharing strata or no fixed effects, cost-sharing reductions are associated with small yet 
statistically significant improvements in multi-dose compliance (Table 1.9a-b, rows [ii] and [iii]). 
These results are consistent with the models of overall HPV vaccination rates by dose, shown in 
Table 1.4a-c: In specifications without plan-level fixed effects, effect sizes are slightly larger 
when the dependent variable is a higher dose level, implying an ongoing effect of cost-sharing 
reductions beyond its effect on vaccine initiation rates. 
  
! !37 
Table 1.8: Plan-employer fixed effects specifications (conditional models): Impact of cost-
sharing reductions on multi-dose HPV vaccine compliance 
 
Dependent variables: Months between consecutive vaccine doses 
Variables 
Dose 1 to Dose 2 Dose 2 to Dose 3 
HR (95% CI) HR (95% CI) 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 1.009  (0.999, 1.019) 1.006  (0.993, 1.020) 
   Census division   East North Central 1.08  (1.05, 1.11)*** 1.06  (1.03, 1.10)*** 
East South Central 0.98  (0.95, 1.02) 1.01  (0.97, 1.06) 
Middle Atlantic 1.15  (1.11, 1.19)*** 1.13  (1.08, 1.18)*** 
Mountain 0.95  (0.91, 0.99)** 0.90  (0.85, 0.95)*** 
New England 1.10  (1.06, 1.15)*** 1.08  (1.03, 1.15)** 
Pacific 1.01  (0.97, 1.04) 0.97  (0.93, 1.02) 
South Atlantic 1.03  (1.00, 1.06)* 1.03  (0.99, 1.07) 
Unknown 1.04  (0.90, 1.20) 0.96  (0.78, 1.17) 
West North Central 1.05  (1.02, 1.09)** 1.05  (1.01, 1.10)* 
West South Central 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
ZIP code SES factors   Median family income (4-person)   !200% FPL 0.85  (0.83, 0.87)*** 0.87  (0.84, 0.90)*** 
201-300% FPL 0.92  (0.90, 0.93)*** 0.92  (0.90, 0.95)*** 
301-400% FPL 0.95  (0.94, 0.97)*** 0.96  (0.94, 0.98)*** 
>400% FPL 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Quartiles, % adults without high school 
completion   
1 (highest completion rate) 1.07  (1.04, 1.09)*** 1.09  (1.06, 1.13)*** 
2 1.04  (1.02, 1.06)*** 1.05  (1.02, 1.08)*** 
3 1.02  (1.00, 1.04) 1.02  (0.99, 1.05) 
4 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Quartiles, % white race   1 (lowest % white) 0.89  (0.87, 0.91)*** 0.96  (0.93, 0.98)*** 
2 0.96  (0.94, 0.97)*** 0.98  (0.96, 1.00) 
3 0.98  (0.97, 0.99)** 0.99  (0.97, 1.01) 
4 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Missing socioeconomic measures 0.89  (0.85, 0.93)*** 0.95  (0.89, 1.00) 
Age at preceding dose   9 years 0.69  (0.62, 0.78)*** 0.83  (0.71, 0.96)* 
10 years 0.85  (0.76, 0.95)** 0.97  (0.84, 1.12) 
11 years 0.83  (0.74, 0.92)*** 0.87  (0.75, 1.00)* 
12 years 0.83  (0.74, 0.93)*** 0.79  (0.69, 0.92)** 
13 years 0.83  (0.74, 0.93)** 0.80  (0.70, 0.93)** 
14 years 0.83  (0.74, 0.93)*** 0.79  (0.68, 0.91)** 
15 years 0.83  (0.74, 0.93)** 0.75  (0.65, 0.87)*** 
16 years 0.84  (0.75, 0.94)** 0.77  (0.66, 0.88)*** 
17 years 0.76  (0.68, 0.85)*** 0.70  (0.60, 0.81)*** 
18 years 0.70  (0.62, 0.79)*** 0.65  (0.56, 0.75)*** 
19 years 0.74  (0.66, 0.83)*** 0.66  (0.57, 0.76)*** 
20 years 0.76  (0.68, 0.86)*** 0.73  (0.62, 0.84)*** 
21 years 0.76  (0.68, 0.86)*** 0.71  (0.61, 0.83)*** 
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
 
  
22 years 0.81  (0.72, 0.91)*** 0.79  (0.68, 0.92)** 
23 years 0.85  (0.75, 0.96)* 0.75  (0.64, 0.88)*** 
24 years 0.92  (0.81, 1.04) 0.81  (0.68, 0.95)* 
25 years 0.96  (0.84, 1.10) 0.80  (0.67, 0.95)* 
26 years 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
Year of preceding dose   2009 1.05  (1.02, 1.07)*** 1.26  (1.22, 1.30)*** 
2010 1.02  (1.00, 1.04) 1.05  (1.02, 1.09)*** 
2011 1.02  (1.00, 1.04)* 1.05  (1.02, 1.08)*** 
2012 0.99  (0.97, 1.01) 1.03  (1.00, 1.06)* 
2013 1.00  (ref) 1.00  (ref) 
   
Plan-employer fixed effects Y Y 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed effects N N 
N 231,050 156,906 
Person-months at risk 1,878,474 1,417,662 
 
Results are from Cox proportional hazard models of months until the next dose in the HPV vaccine series, 
conditional on receiving the preceding dose.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 1.9: Specifications with varying levels of covariate adjustment: Impact of cost-
sharing reductions on multi-dose HPV vaccine compliance 
 
a. Months from dose 1 to dose 2 
Variables 
Hazard ratio (95% CI), by model specification 
(i) 
Plan fixed effects; 
all covariates 
(ii) 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing 
fixed effects;  
all covariates 
(iii) 
No fixed effects; 
all covariates 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 
1.009 1.023*** 1.022*** 
(0.999, 1.019) (1.017, 1.028) (1.018, 1.026) 
    Age at preceding dose Y Y Y 
Year of preceding dose Y Y Y 
Plan-employer fixed effects Y N N 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed effects N Y N 
Plan and data contributor type N Y Y 
Census division of residence Y Y Y 
ZIP code SES factors Y Y Y 
N 231,050 231,050 231,050 
Person-months at risk 1,878,474 1,878,474 1,878,474 
 
 
b. Months from dose 2 to dose 3 
Variables 
Hazard ratio (95% CI), by model specification 
(i) 
Plan fixed effects; 
all covariates 
(ii) 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing 
fixed effects;  
all covariates 
(iii) 
No fixed effects; 
all covariates 
Cost-sharing level at time t  
(per $10 reduction) 
1.006 1.018*** 1.013*** 
(0.993, 1.020) (1.011, 1.026) (1.007, 1.019) 
    Age at preceding dose Y Y Y 
Year of preceding dose Y Y Y 
Plan-employer fixed effects Y N N 
Pre-ACA cost-sharing fixed effects N Y N 
Plan and data contributor type N Y Y 
Census division of residence Y Y Y 
ZIP code SES factors Y Y Y 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Person-months at risk 1,417,662 1,417,662 1,417,662 
 
Results are from Cox proportional hazard models of months until the next dose in the HPV vaccine series, 
conditional on receiving the preceding dose. Specifications with plan-employer fixed effects did not include time-
constant plan-level covariates but implicitly control for these variables.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Subgroup analyses 
In subgroup analyses by attained age, the cost-sharing reductions are estimated to have a 
stronger effect on vaccine initiation rates among adolescent girls than young women (Table 
1.10). The range of statistically significant HRs per $10 cost-sharing reduction is 1.027 (18-20 
year-olds) to 1.060 (13-14 year-olds). Effect estimates are not significant in the 21-23 or 24-26 
year-old age categories. 
Socioeconomic correlates of HPV vaccination in the study sample are generally 
consistent with the literature. As shown Tables 1.3 and 1.8, beneficiaries in ZIP codes with lower 
median family income and lower high school completion rates are less likely to initiate HPV 
vaccination, and are also less likely to complete subsequent doses. Beneficiaries in ZIP codes 
with lower percentages of white residents are more likely to initiate vaccination, but are less 
likely to complete vaccination conditional on initiating the series; similar differences in HPV 
vaccination have been reported by individual-level race/ethnicity, both among U.S. adolescents 
(Reagan-Steiner 2015) and young women (Rahman 2013).  
In subgroup analyses, there is evidence of a heterogeneous policy effect with respect to 
ZIP code-level socioeconomic factors (Table 1.11). In ZIP codes with median 4-person family 
income !200% FPL, the magnitude of the effect estimate for vaccine initiation is roughly double 
that of the >400% FPL category (5.5% vs. 2.7% increase per $10 cost-sharing reduction; 
interaction p<0.001). Similarly, the effect size for vaccine initiation is over twice as large in the 
lowest quartile of high school completion than in the highest quartile (6.9% vs. 3.1%; interaction 
p<0.001). Across quartiles of percentage white race/ethnicity, there was evidence of effect 
modification with respect to two-dose compliance (conditional on vaccine initiation) (interaction 
p=0.029), but not with respect to vaccine initiation (interaction p=0.132). The cost-sharing effect 
! !41 
estimate for two-dose compliance is statistically significant in the lowest quartile of percentage 
white race/ethnicity (2.0% increase per $10 reduction; 95% CI: 0.6-3.4%), as well as in the 
lowest quartile of education and the second-lowest category of income. 
 
 
Table 1.10: Effect estimates by attained age: Hazard ratio per $10 cost-sharing reduction 
 
Dependent variable: Years from age-qualification to vaccine initiation 
Attained age at time t Person-years  at risk  
HR (95% CI)  
in subgroup 
  9 to 10 years 1,136,060 1.048  (1.03, 1.07)*** 
11 to 12 years 695,912 1.037  (1.02, 1.05)*** 
13 to 14 years 414,267 1.060  (1.04, 1.08)*** 
15 to 17 years 506,503 1.042  (1.03, 1.06)*** 
18 to 20 years 430,065 1.027  (1.00, 1.05)* 
21 to 23 years 301,684 1.000  (0.97, 1.04) 
24 to 26 years 176,586 1.014  (0.93, 1.11) 
 
By construction, at every time t in the model of years from age-qualification to vaccine initiation, attained age is 
equal to 9+t years. To estimate the cost-sharing effect by age, the primary model specification with plan-level fixed 
effects is re-run with the addition of interactions between vaccine-related cost-sharing and dummy indicators for 
each attained age category. A dummy variable for being "18 years old and having employee (vs. dependent or 
spouse) status is also added to the model; this variable is associated with a hazard ratio of 0.85 (95% CI: 0.79, 0.91).    
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 1.11: Effect estimates within ZIP code-level socioeconomic subgroups: Hazard ratio 
per $10 cost-sharing reduction 
 
Subgroup 
(i) 
Dose 1 
(ii) 
Dose 1 to Dose 2 
(iii) 
Dose 2 to Dose 3 
HR (95% CI)  
in subgroup 
Interaction 
p-value 
HR (95% CI)  
in subgroup 
Interaction 
p-value 
HR (95% CI)  
in subgroup 
Interaction 
p-value 
Median family 
income  
(4-person)        
!200% FPL 1.055  (1.04, 1.07)*** <0.001 1.014  (1.00, 1.03) 0.108 1.007  (0.99, 1.03) 0.128 
201-300% FPL 1.062  (1.05, 1.07)*** 1.013  (1.00, 1.03)*  1.011  (0.99, 1.03)  301-400% FPL 1.044  (1.03, 1.05)*** 1.008  (1.00, 1.02)  0.997  (0.98, 1.01)  >400% FPL 1.027  (1.02, 1.04)*** 1.006  (0.99, 1.02)  1.007  (0.99, 1.02)  Quartiles, % adults 
without high school 
completion       
1 (highest 
completion) 1.031  (1.02, 1.04)*** <0.001 1.006  (1.00, 1.02) 0.052 1.007  (0.99, 1.02) 0.252 
2 1.041  (1.03, 1.05)*** 1.008  (1.00, 1.02)  1.004  (0.99, 1.02)  3 1.048  (1.04, 1.06)*** 1.009  (1.00, 1.02)  1.000  (0.98, 1.02)  4 1.069  (1.06, 1.08)*** 1.017  (1.00, 1.03)*  1.009  (0.99, 1.03)  Quartiles, % white 
race       
1 (lowest % white) 1.050  (1.04, 1.06)*** 0.132 1.020  (1.01, 1.03)** 0.029 1.001  (0.98, 1.02) 0.331 
2 1.040  (1.03, 1.05)*** 1.009  (1.00, 1.02)  1.009  (0.99, 1.03)  3 1.038  (1.03, 1.05)*** 1.005  (0.99, 1.02)  1.006  (0.99, 1.02)  4 1.040  (1.03, 1.05)*** 1.007  (1.00, 1.02)   1.004  (0.99, 1.02)   
 
Dependent variables are: (i) years from age-qualification to dose 1 (initiation); (ii) months from dose 1 to dose 2; 
and (iii) months from dose 2 to dose 3. For each categorical variable, the primary model specification with plan-
level fixed effects is rerun with the addition of interactions between vaccine-related cost-sharing and dummy 
indicators for each subgroup. Interaction p-values <0.05 indicate significant effect modification, based on Wald chi-
square tests. (Asterisks indicate a significant cost-sharing effect within the subgroup.) 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
DISCUSSION 
Key findings and policy implications 
This paper examines the effect of VBID under U.S. health reform on HPV vaccine uptake 
and compliance. My analyses take advantage of variation in intensity of the VBID intervention 
within a large sample of private health plans existing before and after the ACA’s enactment. I 
control for background trends in vaccination and use plan-employer fixed effects to account for 
unobserved time-constant correlates of vaccine-related cost-sharing and vaccination behavior.  
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From 2009 to 2013, average cost-sharing per HPV vaccine dose decreased by more than 
half among study plans. In regression analyses, cost-sharing reductions are associated with 
statistically significant increases in age-specific vaccine initiation and completion rates in 
proportion to the magnitude of the reduction from pre-ACA levels. Increases are modest on a 
per-dollar basis, but could be sizable depending on the plan’s pre-ACA cost-sharing scenario. 
Among girls and women who initiated the vaccine series, improvements in multi-dose 
compliance with reduced cost-sharing are not statistically significant in the main regression 
analysis. However, there is evidence of a significant effect on multi-dose compliance in 
socioeconomic subgroups that have lower background propensity to complete vaccination. 
This analysis is among the first to evaluate routine vaccination as a target for VBID. 
Despite accumulating evidence that VBID programs can moderately improve adherence to 
chronic disease medications, it was unclear whether to expect similar improvements in HPV 
vaccine uptake following the ACA’s preventive care reforms. In the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, which examined the effect of insurance generosity on health care utilization, cost-
sharing decreased overall use of preventive care for children but did not specifically show an 
effect on immunizations for older children and adolescents. With respect to acute care, cost-
sharing decreased care-seeking for children, but did not significantly affect use of highly-
effective care for children in non-poor families (Newhouse 1993). Given reports that parents of 
adolescent girls often have limited knowledge about HPV and the vaccines (Holman 2014), my 
finding of a significant cost-sharing effect could be the result of parents perceiving HPV 
vaccines as discretionary or non-essential care. The lack of school mandates for HPV vaccines 
may reinforce such perceptions and lead HPV immunization rates to be more price-dependent. 
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The price elasticity of demand in this study (-0.08 for vaccine initiation rates) is 
comparable to those measured in recent evaluations of VBID programs targeting chronic 
medication adherence (Chernew 2008; Choudhry 2010; Frank 2012); for example, Frank et al. 
found an elasticity of -0.06 for adherence to statins in the VBID program of a large regional 
health plan. Conversely, -0.08 is toward the low end of the elasticity range from studies that 
broadly examined how beneficiaries’ use of health services responds to varying levels of cost-
sharing: In a systematic review of such studies, price elasticity of demand for all health services 
ranged from -0.04 to -0.75, with most estimates clustering around -0.17 (Ringel 2002). As with 
any VBID intervention, it is possible that limited awareness of the value-based incentives 
dampened beneficiaries’ responsiveness to them. In a 2014 poll, less than half of the population 
(43%) reported knowing that the ACA eliminated out-of-pocket costs for preventive services 
(Hamel 2014). The impact of the preventive care reforms on behavior may evolve as more plans 
lose grandfathered status and the provisions apply more universally to the privately-insured 
population. 
This study contributes to new evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic 
factors and beneficiaries’ sensitivity to cost-sharing changes under VBID. The removal of 
financial barriers to high-value preventive care should theoretically reduce disparities in the use 
of these services. However, the literature is mixed on whether and how much heterogeneity in 
price responsiveness exists across socioeconomic groups (Scitovsky & McCall 1977; Cherkin 
1990; Newhouse 1993; Chernew 2008). VBID might even exacerbate inequalities in access if, 
for example, lower income beneficiaries are less likely to be aware of the benefit variations, as 
one recent survey found within a VBID program population (Henrikson 2014). 
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Within study plans, I observe significant variation in HPV vaccination patterns by ZIP 
code-level socioeconomic factors, as well as variation in price sensitivity by these factors. 
Beneficiaries in lower categories of ZIP code-level income and educational attainment are less 
likely to initiate and complete vaccination, and have notably larger increases in vaccine initiation 
per dollar reduction in cost-sharing. In the most disadvantaged categories of income and 
education, the price elasticity of vaccine initiation is approximately two times that observed in 
the least disadvantaged categories. Beneficiaries in the most disadvantaged ZIP code quartile of 
race/ethnicity are more likely to initiate vaccination compared to the least disadvantaged quartile, 
but have lower multi-dose compliance conditional on initiation. Improvements in compliance 
with cost-sharing reductions are statistically significant in this subgroup, despite not being 
significant in the overall sample. In the absence of household-level data on income, education, 
and race/ethnicity, it is not possible to distinguish between individual socioeconomic factors and 
area-level traits in this analysis. Nevertheless, these results are promising and suggest that cost-
sharing reductions for the HPV vaccine are likely to help reduce disparities in uptake. 
 Interestingly, during the post-ACA period, there are large increases in vaccine initiation 
rates not explained by the vaccine-related cost-sharing reductions since 2009. The increases are 
seen even among plans with zero or very low baseline cost-sharing levels, which generally had 
little change in cost-sharing from 2009 through 2013. This trend could be due to unrelated 
contemporaneous events; for example, ACIP extended the recommendation for routine 
quadrivalent vaccination to males in mid-2011 (CDC 2011), which may have renewed interest in 
the vaccine. However, it is also possible that spillover effects of the preventive care provisions 
contributed to the increase in vaccination rates. In plans without actual cost-sharing changes, the 
reforms could still have impacted vaccination rates by signaling the value of HPV vaccines to 
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providers. Announcement of the reforms may have also led patients and providers to assume 
(correctly or incorrectly) that the HPV vaccine would be fully covered, or alerted more patients 
to preventive care benefits that their plan already featured before the ACA. 
Nevertheless, complementary approaches are probably still needed to substantially raise 
HPV vaccine coverage among U.S. adolescents and young women. Even under the free 
vaccination scenario (and even when applying 2013 vaccination rates), cumulative coverage with 
all three doses still falls far short of federal public health objectives (Healthy People 2020 goal of 
80% vaccine completion by ages 13-15). A number of factors hinder HPV vaccine uptake 
beyond cost, including misinformation about the value of HPV vaccines, discomfort vaccinating 
young adolescents against a sexually transmitted infection, infrequent contact between 
adolescent patients and providers, and logistical difficulties of vaccine completion. Additional 
incremental strategies could focus on improving the quality of provider recommendations 
(Gilkey 2015), expanding the authority of other provider types (e.g., pharmacists) to deliver HPV 
vaccines (Brewer 2014), and establishing reminder and recall systems to increase initiation and 
completion rates (Dunne 2014). The political feasibility of strong interventions (such as HPV 
immunization requirements for school enrollment) should also be re-evaluated in the wake of 
health reform, which reduces funding-related barriers to state-mandated vaccinations. 
 
Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations. Plan-level fixed effects greatly reduce the 
potential for confounding by unobserved plan or group characteristics that independently 
correlate with HPV vaccine uptake; still, this approach does not exclude the possibility of time-
varying confounding. Such bias could occur if reductions in overall generosity tended to 
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accompany vaccine-related cost-sharing reductions, given the rules defining grandfathered status 
eligibility. However, the resulting bias would likely be in the opposite direction of the observed 
policy effect (and small in magnitude, since many plans could have lost grandfathered status 
voluntarily or due to minor reductions in benefits). Effect sizes show very little change when 
adding individual-level covariates to a model with plan-employer fixed effects, which helps 
alleviate concerns about potential changes in the composition of beneficiaries over time. 
Although MarketScan includes enrollees from all U.S. states, it is not representative of 
the entire U.S. private insurance market. The database disproportionately represents large group 
health plans, which may be more generous on average than small group or individual health 
plans. Enrollees are also concentrated in more socioeconomically advantaged ZIP codes 
compared to the general population, and may be less price sensitive than average. Consequently, 
the results may understate both the extent of the cost-sharing reductions and the per-dollar 
behavioral effects of the VBID intervention among U.S. health plans. 
Empirical cost-sharing estimates are susceptible to random measurement error, which 
may attenuate the policy effect estimates. However, the large average size of study plans 
mitigates this concern. The plan-level fixed effects models rely on within-plan changes in cost-
sharing, which are likely to have good accuracy in large plans (based on the observed precision 
of cost-sharing estimates for these plans). Effect sizes only slightly increase in sensitivity 
analyses that exclude relatively small plans from the sample. 
Insured adolescents are eligible to receive free vaccination through the VFC program for 
any routine vaccines not covered by insurance. As a result, in plans with very high pre-ACA 
cost-sharing that lost grandfathered status, there could be differentially higher rates of missing 
HPV vaccination records in years before the ACA-mandated cost-sharing reductions. However, 
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this concern applies only to plans in the highest pre-ACA cost-sharing stratum (>$50 per dose in 
2009), and policy effect estimates show little change when this group is removed from the 
analyses. Moreover, due to caveats in VFC eligibility for the underinsured, the number of 
federally-provided vaccinations is likely to be limited even in the >$50 cost-sharing stratum: 
Insured adolescents are not VFC-eligible for vaccines covered with high coinsurance or only 
after a deductible is met; and those who are eligible can only receive VFC vaccines through 
federally-qualified or rural health centers, which have limited capacity and geographic reach 
(Lindley 2009; Smith 2009). 
 
Conclusions 
In years following the ACA’s preventive care reforms, plans with larger reductions in 
vaccine-related cost-sharing tended to show larger increases in HPV vaccine initiation and 
completion rates. Results suggest that the cost-sharing reductions generated modest increases in 
vaccine uptake, consistent with prior empirical evaluations of VBID programs targeting 
prescription drug adherence. Responsiveness to cost-sharing changes is more notable among 
residents of socioeconomically disadvantaged areas, who have lower background rates of 
vaccination. Nevertheless, below-target vaccination rates under zero cost-sharing highlight the 
need for additional interventions to improve HPV vaccine uptake.  
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Paper 2: 
 
Comparative effectiveness of human papillomavirus vaccination against 
cervical abnormalities by dose level 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background and significance 
Persistent infection with high-risk types of HPV is the cause of essentially all cervical 
cancer cases (Walboomers 1999; Saslow 2012). HPV is the most common sexually transmitted 
disease, with most sexually active adults acquiring at least one HPV infection during their 
lifetime (Weinstock 2004). The quadrivalent and bivalent HPV vaccines protect against the two 
most carcinogenic strains (HPV-16/18), which account for 70% of cervical cancers worldwide 
and cause both high-grade cervical lesions (precursors to cancer) and low-grade lesions (de 
Sanjose 2010). When administered before infection, the vaccines prevent 95-98% of 16/18-
related high-grade cervical lesions (Lehtinen 2012; Kjaer 2009), and provide some cross-
protection against high-grade lesions related to certain other HPV types (Brown 2009; Schiller 
2012; Wheeler 2012). The quadrivalent vaccine also protects against HPV-6/11, which cause 
over 90% of genital warts (Lacey 2006). 
The standard three-dose immunization schedule, however, is expensive and creates 
logistical challenges for vaccine provision in both low- and high-resource countries (Natunen 
2011; Elam-Evans 2014; Fagot 2011; Herweijer 2014). In the U.S., one-third of adolescent girls 
who initiate vaccination do not complete the series (Elam-Evans 2014). Practical barriers to 
vaccine completion may also deter providers from recommending and patients from accepting 
HPV vaccines (Bynum 2014; Ford 2009; Kahn 2008). There are increasing calls to examine the 
magnitude of protection provided by partial vaccination with one or two doses (Markowitz 2014; 
President’s Cancer Panel 2013; Kreimer 2015). Dose-stratified efficacy data could guide 
program design by, for example, suggesting the relative priority of strategies to encourage 
vaccine initiation versus to ensure dosing adherence.  
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Clinical trials have examined reduced-dose vaccination schedules using immunogenicity 
or HPV infection as interim outcomes, and generally support the efficacy of partial vaccination 
(Dobson 2013; Kreimer 2011; Kreimer 2015). Based on immunogenicity findings, a two-dose 
schedule for young adolescent girls is now licensed in some countries and endorsed by the World 
Health Organization (WHO 2014). However, further evidence is needed to confirm strong 
protection against long-term clinical endpoints. Observational data collected since HPV vaccine 
introduction can help provide such evidence. The U.S. may be an ideal setting for empirical 
comparisons of varying dose levels given the large number of resident girls with partial HPV 
vaccination, as well as the low potential for bias from herd immunity. 
 
Specific aims 
My paper examines the association between HPV vaccination by dose level and cervical 
abnormality rates within a large U.S. cohort of privately insured adolescent girls. I compare the 
incidence of both cytological and histology-confirmed abnormalities between recipients of zero, 
one, two, or three doses, using inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) to adjust for a 
broader set of covariates than has previously been possible using conventional regression 
methods (Crowe 2014; Gertig 2013). Vaccine effect estimates from this study are compared with 
prior evidence on HPV epidemiology and vaccine efficacy to assess plausibility. Differences in 
screening initiation rates by HPV vaccination status are also examined. 
 
METHODS 
Setting and data source 
U.S. guidelines for HPV vaccination and cervical screening  
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Since 2007, U.S. guidelines have recommended routine three-dose HPV vaccination of 
11 to 12 year-old females, with catch-up vaccination of 13 to 26 year-old females who were not 
previously vaccinated. Vaccination can be started as early as age 9 years (Markowitz 2007). 
HPV vaccines are primarily targeted to young adolescents because they are most effective when 
delivered before the onset of sexual activity (Markowitz 2014). To better approximate the 
potential impact of HPV vaccination in the target age group, my analysis of screening-detected 
cervical abnormalities focuses specifically on vaccine-eligible adolescent girls who were 9 to 17 
years old in 2007.  
 Cervical cancer screening aims to detect pre-invasive cervical abnormalities, which are 
asymptomatic (Kumar 2013). Screening guidelines are issued by several different professional 
organizations4 in the U.S., and underwent changes during the study timeframe (2007-2013). In 
2007, routine Pap-based cytology screening was recommended at either one- or two-year 
intervals starting at approximately three years after sexual initiation and no later than age 21 
years (Saslow 2002; USPSTF 2003; ACOG 2003). As of 2012, all national organizations 
recommend that women initiate routine Pap screening at age 21 years and continue screening at 
three-year intervals (Saslow 2012; USPSTF 2012; ACOG 2012).5  
 
Claims data  
MarketScan Commercial Claims & Encounters (2007-2013) is a de-identified, individual-
level database containing health care claims from over 100 employers and insurers, with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Recommendations are issued by the American Cancer Society (ACS), American Society for Colposcopy and 
Pathology (ASCCP), American Society for Clinical Pathology (ASCP), U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 
(USPSTF), and American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). 
5 Guidelines from ACOG were updated in December 2009 to recommend screening starting from age 21 with two-
year intervals during ages 21-29 (ACOG 2009); however, guidelines from other organizations were unchanged until 
2012. 
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approximately 33 million enrollees in 2007. Although not nationally representative, the database 
provides a large convenience sample with enrollees in all U.S. states. Claims are integrated from 
all outpatient, inpatient, and pharmacy providers that submitted for reimbursement through the 
enrollee’s health plan. With this data, it is possible to track vaccination status and cervical cancer 
screenings for an enrollee over time. Enrollment files contain basic person-level demographics 
and plan information, as well as socioeconomic measures based on enrollees’ 5-digit ZIP code of 
residence. 
 
Overview of approach and analytical challenges 
Comparator interventions and hypothetical trial design 
My analysis seeks to compare cervical abnormality outcomes across four different 
preventive care regimens: receipt of either zero, one, two, or three HPV vaccine doses followed 
by new initiation of a Pap screening regimen. In effect, the screening regimen can be viewed as a 
component of each intervention, albeit one that is common to all four comparators. Each new 
screening episode for an individual is defined as a Pap cytology test plus any necessary follow-
up procedures to confirm or treat atypical findings. 
Hypothetically, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) could have been initiated in 2007 to 
compare the efficacy of these four interventions against cervical abnormalities, assuming no 
equipoise issues or other practical constraints. In such an RCT, study participants (screening-
naïve girls 9-17 years old in 2007) would be randomized to receive zero, one, two or three doses 
followed by initiation of a cervical cancer screening regimen. Age at the time of randomization is 
likely to be strongly related to the trajectory of cervical abnormality risk (e.g., due to differences 
in HPV exposure risk and immune system factors by age); therefore, the randomization could be 
! !54 
conducted separately within blocks defined by starting age in 2007. Age at vaccine initiation 
would need to be consistent between the intervention groups, which could be accomplished by 
delivering the first dose at randomization. 
Because precancerous cervical lesions are asymptomatic, the schedule of screenings 
within each age block would also need to be independent of randomization group to prevent 
differential ascertainment of the outcomes (a type of information bias). The first screening could 
be scheduled for 2008 or later to provide a sufficient window of time for three-dose vaccination 
beforehand. With a uniform schedule of screenings across the groups, case-counting for 
abnormalities could start at the randomization visit as per an intent-to-treat (ITT) approach, with 
censoring at loss to follow-up. 
 
Observational cohort design 
By contrast, in a retrospective cohort study of vaccine effectiveness by dose level, study 
subjects self-select their number of vaccine doses and the timing thereof. Age at the first 
screening will vary among girls receiving care in usual practice, especially under pre-2012 
guidelines (Saslow 2002). The time interval between consecutive screenings will also vary 
across (and within) individuals, although to a lesser extent; roughly annual intervals are likely to 
be common among insured girls and young women during the study timeframe. 
As with any observational study, because treatment is not randomly assigned, there is 
potential for confounding from unobserved factors that affect both treatment choice and 
outcomes. In addition, because the outcomes in this study are asymptomatic, there is strong 
potential for outcome ascertainment bias if vaccination status is correlated with the timing of 
screening. This analytical challenge was recently noted by Herweijer et al. (2015) in a paper that 
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examined the association between HPV vaccination and screening attendance among Swedish 
women. After observing significantly higher screening rates among vaccinated women (which 
was almost entirely explained by socioeconomic factors6), the authors noted the following: 
“Our findings […] imply that studies should take increased screening rates in vaccinated 
women into consideration when assessing the effectiveness against screen-detected 
cervical cancer precursor lesions […]. If HPV-vaccinated women participate more 
extensively in screening, the recorded incidence of screen-detected lesions may be 
paradoxically somewhat increased, compared to the recorded incidence in 
unvaccinated—and less frequently screened—women. This potential for detection bias 
may lead to an underestimation of vaccine effectiveness against cervical lesions in 
population-based studies […].” (Herweijer 2015) 
In supplemental analyses, I show that this concern is indeed applicable to the present U.S.-based 
sample: Among screening-naïve adolescent enrollees, HPV vaccination ("1 dose) is associated 
with significantly higher hazard rates of screening initiation relative to no vaccination, although 
screening rates are similar across the one-, two-, and three-dose levels. 
In an effort to minimize the potential for ascertainment bias and mimic other conditions 
of the hypothetical RCT using retrospective claims, my primary design approach is to: (i) 
identify screening-naïve female enrollees aged 9-17 years in 2007 who reached their age of first 
screening during 2008-2013; (ii) assign exposure as the number of vaccine doses received before 
the first screening; (iii) use an IPTW approach to align the comparator groups in terms of starting 
age in 2007 and, within each age block, the distribution of other observed characteristics !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Among Swedish women invited to attend cervical cancer screening, the hazard ratio of screening attendance 
associated with vaccination ("1 dose) versus no vaccination was 1.28 (95% CI: 1.24, 1.32) before covariate 
adjustment (Herweijer 2015). This hazard ratio decreased to 1.05 (95% CI: 1.02, 1.08) after adjusting for individual-
level income and educational attainment, socioeconomic factors that are unavailable in the present U.S.-based 
analysis. 
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(including age of first screening and age of vaccine initiation); and (iv) approximately maintain 
the age/year alignment of dose groups at subsequent Pap visits by censoring individuals upon an 
18-month gap without additional screening.  
In contrast to an ITT analysis of the hypothetical RCT, in which the time origin for 
outcome ascertainment is randomization (i.e., vaccine initiation), this observational cohort design 
instead treats screening initiation as time zero. This time zero assignment resembles that of per-
protocol analyses of HPV vaccine trials, which focused on participants who reached the start of 
the post-vaccination follow-up period without protocol deviations or prior evidence of HPV 
infection (Kjaer 2009). Note that while this design requires subjects to reach the screening phase 
of their preventive care regimen, it does not condition on clinical events occurring after the start 
of screening. Analyses also adjust for age/year of screening initiation so that, at the first 
screening, the groups are balanced with respect to how long individuals have been screening-
naïve/“abnormality-free” thus far.  
 
Key limitations 
One drawback of this approach is that conditioning sample selection on screening 
initiation could potentially introduce “M-bias”, a form of collider bias that can arise when 
stratifying on a collider variable (in this case, screening) that is affected by both a risk factor for 
exposure and a risk factor for disease. Prior evidence suggests that socioeconomic advantage 
may increase rates of both HPV vaccine exposure (Reagan-Steiner 2015; Rahman 2013) and 
screening (Herweijer 2015; Leyden 2005). Meanwhile, sexual behavior factors affect the risk of 
HPV-related cervical atypia, and are also likely to influence screening decisions during the study 
timeframe due to guidelines that linked the recommended start of screening with age at sexual 
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initiation (Saslow 2002). As a result, conditioning selection on screening could open a non-
causal “back-door” path between HPV vaccination and cervical atypia that biases the estimated 
effectiveness of vaccination (Greenland 2003). 
The simplified schematic in Figure 2.1 illustrates the tradeoff between addressing 
outcome ascertainment bias versus avoiding collider bias, following the conventions used by 
Shahar (2009) and Hernán & Cole (2009) to depict information bias in causal diagrams. The 
diagram shows potential causal pathways linking vaccination and its determinants to the risk of 
having a cervical abnormality endpoint at a given point in calendar time among girls with the 
same attained age. The causal effect of interest (represented by the solid black line) is between 
vaccine exposure status (E) and latent abnormality status (D), an unobserved indicator for the 
screening test result that would be revealed if the individual were to undergo screening. 
However, it is only possible to estimate the effect of E on detected abnormality status (D*), 
which is equal to D if the individual actually does undergo screening (i.e., if S=1) or 0 if the 
individual remains unscreened (i.e., if S=0).  
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual diagram of causal pathways linking HPV vaccination status (E) to 
detected abnormality status (D*) among subjects with the same attained age and birth year 
 
 
  
In addition to the direct pathway from E to D* through D (E!D!D*), there are several 
extraneous pathways linking E to D* through screening (S) that are not of causal interest. 
Socioeconomic and health system access factors (A) are assumed to influence the likelihood of 
both vaccination (E) and screening (S). Background risk of HPV infection (B), a latent variable 
that depends on sexual history and epidemiologic factors, may similarly affect both E and S. As 
shown, E may also be indirectly connected to B through A, given that the socioeconomic factors 
affecting vaccination status could also affect background risk of HPV infection. 
Adjusting for confounders A and B would block the information biasing pathways from 
E to D* through S, in addition to blocking the confounding pathways from E to D through A and 
B; however, full adjustment is not possible using administrative claims data. Therefore, to 
address information bias, I instead condition sample selection on screening (i.e., S=1), which 
directly blocks the S#D* path. The cost of this approach is that S becomes a collider variable on 
the pathway E$A#S$B#D#D*, an M-bias structure represented by the dashed black line. 
Conditioning on S could thus open up a non-causal, spurious path of association between E and 
Latent abnormality 
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D* through D. To give a concrete example, it is possible that high socioeconomic status is a 
cause of both higher vaccination rates and more prompt initiation of cervical screening following 
sexual initiation. In this case, conditioning on screening initiation could induce a correlation 
between vaccination and older age of sexual initiation, presumably inducing confounding of the 
E#D#D* effect by B. If older age at sexual initiation reduces abnormality risk, the resulting 
bias would make vaccination appear more effective; then again, bias from small differences in 
age of sexual initiation may be minor (Bahmanyar 2012). 
Because the hypothesized collider bias in Figure 2.1 involves variables that are latent 
(i.e., background risk of HPV) or imperfectly measured (i.e., socioeconomic factors), the 
magnitude and direction of bias is uncertain. However, I expect that adjusting for screening will 
result in less bias than failing to adjust for this variable. A paper by Greenland (2003) provides 
algebraic evidence that M-type collider bias is often slight, and that when a variable is thought to 
act as both a collider and a confounder, adjustment is likely to remove more bias that it induces. 
Although screening does not operate as a classical confounder in Figure 2.1, it is a strong 
determinant of individuals’ detected abnormality status and (as reported in the Results section) is 
significantly correlated with vaccination status despite covariate adjustment. Without adjusting 
for this path of information bias, analyses comparing vaccination (any dose level "1) versus no 
vaccination are likely to substantially underestimate vaccine effectiveness, as predicted by 
Herweijer et al. (2015).  
Moreover, note that screening acts as a proxy for the confounders socioeconomic status 
and background HPV risk in Figure 2.1. (This contrasts with usual textbook examples of M-bias, 
in which the A and B variables are causes of E and S or D and S, but are not also confounders 
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that cause both E and D.) Consequently, adjusting for screening may reduce more confounding 
than it induces, in addition to the advantage of this approach in preventing information bias. 
 To reduce the potential for both selection-induced and classical confounding, I control for 
a variety of observed demographic, socioeconomic, and utilization-based covariates likely to be 
correlated with vaccination status, cervical abnormality risk, and/or screening participation. In a 
sensitivity analysis, I compare cervical abnormality rates across the one-, two-, and three-dose 
levels using an alternative cohort design that does not condition sample selection on screening 
initiation. Because residual confounding remains a concern, particularly for comparisons with 
the zero-dose group, my paper also explores the plausibility of vaccine effect estimates using 
prior evidence on vaccine efficacy and disease epidemiology. 
  
Sample selection 
Within the MarketScan database, the retrospective cohort includes females born during 
1989-1997 who were continuously enrolled for at least 2007 and 2008. Per the hypothetical RCT 
design, I select enrollees with one or more Pap screening claims, with the first occurring in 2008 
or later. To increase confidence that subjects were screening naïve before their first observed Pap 
test in the database, I exclude enrollees with prior evidence of screening, including those with 
HPV DNA or histology (i.e., follow-up diagnostic) procedure claims before the first Pap test 
date. Those who began screening before age 11 years are also excluded due to small numbers. 
To ensure a similar schedule of screenings across vaccine exposure groups, the outcome 
ascertainment period begins with the first Pap screening and continues until the first screening 
with the abnormality of interest, or the last screening before right censoring. I account for 
interval censoring by restricting the main analysis to consecutive Pap visits occurring at 
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approximately annual intervals (9-18 months), which reduces variability in the spacing of 
screenings beyond the first visit. (Pap tests occurring less than 9 months from the previous 
included Pap screening are regarded as repeat cytology rather than the start of a new screening 
episode; thus, any diagnoses associated with these repeat cytology tests are attributed to the 
preceding Pap screening.) Individuals are right censored at the earliest of: December 31, 2013, 
disenrollment from the MarketScan database, or an 18-month gap without Pap screening. 
 
 
Variable measurement 
Exposure definitions 
 Vaccination records are extracted from both medical and pharmacy claims (Appendix 
B.1). I define vaccine exposure by the number of doses received before the first Pap test date, 
counting all vaccine claims that complied with minimum acceptable intervals between doses (24 
days between doses one and two, 80 days between doses two and three) (CDC 2012). Vaccine 
exposure assignment is static rather than time-varying due to the expected influence of screening 
results on subsequent vaccination decisions, as well as the higher likelihood of pre-existing HPV 
infections by the typical age of screening.  
 
Outcome measures 
To identify abnormalities detected within each screening episode, I use diagnosis codes 
associated with the initial Pap screening (i.e., the visit that marks the beginning of a new 
screening episode) and any follow-up procedures within 9 months of that visit (Appendix B.1). 
Follow-up could include repeat cytology, or histology procedures (e.g., colposcopy, biopsy, 
cervical excision) to diagnose or treat abnormal cytology findings. 
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I categorize abnormalities by cytology result (according to the 2001 Bethesda System) 
and by follow-up histology grade (Solomon 2002). Cytological abnormalities include: high-
grade squamous intraepithelial lesion (HSIL), low-grade SIL (LSIL), atypical glandular cells 
(AGC), atypical squamous cells of undetermined significance (ASC-US), and ASC, cannot rule 
out HSIL (ASC-H). In the absence of abnormal cytology diagnoses, an unknown cytological 
abnormality is flagged if the Pap test prompted histology follow-up. I classify histology-
confirmed cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) as either high-grade (CIN2 or CIN3+) or low-
grade (CIN1 or unspecified dysplasia). If more than one histology grade is recorded within the 
same screening episode, the higher-severity grade is used.  
Primary study endpoints include any cytological abnormality (a composite measure) and 
high-grade CIN. As secondary endpoints, each cytological abnormality type and histology grade 
is examined individually in order to assess variation in effect sizes by endpoint severity. 
 
Covariates 
I adjust for birth year, age at first screening, age at vaccine initiation, and years since 
vaccine initiation as of the first screening, plus additional demographic and socioeconomic 
covariates: census division of residence; data contributor type (insurer or employer); health plan 
type; outpatient utilization in 2007 ("1 visit) as a measure of health system access; and ZIP-
code-level categories of percentage white race/ethnicity, percentage without high school 
completion, and median family income. I also include two claims-based proxies for potential 
HPV infection risk (history of testing and history of diagnosis for chlamydia or gonorrhea at or 
before the first screening visit), based on their empirical correlations with cytological 
abnormality risk (Appendix B.2).  
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Statistical analysis 
Primary analysis 
I conduct discrete-time survival analyses using pooled logistic regression models to 
estimate the incidence rate of cervical abnormalities by vaccine dose level. The models are fitted 
using IPTW to reweight subjects such that the distributions of observed covariates in each 
exposure group closely match that of the entire study cohort (Austin 2011). IPTW is a propensity 
score-based adjustment method that offers a more practical alternative to propensity score 
matching for analyses featuring multi-level (>2) treatment groups. Compared to conventional 
regression analysis, IPTW (like other propensity score methods) generally allow for more 
flexible covariate selection when treatment is common and binary outcomes are rare (Braitman 
& Rosenbaum 2002), as in the present study.  IPTW also enables me to simultaneously compare 
outcomes across all dose levels (including the unvaccinated group), while controlling for 
attributes of the HPV vaccination regimen that are only applicable to recipients of "1 dose (e.g., 
age at first dose). 
I stratify the propensity score estimation by birth year to adjust for age in 2007 and the 
age-specific distributions of all other covariates. Within each birth year stratum, I use a three-
level nested logit model to estimate the probabilities of having received zero, one, two, or three 
doses before screening. The first logistic regression estimates the probability of having received 
"1 (versus 0) doses before screening initiation, given the calendar year of the first Pap, 
demographic and socioeconomic factors, and claims-based risk proxies. The second model 
estimates the probability of having received "2 doses among women with "1 dose, given the 
above covariates plus variables for age at first dose and the time interval between the first dose 
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and the first Pap test. The third model includes the same covariates as the second model, and 
estimates the probability of vaccine completion among those with "2 doses. Each individual is 
assigned a weight equal to the inverse of her estimated propensity to receive her actual number 
of doses. To avoid assigning extreme weights to individuals, weights are truncated at the 99th 
percentile in each group. 
Pooled logistic regressions (with person-screening as the unit of analysis) are fitted with 
the weights to estimate the relationship between dose level and incidence of abnormalities 
(Hernán 2000). For each abnormality endpoint, the regression models the hazard probability of 
detection within a screening episode, given that the abnormality had not been detected by the 
previous screening. Independent variables include indicators for dose level and episode number 
(the individual’s first, second, or nth screening). This specification allows the underlying hazard 
probability of abnormalities to vary over time while assuming proportional hazard probabilities 
between the exposure groups at any specific visit number, analogous to a Cox proportional 
hazards model for continuous-time survival outcomes. To estimate the adjusted incidence rate of 
an abnormality outcome by dose level, I average the hazard probability associated with each 
dose level over the distribution of visit numbers in the overall cohort. I use the hazard probability 
odds ratio comparing different dose levels to approximate the relative risk and summarize the 
results as point estimates of the incidence rate (events per 100 person-screenings), relative risks 
for all pairwise comparisons, and associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs). All models use 
robust variance estimation. 
Crude incidence rates of abnormalities (equal to the number of events divided by person-
visits at risk) are similarly analyzed using un-weighted pooled logistic regressions that only 
include indicators for dose level. 
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Assessing plausibility and sensitivity of results 
Comparing effect estimates with prior epidemiologic data 
To examine the plausibility of my effect estimates, I compare the risk reductions for full 
vaccination (versus no vaccination) with prior evidence from epidemiologic studies (Insinga 
2008; Hariri 2012) and multinational RCTs of the vaccines among 15-26 year-old women 
(Lehtinen 2012; Kjaer 2009). 
 Specifically, I first compare these effect estimates with the reported proportions of U.S. 
CIN cases attributed to vaccine-targeted HPV types. Because these attributable proportions were 
estimated before HPV vaccines became widely available, they provide a theoretical maximum 
for the percent of CIN cases that are vaccine-preventable (assuming no cross-protection against 
other HPV-related CIN and no replacement of HPV types in the population). I interpret these 
comparisons based on reported vaccine efficacy against vaccine type-related CIN1, CIN2+, and 
CIN3+. 
 Additionally, I compare my effect estimates with the reported efficacy of the quadrivalent 
and bivalent vaccines against all-cause CIN1, CIN2+, and CIN3+ (i.e., CIN cases caused by any 
HPV type). These efficacy results can be directly compared with effect sizes from the present 
study, with the caveat that efficacy against all-cause CIN partly depends on the proportions 
attributable to vaccine HPV types within the mix of countries that contributed trial participants. 
 
Testing different exposure or outcome ascertainment windows 
I conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to assess robustness. First, I restrict outcome 
ascertainment to subjects’ first screening episode only. The main rationale for this test is to 
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ensure that the risk reductions observed with partial vaccination in the main analyses are not 
driven by the subset of girls who completed vaccination during follow-up (3.2%, 5.7%, and 9.1% 
of the zero-, one-, and two-dose groups, respectively). This sensitivity analysis also addresses the 
possibility of informative censoring in the main analysis, i.e., if subjects who continued annual 
Pap screening beyond the first Pap exam are not representative of subjects with the same 
baseline covariate values who were right-censored. 
Second, I expand follow-up to include screening episodes that occurred at any interval of 
at least 9 months. The main analysis focuses on screenings that occurred approximately annually 
(9-18 months), which could potentially overstate vaccine impact if a short screening interval is 
more likely to detect transient abnormalities that otherwise would have resolved before 
detection. 
Third, I apply buffer periods for vaccine exposure assignment to reflect the uncertain 
latent period between HPV infection and abnormality development. In this set of analyses, dose 
level is assigned according to the number of doses received prior to a buffer period (30, 90 or 
180 days) before the first Pap cytology visit. The rationale is to omit doses received shortly 
before the start of outcome ascertainment, with the assumption that any detected abnormalities 
are likely due to HPV infections that pre-existed those vaccine doses. For each alternative 
exposure definition, I re-estimate subjects’ inverse probability of treatment weights before fitting 
the weighted logistic regression models. 
 
Examining potential screening-related selection bias 
The main analyses adjust for the timing, spacing, and number of screenings to prevent 
bias from differential outcome ascertainment; however, as discussed earlier, the decision to 
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condition sample selection on screening (a potential collider) may create selection bias. I 
therefore conduct additional analyses to gauge the potential for selection bias due underlying 
differences in screening participation across exposure groups. 
First, I evaluate the association between HPV vaccination status and time to cervical 
screening initiation in the broader sample of age-eligible female enrollees (9-17 years old in 
2007) who were enrolled at least for the 2007 and 2008 plan years and were screening-naïve as 
of January 1, 2008. I fit a Cox proportional hazards model of time to first Pap screening 
(measured in months from January 2008). Follow-up continues until the month of first screening 
or censoring at disenrollment or December 2013. Given the importance of starting age on time to 
first screening, I stratify the baseline hazard function by age in 2007 (i.e., by birth year). 
Independent variables include time-varying indicators for vaccination status (corresponding to 
the number of doses received up to and including each month of follow-up), and socioeconomic 
and demographic covariates. 
Second, I conduct a sensitivity analysis of cervical abnormality rates with full versus 
partial vaccination using an alternative cohort study design, which does not require screening 
initiation for cohort entry. This analysis includes age-eligible girls who initiated HPV 
vaccination prior to screening initiation or disenrollment, whichever occurred first. Follow-up 
starts at vaccine initiation, with the assumption that time prior to screening was time without the 
abnormality. (As described in the Results section, timing of the first Pap exam is non-differential 
across the one-, two-, and three-dose levels; ascertainment bias therefore is not a major concern 
for the comparison of dose levels "1.) I fit Cox proportional hazard models of months from 
vaccine initiation until abnormality detection or censoring, with time-varying indicators for doses 
! !68 
received up to and including each month of follow-up.7 The model is stratified by each unique 
combination of age and calendar year at vaccine initiation. Demographic and socioeconomic 
factors are included as covariates.  
 
Subgroup analyses 
 Because the privately insured cohort that I examine is concentrated in more 
socioeconomically advantaged ZIP codes compared to the general population, I test for effect 
modification with respect to outpatient utilization, ZIP code-level socioeconomic measures, and 
sexually transmitted infection testing. In subgroup analyses of the two primary study endpoints, I 
estimate vaccine effectiveness by dose level within each strata by adding the relevant main effect 
and its interactions with treatment to the weighted pooled logistic regression. 
 
RESULTS 
Cohort characteristics 
The screening cohort includes 234,829 adolescent girls who received zero (63%, 
N=147,341), one (8%, N=18,999), two (9%, N=22,113), or three (20%, N=46,376) HPV vaccine 
doses before their first cervical screening (Figure 2.2). Over 99% of those vaccinated received 
the quadrivalent vaccine. 
On average, study subjects initiated screened at 17.8 years old and (among those with "1 
dose) initiated vaccination at 15.6 years old (Table 2.1). Compared to fully vaccinated girls, 
partially vaccinated girls were generally older at vaccine initiation. Girls with fewer or no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Due to endogeneity concerns, and because the interventions of interest consist of vaccine doses administered prior 
to screening, vaccine doses received at or after the first Pap screening visit do not count towards an individuals’ 
vaccination status in the Cox regression analysis. To account for the portion of individuals who receive additional 
doses post-screening initiation, I fit another set of Cox regression models in which individuals are right-censored 
beyond their first screening episode. 
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vaccine doses also had lower outpatient utilization and tended to reside in areas with lower 
median family income and high school completion rates. Prevalence of testing and diagnoses for 
chlamydia or gonorrhea were highest among one- and two-dose recipients. In the reweighted 
sample, observed characteristics were well matched across the four groups (Table 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.2: Selection of screening cohort to examine cervical abnormality rates by HPV 
vaccine dose level 
 
 
Vaccine claims count as separate dosages if time since the previous dose complied with minimum intervals (24 days 
between doses one to two, 80 days between doses two to three, i.e., 4 weeks and 12 weeks minus an extra 4-day 
grace period). 
 
  
HPV vaccine doses received before first Pap test:
0 doses: 147,341 (63%)
1 dose: 18,999 (8%)
2 doses: 22,113 (9%)
3 doses: 46,376 (20%)
U.S.-resident girls 9-17 years old as of 01/01/2007 
continuously enrolled in MarketScan through 
12/31/2008 or later
(N=1,295,649)
Excluded:
No cervical screening test during enrollment 
period (N=991,934)
Subjects with !1 cervical screening test in claims
(N=303,715) Excluded:
HPV DNA or histology before Pap screening 
(N=4,822)
First screening observed in 2007 (N=61,804)
Screening result before first Pap (N=2,229)
Screening initiated at age 10 years (N=31)Study sample for analysis of cervical abnormalities
(N=234,829)
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Table 2.1: Cohort characteristics before and after inverse probability of treatment 
weighting 
 
Covariate 
Before weighting  After weightinga 
0 dose 1 dose 2 dose 3 dose  0 dose 1 dose 2 dose 3 dose 
  
          
N 147,341 18,999 22,113 46,376  147,341 18,999 22,113 46,376 Mean age in 2007 (SD) 15.1 (1.6) 14.9 (1.7) 14.9 (1.7) 14.8 (1.7)  15.0 (1.7) 15.0 (1.7) 15.0 (1.7) 15.0 (1.7) Mean age at first Pap (SD) 17.7 (1.9) 17.6 (1.9) 17.7 (1.9) 18.0 (1.9)  17.7 (1.9) 17.8 (1.9) 17.8 (1.9) 17.8 (1.9) 
Year of first Pap, %          
2008 33.4 30.1 27.5 16.7  29.3 27.9 28.2 27.5 
2009 26.2 25.3 25.1 23.7  25.6 25.4 25.5 25.2 
2010 13.6 13.9 13.9 16.6  14.2 14.1 14.5 14.6 
2011 10.4 11.1 12.0 15.0  11.5 11.8 11.8 12.0 
2012 9.3 10.6 11.5 14.8  10.7 11.3 10.9 11.3 
2013 7.1 8.9 10.0 13.3  8.7 9.4 9.1 9.3 
          Census division, %          East North Central 21.3 18.2 19.3 22.1  21.0 20.8 20.9 20.6 East South Central 8.1 6.5 6.6 7.2  7.7 7.6 7.6 7.7 Middle Atlantic 4.7 7.1 8.4 9.8  6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 Mountain 4.5 4.4 4.2 3.6  4.3 4.5 4.4 4.3 New England 1.8 3.8 5.4 6.5  2.9 3.2 3.3 3.3 Pacific 11.4 18.1 15.1 10.6  12.3 12.7 12.4 12.8 South Atlantic 21.8 20.7 21.0 20.2  21.3 20.9 21.3 21.2 West North Central 5.6 5.5 6.0 7.6  6.0 5.9 5.9 6.0 West South Central 20.9 15.8 14.1 12.5  18.2 18.1 17.8 17.6 
          Data contributor type 
(insurer vs. employer)b, % 39.5 34.5 33.6 30.5  36.9 36.3 36.3 35.7 
Plan type, %          Health maintenance 
organization 18.1 23.4 22.1 21.2  19.6 19.4 19.6 19.8 
Point-of-service (non-
capitated) 11.2 11.9 13.0 13.9  11.8 11.8 12.0 12.0 
Preferred provider 
organization 62.9 57.2 57.0 57.1  60.8 61.0 60.6 60.4 
Other plan typesc 7.8 7.6 7.9 7.8  7.8 7.8 7.9 7.8 Any outpatient service use 
in 2007, % 82.4 90.9 94.5 96.0  86.9 87.6 88.8 90.3 
          Socioeconomic measures 
by ZIP coded, %          
Median family income 
(4-person)           
!200% FPL 10.9 8.6 7.1 5.3  9.3 9.1 8.9 8.6 201-300% FPL 29.2 24.0 21.0 18.6  26.0 26.0 25.7 25.6 301-400% FPL 29.0 27.1 26.4 26.1  28.1 28.4 28.2 28.0 >400% FPL 28.8 38.0 43.2 48.0  34.5 34.4 35.0 35.7 Quartiles, % adults 
without high school 
completion          
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
1 (highest % 
completion) 26.2 33.2 38.6 44.0  31.2 31.5 31.7 32.1 
2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.1  25.3 25.4 25.4 25.4 3 26.1 22.4 20.0 18.0  23.7 23.6 23.6 23.7 4 20.3 16.9 13.9 10.9  17.6 17.5 17.1 16.8 Quartiles, % white race          1 (lowest % white) 20.3 21.1 17.5 14.2  19.0 19.0 18.6 18.3 2 25.6 26.6 25.9 25.0  25.7 25.6 25.7 25.9 3 27.2 28.2 30.0 32.0  28.3 28.6 28.4 28.6 4 24.7 21.8 24.1 26.9  24.8 24.7 25.2 25.1 Missing socioeconomic 
measures 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.0  2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 
          Claim(s) at or before first 
Pape, %          
Chlamydia or gonorrhea 
testing 55.0 62.2 60.1 58.9  56.7 56.8 56.9 56.9 
Chlamydia or gonorrhea 
diagnosis 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
          Mean age of vaccine 
initiation (SD) - 16.0 (1.7) 15.6 (1.7) 15.3 (1.7)  - 15.7 (1.7) 15.7 (1.7) 15.6 (1.7) 
Time since vaccine 
initiation at first Pap, %          
<1 year - 42.8 27.0 9.7  - 26.2 25.9 23.4 1-2 years - 24.3 28.2 29.4  - 30.6 30.6 31.7 >2 years - 32.9 44.7 60.9  - 43.2 43.4 44.9 
                    
 
[a] Subjects are weighted by the inverse of their estimated propensity to be in their observed exposure group.  
[b] Type of MarketScan data contributor (insurer vs. employer) is a proxy for smaller versus larger employer size, 
respectively. 
[c] Other plan types are combined above but are adjusted for individually: comprehensive, exclusive provider 
organization, point-of-service (with capitation), consumer-driven health plan, and other/unknown. 
[d] Categorical socioeconomic measures at the 5-digit ZIP code level are based on the American Community Survey 
5-year estimates (2008-2012). Median 4-person family income is compared to federal poverty level (FPL) for a 4-
person household in 2012 ($23,050). 
[e] Chlamydia and gonorrhea are sexually-transmitted infections for which routine testing is recommended among 
sexually-active girls and young women (Workowski 2015). 
 
 
3.2 Incidence of cervical abnormalities 
The numbers of events and annual person-visit contributions by dose level are presented 
in Table 2.2 for the primary study endpoints, along with crude incidence rates. As shown, crude 
rates of any cytological abnormality fall as the number of doses increases (Table 2.2).  
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The adjusted rates of any cytological abnormality (per 100 annual person-screenings) are 
similar to unadjusted rates, ranging from 11.60 with zero doses to 9.05 with three doses (Table 
2.3). Relative risks (95% CI) of any cytological abnormality versus zero doses are 0.91 (0.87-
0.95), 0.84 (0.81-0.88), and 0.76 (0.73-0.79) for one, two, and three doses, respectively. For 
histologically confirmed high-grade CIN, relative risks (95% CI) versus zero doses are 0.61 
(0.50-0.75), 0.68 (0.57-0.82) and 0.47 (0.40-0.55) with one, two, and three doses.  
For most abnormality endpoints, I observe significant risk reductions versus no 
vaccination starting at the one-dose level. The risk reductions associated with vaccination are 
largest for the highest-severity endpoint, CIN3+ (e.g., relative risk for three versus zero doses: 
0.33; 95% CI: 0.23-0.46). Effect sizes are considerably smaller for low-severity endpoints such 
as LSIL, ASC-US, and low-grade CIN. 
Point estimates of the incidence rate tend to decrease with increasing dose level for most 
abnormality types. However, the relative risks comparing one-, two-, and three-dose vaccination 
are significant for only a subset of endpoints. Compared to two doses, full vaccination is 
associated with significantly lower rates of both primary study endpoints (both p<0.05). 
Compared to one dose, two doses is associated with significantly lower rates of any cytological 
abnormality (p<0.05). 
 
  
! !73 
Table 2.2: Unadjusted number of events and person-visits by HPV vaccine dose level: Any 
cervical abnormality and histology-confirmed high-grade CIN 
 
Endpoint Persons, No. 
Person-time at risk 
(Annual screenings, 
No.) 
Events, No. 
Unadjusted incidence rate (95% CI)a 
(Events per 100 annual person-
screenings) 
      Any cytological 
abnormality      
0 dose (unvaccinated) 147,341 202,838 23,876 11.77 (11.63, 11.91) 
1 dose 18,999 26,233 2,793 10.65 (10.28, 11.02) 
2 dose 22,113 31,822 3,110 9.77 (9.45, 10.10) 
3 dose 46,376 67,841 6,100 8.99 (8.78, 9.21) 
      High-grade CIN (CIN2+)b      0 dose (unvaccinated) 147,341 215,256 1,605 0.75 (0.71, 0.78) 
1 dose 18,999 27,778 124 0.45 (0.37, 0.53) 
2 dose 22,113 33,628 157 0.47 (0.40, 0.55) 
3 dose 46,376 71,364 232 0.33 (0.29, 0.37) 
            
 
[a] Results are from unweighted pooled logistic regression models with person-screening as the unit of analysis.  
[b] High-grade cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) includes CIN2, CIN3, adenocarcinoma in situ, and rare 
instances of cervical malignancy. 
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Sensitivity analyses 
Results are similar in sensitivity analyses that vary the exposure or outcome 
ascertainment window (Table 2.4). When focusing on subjects’ first screening episode only, one 
dose and two doses continue to be associated with significantly lower risks of any cytological 
abnormality and high-grade CIN versus zero doses, despite the reduced statistical power in this 
analysis. This result offers assurance that the estimated benefit of partial vaccination in the main 
analysis is not driven by subjects who completed vaccination at or after their first Pap visit. 
Additionally, the study findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of cervical screenings that 
occurred at longer than annual intervals. Findings are also comparable when using varying buffer 
periods for vaccine exposure assignment, although the relative risks comparing full versus partial 
vaccination regimens are not statistically significant across all buffer periods with respect to 
high-grade CIN. 
I find no evidence of effect modification across socioeconomic and risk proxy subgroups 
with respect to any cytological abnormality (Table 2.5) or high-grade CIN (Table 2.6). 
 Appendix B.3 reports parameter estimates from the Cox regression model of time to first 
cervical screening among age-eligible adolescent girls (N=1,226,763). Based on this model, 
Table 2.7 provides risk-adjusted cumulative incidences of screening initiation by dose number. 
The hazard of screening initiation is approximately 25% lower among unvaccinated versus 
vaccinated ("1 dose) individuals, which translates to a cumulative incidence of 31% versus 37% 
through 2013, respectively. Screening rates are otherwise non-differential by dose. Apart from 
birth year, the single strongest predictor of screening initiation in the model is outpatient service 
utilization (hazard ratio: 1.57; 95% CI: 1.55-1.59). 
! !76 
Across the "1 dose levels, the study conclusions are robust when using an alternative 
study design that does not condition sample selection on screening initiation. In the Cox models 
of time from vaccine initiation to abnormality detection (N=411,312), hazard ratios for full 
versus partial vaccination are comparable to relative risks from the main analysis with respect to 
both primary endpoints (Table 2.8a). Similarly, when I modify the Cox models to censor 
individuals beyond their first cervical screening episode (Table 2.8b), hazard ratios for full 
versus partial vaccination are consistent with relative risks from the logistic regression analysis 
focusing on screened individuals’ first screening episode only (sensitivity analysis 1 in Table 
2.4). 
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Table 2.5: Subgroup analyses: Adjusted incidence of any cytological abnormality !
Stratification variable N 
Adjusted incidence rate 
 (per 100 annual person-
screenings), 
by dose levela 
  Adjusted relative risk (95% CI) 
0 1 2 3   1 vs. 0 2 vs. 0 3 vs. 0 
Chlamydia or gonorrhea 
 testing                
Yes 133,438 12.85 11.42 11.01 9.91  0.87 (0.82, 0.93) 
*** 0.84 (0.80, 0.89) *** 0.75 (0.71, 0.78) *** 
No 101,391 10.09 9.71 8.62 8.00  0.96 (0.89, 1.04)  0.84 (0.78, 0.90) 
*** 0.77 (0.73, 0.82) *** 
Median family income  
(4-person)                 
!200% FPL 21,664 13.69 12.44 11.31 11.08  0.90 (0.77, 1.04)  0.80 (0.69, 0.93) 
** 0.79 (0.69, 0.90) *** 
201-300% FPL 60,892 12.55 11.52 10.23 9.37  0.91 (0.83, 1.00) 
* 0.79 (0.72, 0.87) *** 0.72 (0.67, 0.78) *** 
301-400% FPL 65,843 11.37 10.81 10.40 8.83  0.94 (0.86, 1.03)  0.90 (0.84, 0.98) 
* 0.76 (0.71, 0.81) *** 
>400% FPL 81,389 10.51 9.47 9.06 8.51  0.89 (0.82, 0.97) 
** 0.85 (0.79, 0.91) *** 0.79 (0.75, 0.83) *** 
Quartiles, % adults 
without high school 
completion      
          
1 73,848 10.58 9.80 8.96 8.32  0.92 (0.84, 1.00) 
* 0.83 (0.78, 0.89) *** 0.77 (0.73, 0.81) *** 
2 59,167 11.42 10.60 10.06 8.85  0.92 (0.84, 1.01)  0.87 (0.80, 0.94) 
*** 0.75 (0.70, 0.81) *** 
3 55,470 12.04 11.73 10.68 9.39  0.97 (0.88, 1.07)  0.87 (0.80, 0.96) 
** 0.76 (0.70, 0.82) *** 
4 41,303 13.08 10.92 10.65 10.28  0.81 (0.72, 0.92) 
*** 0.79 (0.71, 0.88) *** 0.76 (0.69, 0.84) *** 
Quartiles, % white race                
1 44,432 13.36 12.06 11.87 10.35  0.89 (0.80, 0.98) 
* 0.87 (0.79, 0.96) ** 0.75 (0.69, 0.82) *** 
2 60,133 11.44 10.54 9.56 9.15  0.91 (0.83, 1.00)  0.82 (0.75, 0.89) 
*** 0.78 (0.73, 0.84) *** 
3 66,930 11.43 10.64 9.74 8.59  0.92 (0.84, 1.01)  0.84 (0.77, 0.90) 
*** 0.73 (0.68, 0.78) *** 
4 58,293 10.64 9.81 9.21 8.53  0.91 (0.82, 1.01)  0.85 (0.78, 0.93) 
*** 0.78 (0.73, 0.84) *** 
Outpatient service use  
in 2007                
Yes 204,138 11.51 10.68 9.74 9.04  0.92 (0.87, 0.97) 
*** 0.83 (0.79, 0.87) *** 0.76 (0.74, 0.79) *** 
No 30,691 12.20 10.31 11.57 9.12  0.83 (0.71, 0.97) 
* 0.94 (0.80, 1.11)  0.72 (0.62, 0.85) 
*** 
 
[a] Results are from weighted pooled logistic regression models with person-screening as the unit of analysis. The 
weighted models include indicators for vaccine dose level, the subgroup of interest, interactions between the 
subgroup and dose level, and screening episode number. The finding of no effect modification is based on formal 
tests for the overall significance of the interaction terms between categories of dose level and of each stratification 
variable (all p>0.05). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.6: Subgroup analyses: Adjusted rates of histology-confirmed high-grade CIN by 
dose level 
 
Stratification variable N 
Adjusted incidence rate 
 (per 100 annual  
person-screenings), 
by dose levela 
  Adjusted relative risk (95% CI) 
0 1 2 3   1 vs. 0 2 vs. 0 3 vs. 0 
                Chlamydia or 
gonorrhea testing                
Yes 133,438 0.78 0.51 0.50 0.35  0.65 (0.51, 0.84) 
*** 0.63 (0.50, 0.80) *** 0.45 (0.36, 0.55) *** 
No 101,391 0.63 0.35 0.48 0.32  0.54 (0.38, 0.77) 
*** 0.76 (0.57, 1.00)  0.50 (0.38, 0.65) 
*** 
Median family income 
 (4-person)                 
!200% FPL 21,664 0.69 0.54 0.44 0.31  0.79 (0.40, 1.58)  0.64 (0.34, 1.22)  0.45 (0.26, 0.78) 
** 
201-300% FPL 60,892 0.79 0.41 0.53 0.35  0.52 (0.35, 0.78) 
** 0.67 (0.46, 0.99) * 0.45 (0.31, 0.65) *** 
301-400% FPL 65,843 0.81 0.52 0.60 0.38  0.64 (0.45, 0.91) 
* 0.74 (0.54, 1.02)  0.47 (0.35, 0.63) 
*** 
>400% FPL 81,389 0.60 0.35 0.38 0.29  0.59 (0.40, 0.87) 
** 0.64 (0.48, 0.84) ** 0.49 (0.38, 0.64) *** 
Quartiles, % adults 
without high school 
completion                
1 73,848 0.63 0.33 0.42 0.32  0.53 (0.34, 0.80) 
** 0.66 (0.48, 0.92) * 0.50 (0.39, 0.65) *** 
2 59,167 0.77 0.58 0.54 0.30  0.76 (0.53, 1.08)  0.70 (0.51, 0.96) 
* 0.39 (0.29, 0.53) *** 
3 55,470 0.78 0.48 0.53 0.40  0.61 (0.42, 0.90) 
* 0.68 (0.47, 0.99) * 0.51 (0.36, 0.74) *** 
4 41,303 0.71 0.34 0.49 0.33  0.48 (0.26, 0.87) 
* 0.69 (0.43, 1.12)  0.46 (0.28, 0.74) 
** 
Quartiles, % white race                
1 44,432 0.64 0.52 0.42 0.25  0.82 (0.53, 1.27)  0.66 (0.43, 1.03)  0.40 (0.25, 0.64) 
*** 
2 60,133 0.69 0.42 0.46 0.40  0.61 (0.40, 0.92) 
* 0.66 (0.47, 0.92) * 0.57 (0.42, 0.77) *** 
3 66,930 0.80 0.40 0.48 0.36  0.49 (0.34, 0.71) 
*** 0.60 (0.43, 0.84) ** 0.45 (0.33, 0.61) *** 
4 58,293 0.69 0.43 0.58 0.30  0.62 (0.39, 0.96) 
* 0.84 (0.59, 1.19)  0.44 (0.31, 0.61) 
*** 
Outpatient service use 
in 2007                
Yes 204,138 0.73 0.47 0.49 0.34  0.64 (0.52, 0.79) 
*** 0.67 (0.56, 0.80) *** 0.46 (0.39, 0.55) *** 
No 30,691 0.65 0.21 0.51 0.34  0.33 (0.13, 0.82) 
* 0.78 (0.36, 1.71)  0.52 (0.24, 1.11)  
                                
 
[a] Results are from weighted pooled logistic regression models with person-screening as the unit of analysis. The 
weighted models include indicators for vaccine dose level, the subgroup of interest, interactions between the 
subgroup and dose level, and screening episode number. The finding of no effect modification is based on formal 
tests for the overall significance of the interaction terms between categories of dose level and of each stratification 
variable (all p>0.05). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.7: Adjusted cumulative incidence of Pap screening initiation by number of HPV 
vaccine doses 
 
Age in 2007 N 
Cumulative percent of subjects initiating Pap screening 
By end of 2010 By end of 2013 
0 dose 1 dose 2 dose 3 dose 0 dose 1 dose 2 dose 3 dose 
All ages 1,226,763 15.3% 19.1% 18.9% 19.2% 31.3% 37.2% 37.0% 37.3% 
17 years 103,471 43.9% 53.3% 53.0% 53.5% 69.5% 79.1% 78.8% 79.3% 
16 years 139,773 36.8% 45.4% 45.1% 45.6% 66.7% 76.5% 76.2% 76.7% 
15 years 146,971 28.0% 35.1% 34.9% 35.3% 58.4% 68.5% 68.2% 68.8% 
14 years 147,230 17.8% 22.8% 22.6% 22.9% 41.8% 50.9% 50.6% 51.2% 
13 years 145,215 9.4% 12.3% 12.1% 12.3% 23.4% 29.6% 29.4% 29.8% 
12 years 142,389 4.5% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 14.6% 18.7% 18.6% 18.8% 
11 years 137,979 1.7% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 7.8% 10.1% 10.0% 10.2% 
10 years 134,492 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 3.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 
  9 years 129,243 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1.3% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 
 
Notes: Cumulative incidences of screening by dose level are estimated from the birth year-stratified Cox 
proportional hazards model shown in Appendix B.3, based on the average values of all other covariates. Because 
vaccination status is time-varying in the model, Table 2.7 conservatively assumes that all vaccine doses were 
delivered before January 1, 2008, which maximizes the divergence between the dose groups. 
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis using alternative study design: Time from HPV vaccine 
initiation until abnormality detection among age-eligible female enrollees who initiated 
vaccination while screening-naïve  
 
a. With right censoring at the earlier of: disenrollment; or an 18-month gap without another 
screening episode after an individual has initiated screening !
Endpoint /  
Comparison 
Adjusted hazard ratio (95% CI)a 
[Sensitivity analysis with 
alternative cohort design] 
  
Adjusted relative risk (95% CI)b,c 
[Main analysis] 
        Any cytological abnormality        3 vs. 1 doses 0.77 (0.74, 0.81) *** 0.84 (0.79, 0.88) *** 
3 vs. 2 doses 0.86 (0.82, 0.90) *** 0.90 (0.86, 0.95) *** 
        High-grade CIN (CIN2+)        3 vs. 1 doses 0.70 (0.55, 0.88) **  0.77 (0.60, 0.99) 
* 
3 vs. 2 doses 0.69 (0.56, 0.84) *** 0.69 (0.54, 0.87) ** 
                !
b. With right censoring at the earlier of: disenrollment; or end of the first cervical screening 
episode !
Endpoint /  
Comparison 
Adjusted hazard ratio (95% CI)a 
[Sensitivity analysis with 
alternative cohort design] 
  
Adjusted relative risk (95% CI)c,d 
[Sensitivity analysis 1 from  
Table 2.4] 
        Any cytological abnormality        3 vs. 1 doses 0.83 (0.78, 0.88) *** 0.82 (0.77, 0.88) *** 
3 vs. 2 doses 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) **  0.92 (0.86, 0.98) 
** 
        High-grade CIN (CIN2+)        3 vs. 1 doses 0.70 (0.51, 0.94) *  0.69 (0.50, 0.95) 
* 
3 vs. 2 doses 0.70 (0.53, 0.92) *  0.65 (0.48, 0.88) 
** 
                
 
[a] The multivariate analyses of months from vaccine initiation to abnormality detection include the 411,312 age-
eligible enrollees who initiated vaccination prior to screening or disenrollment (whichever occurred first). 
Vaccination status is a time-varying variable reflecting the number of doses received up to and including each month 
of follow-up. (Due to endogeneity concerns, vaccine doses received at or after the first Pap screening visit do not 
count towards an individuals’ vaccination status.) 
[b] From the main analysis in Table 2.3. The weighted pooled logistic regression analysis of abnormalities per 
annual person-screening is restricted to the screening cohort (N=234,829), which includes 87,488 subjects with "1 
dose prior to screening.  
[c] Hazard probability odds ratios are taken as approximations of the relative risks comparing different dose levels.  
[d] From sensitivity analysis 1 in Table 2.4, which focuses on the first screening episode only. As with the main 
analysis, this analysis is restricted to the screening cohort (N=234,829), which includes 87,488 subjects with "1 dose 
prior to screening.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Comparisons with prior epidemiologic data   
For CIN1, CIN2+, and CIN3+, risk reductions with three (versus zero) doses in the 
present study are close to the estimated proportions of CIN1, CIN2+, and CIN3+ cases attributed 
to HPV-6/11/16/18 in the U.S. (Table 2.9).   !
Table 2.9: Estimated reductions in CIN with three doses in present study, alongside 
reported proportions of CIN attributable to HPV-6/11/16/18 in U.S. 
 
Endpoint 
% Reduction in present study 
(3 vs. 0 doses)[a] 
Estimated proportion of cases 
attributed to HPV-6/11/16/18 in United 
States[b] 
  
Main analysis  
(95% CI) 
Range in 
sensitivity 
analyses Insinga (2008)[c] Hariri (2012)[d] 
CIN1 20% (14, 25) 18-23% 20% - 
CIN2+ 53% (45, 60) 50-55% 59% 54% 
CIN3+ 67% (54, 77) 58-70% - 66% 
 
[a] Percent reductions, calculated as (1 - relative risk)*100%, are based on relative risks from the main analysis 
(Table 2.3) and sensitivity analyses (shown in Table 2.4 for the primary study endpoints). For CIN1, I refer to the 
percent reductions corresponding to low-grade CIN in my analyses. 
[b] Attributable proportions are among pre-invasive cervical lesions only (i.e., highest-severity cases are CIN3 or 
adenocarcinoma in situ, not invasive cervical cancer). 
[c] The meta-analysis by Insinga (2008) estimated the attribution of individual HPV types in CIN1 and CIN2/3, with 
adjustment for the co-occurrence of HPV types.  
[d] Hariri (2012) estimated HPV type attributions in a sample of U.S. women aged 18-39 years within the HPV-
IMPACT monitoring system who had a diagnosis of CIN2+ during 2008-2009. The authors noted that these 
estimates may have been somewhat impacted by HPV vaccination in a small percentage of the sample. 
 !
Appendix B.4 summarizes vaccine efficacy against all-cause CIN (i.e., irrespective of 
HPV type) from quadrivalent and bivalent trials among 15-26 year-old women. For all-cause 
CIN2+, my effect estimate for three versus zero doses (53%; 95% CI: 45-60) is larger than 
efficacy within the ITT trial populations, but comparable to efficacy within the HPV-naïve 
populations from the quadrivalent (43%; 95% CI: 24-57) and bivalent (65%; 95% CI: 53-74) 
trials (Muñoz 2010; Lehtinen 2012).  
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The comparison of effect sizes for all-cause CIN3+ follows a similar pattern as CIN2+. 
Conversely, for all-cause CIN1, I observe reductions of 20% (95% CI: 14-25) with three versus 
zero doses, which is closer to the reported efficacy of the quadrivalent vaccine in the ITT 
population (20%; 95% CI: 12-28) than in the HPV-naïve population (30%; 95% CI: 17-41) 
(Muñoz 2010).  
 
DISCUSSION 
Key findings and policy implications 
To my knowledge, this study represents the largest and the first U.S.-based analysis of 
cervical abnormalities by number of HPV vaccine doses. Completion of the three-dose series 
prior to screening is associated with significantly lower rates of all abnormality endpoints. 
Receipt of one or two doses is associated with significant but smaller decreases across most 
endpoints. For all dose levels, risk reductions with vaccination are greatest with respect to 
CIN3+, as expected given that the proportion of abnormalities caused by HPV-16/18 increases 
with greater lesion severity (Insinga 2008; Hariri 2012).  
 This study extends prior research describing the public health impact of HPV 
vaccination. Ecological data have shown large declines in HPV infections and genital warts 
following vaccine introduction in the U.S (Bauer 2012; Kahn 2012; Markowitz 2013). An 
individual-level analysis of national survey data observed 82% lower HPV-16/18 prevalence 
among vaccinated ("1 dose) versus unvaccinated sexually active adolescent females (Markowitz 
2013). Outside of the U.S., a population-based cohort study in Sweden reported monotonic 
decreases in genital wart incidence with each additional dose of the quadrivalent series 
(Herweijer 2014). Conversely, in an analysis of cervical abnormalities among Australian 11-27 
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year-olds in 2007, modest risk reductions versus no vaccination were seen with one dose, but the 
estimated reductions were only statistically significant starting from the two-dose level (Crowe 
2014). Initiation/completion rates were high (84%/70%) within the region’s school-based 
vaccination program, so the lack of significance with one dose may have been due to relatively 
small numbers (Crowe 2014).  
Internationally, there has been growing interest in one- or two-dose HPV vaccination 
schedules (Markowitz 2014; President’s Cancer Panel 2013; Natunen 2011; WHO 2014). In 
settings where the costs or logistics of three-dose vaccination are prohibitive, effectiveness 
evidence on fewer than three doses could be a critical factor for country-level vaccine adoption 
decisions (Natunen 2011; WHO 2014). In the U.S., the recommended three-dose regimen is 
unlikely to change on the basis of population-based surveillance studies, especially if future 
studies continue to show optimal risk reductions with three doses. However, observational data 
could guide policy and clinical efforts to increase HPV vaccine coverage, considering that the 
goals of increasing vaccine initiation versus improving multi-dose adherence probably require 
different strategies. Real-world evidence of significant protection with one or two doses may also 
encourage better vaccine acceptability at the individual level in both high- and low-resource 
settings (Kahn 2008; Natunen 2011; Francis 2010). 
To date, trial-based evaluations of reduced-dose regimens have been restricted to 
intermediate endpoints. The available data suggest that partial vaccination may be efficacious but 
also provide some evidence of incremental benefit from a third dose. In a Canadian trial of 9-13 
year-old girls randomized to two or three quadrivalent vaccine doses, antibody responses to 
HPV-6/11/16/18 were non-inferior with two doses at month 7, but non-inferiority was lost at 
subsequent visits for HPV-6/18 (Dobson 2013). In a recent post-hoc analysis of the Costa Rica 
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and PATRICIA trials, one, two, and three doses of bivalent vaccine showed similar protection 
against persistent 16/18-type infections over four years of observation (Kreimer 2015). Cross-
protection against persistent 31/33/45-type infections was limited to three doses, although a sub-
analysis suggested that cross-protection may occur with two doses spaced apart by "6 months 
(Kreimer 2015). In the Costa Rica trial, antibodies against 16/18 remained stable for four years 
even with one dose, but were approximately five times higher with three doses (Safaeian 2013).  
My effect estimates for full vaccination are supported by data from epidemiologic studies 
and vaccine trials among 15-26 year-old women. For example, the 53% (95% CI: 45-60) 
reduction in CIN2+ with three doses aligns with the U.S. proportion of CIN2+ cases attributed to 
HPV-16/18 (54-59%) (Insinga 2008; Hariri 2012). Assuming no cross-protection, this 16/18-
attributable proportion provides an estimate for the percent of CIN2+ that is vaccine-preventable, 
given that the vaccines prevented 95-98% of 16/18-related CIN2+ when administered before 
infection (Lehtinen 2012; Kjaer 2009). Vaccination only prevented 52-61% of 16/18-related 
CIN2+ within the mix of HPV-exposed and –unexposed trial participants; however, mean age at 
vaccine initiation was approximately four years older than in the present study. 
 
Limitations 
Strengths of this study include the use of a large administrative database with enrollees in 
all U.S. states, which provides sufficient sample and follow-up for a dose-stratified analysis of 
cervical endpoints. However, this study is subject to some important limitations. Because it is 
observational, bias from unmeasured confounders is possible. Within the study sample, ZIP 
code-level socioeconomic advantage tends to increase with increasing dose level. Other 
unobserved factors could correlate with both vaccination status and HPV exposure risk. 
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Nevertheless, I use IPTW to control for a number of covariates likely to be associated with 
vaccine exposure and the outcomes. This approach yields balanced distributions of observed 
covariates across the dose groups, and does not appreciably change my estimates. The magnitude 
and pattern of effect sizes are also well aligned with expectations for vaccines targeting HPV-
16/18. 
Indeed, one key threat to validity is that sexual history and HPV vaccination status could 
be correlated. My analyses include reasonable proxies for higher HPV exposure risk (i.e., history 
of testing/diagnoses for other sexually transmitted infections), which do not monotonically or 
substantially differ across dose groups. Previous survey studies also have found no significant 
associations between HPV vaccination status and age of sexual initiation (Markowitz 2013; 
Liddon 2012; Marchand 2013) or number of partners (Liddon 2012; Marchand 2013), though 
one study noted more sex partners among vaccinated (versus unvaccinated) adolescents 
(Markowitz 2013). 
 Some misclassification of exposure could occur due to vaccinations not captured by 
administrative claims. Yet such underreporting should be minimal because HPV vaccines are 
expensive and covered by private insurance. Further, few study subjects would have been 
eligible for federally funded free vaccinations. 
Outcomes data are unavailable for age-eligible enrollees who did not initiate screening 
during the study timeframe; however, I expect those who underwent screening to be a more 
policy-relevant population of adolescents who were likely past sexual initiation by the time of 
outcome ascertainment. Sensitivity analyses suggest that potential selection bias from 
conditioning on screening participation is unlikely to account for the observed dose-response 
patterns, particularly among the "1 dose levels. Screening-related selection bias also would not 
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explain the analogous finding in Sweden of a dose-response relationship between HPV 
vaccination and genital warts, a symptomatic rather than screening-detected endpoint (Herweijer 
2014). 
Despite its size, MarketScan is not representative of the entire private insurance market or 
general U.S. population. While I do not observe effect modification across socioeconomic 
subgroups, vaccine effectiveness may be sensitive to population-specific characteristics such as 
timing of sexual initiation and prevalence of vaccine-targeted HPV types.  
 
Conclusions 
 Adolescent girls who received three HPV vaccine doses show significantly reduced risks 
of cervical abnormalities, including high-grade lesions that are considered precursors to cervical 
cancer. Partial vaccination with one or two doses is associated with significant but lesser risk 
reductions. These results, combined with preliminary trial evidence, suggest that HPV 
vaccination may be reasonably protective even when incomplete. My findings highlight the 
importance of increasing vaccine uptake, even when the patient or provider anticipates difficulty 
ensuring completion of subsequent doses. Further investigation is needed to assess both the 
efficacy and durability of protection from partial vaccination. Evidence of significant protection 
with only one or two doses could be an important driver of HPV vaccine acceptance, 
accessibility, and affordability in many countries. 
  
! !88 
!
Paper 3: 
 
Cost-effectiveness of performance-based contracts for obstetric care providers  
in rural India !  
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INTRODUCTION 
Maternal mortality and provider quality in India 
Globally, there were an estimated 303,000 deaths due to pregnancy and childbirth in 
2015, with the vast majority occurring in developing countries (WHO 2015a). Maternal deaths 
usually occur during the labor, delivery, and immediate postpartum stages of maternity (Lassi 
2014), and are largely preventable using available and effective medical interventions. 
Postpartum hemorrhage, the single largest cause of maternal mortality, can often be averted 
through inexpensive prophylactic measures (e.g., administration of oxytocic drugs during the 
third stage of labor, uterine massage); meanwhile, interventions such as blood transfusions, 
further oxytocic treatment, or manual removal of the placenta can effectively manage bleeding in 
time to prevent death (WHO 2012; Hofmeyr 2013). Sepsis and sepsis-related mortality can be 
prevented through clean delivery practices, prophylactic antibiotics during caesarean section, and 
therapeutic antibiotics (WHO 2008). Monitoring, drug therapy, and induction of labor when 
appropriate can prevent the progression of pre-eclampsia to eclampsia, as well as lower the risk 
of death from these hypertensive disorders (WHO 2011). 
In India, poor maternal health outcomes continue to be a significant problem despite large 
increases in hospital-based deliveries over the past decade (Das & Hammer 2014; IIPS 2014). 
Low-quality medical care is one likely cause of pregnancy-related complications and death 
among women who give birth in health facilities. Evidence suggests that poor quality of care in 
India stems from a combination of insufficient knowledge of clinically appropriate procedures 
and deficits in effort among providers (Das 2008; Das 2012a; Tielsch 2015). In a vignette study 
of primary care providers (in which actors posed as patients to test providers’ knowledge), Das et 
al. (2012a) found low levels of adherence to basic essential procedures for common illnesses, 
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with only small differences in adherence between providers with and without medical 
qualifications. Another study that combined vignettes with direct observation of patient-provider 
interactions noted a gap between what trained providers know versus what they do: In Delhi’s 
private sector, providers without an MBBS knew only 20% of essential tasks but performed 
nearly all of this 20%, whereas providers with an MBBS knew 40% of essential tasks when 
tested but performed only 25% (Das 2008). Reward payments based on performance measures 
may help address such “know-do” gaps by aligning provider incentives with patient health goals. 
 
Cost-effectiveness of paying for quality: State of the evidence 
Under pay-for-performance (P4P), health care providers receive financial incentives 
based on pre-specified performance indicators, which may relate to process-of-care quality or 
(less commonly) patients’ health outcomes. P4P schemes are now widespread in the U.S. and 
other high-income countries (Eijkenaar 2012), and have become increasingly popular in low- and 
middle-income countries as a policy instrument to encourage the delivery of high-value medical 
interventions (Witter 2012; Meessen 2011; Barter 2014; Miller 2013). Research on P4P has 
yielded mixed results but suggests that P4P programs can be effective in achieving quality 
improvements depending on the health context and specific design features (e.g., whether 
rewards are allocated to individual providers, teams, or organizations; type of performance 
measures used; secondary program features such as training or feedback, etc.) (Eijkenaar 2013; 
Miller 2013).  
However, it remains unclear whether P4P represents a good use of resources, even when 
it is found to have the desired effects on quality. Most evaluations of P4P initiatives have 
focused exclusively on their effectiveness without considering costs or cost-effectiveness, an 
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evidence gap that has been highlighted by several review articles and commentaries (Maynard 
2012; Meacock 2014; Eijkenaar 2013; de Bruin 2011; Emmert 2012; Peterson 2006). Past 
economic evaluations of P4P have generally been inconclusive because they either failed to 
incorporate a sufficiently broad range of cost categories, or did not attempt to convert measures 
of P4P program effectiveness into standard metrics (e.g., quality-adjusted life years) that would 
enable comparisons with recommended willingness-to-pay thresholds (Emmert 2012). Cost-
effectiveness evidence is especially sparse in resource-constrained settings, where operating 
efficient P4P programs may be particularly challenging (e.g., due to a lack of pre-existing 
infrastructure for collecting performance data) (Borghi 2015). 
 
Specific aims 
 My paper examines the cost-effectiveness of two P4P interventions that aim to improve 
maternal health in rural Karnataka, India. The cost-effectiveness model uses primary data from a 
recently-completed randomized experiment, which tested two forms of P4P versus a control arm 
among private obstetric care providers: (i) outcome-based P4P, where rewards are based on the 
measured occurrence of obstetric complication outcomes; and (ii) input-based P4P, where 
rewards are based on measures of adherence to guideline-recommended practices. In this study, 
the input-based approach appeared to generate a 9 percentage point reduction in the probability 
of postpartum hemorrhage compared to the control arm, although similar improvements were not 
seen with respect to other measured complications or under outcome-based P4P. I extrapolate 
from these trial findings to assess whether the interventions are economically attractive given 
region-specific willingness-to-pay thresholds.  
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METHODS 
Overview of randomized experiment 
Participants 
The Experimental Evaluation of Performance Incentive Contracts was a cluster-
randomized experiment designed to evaluate the effectiveness of P4P contracts aiming to 
improve the quality of maternal health care in rural Karnataka (Mohanan 2015). The study was 
jointly funded by the State Government of Karnataka and external donors, including the World 
Bank, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, and the UK Department for International 
Development.  
Participants were eligible if they were private medical providers who performed obstetric 
services in rural areas of the state, defined as hoblis in which there were no large public health 
providers (e.g., district hospital, taluk hospital, sub-divisional hospital, community health center, 
or 24/7 primary health center). Providers were ineligible if they provided obstetric care 
infrequently (<24 deliveries per year), or moved from the region before randomization. Providers 
were recruited into the study through a three-stage process that included field work seeking to 
identify all formal obstetric care providers in targeted regions of Karnataka, interviews with 
providers to assess eligibility, and snowball sampling to identify additional eligible providers 
missed by the initial field work. Details of the recruitment and screening process are presented in 
Figure 3.1. 
 
Financial incentives 
Providers were randomly assigned to one of three intervention arms: input-based P4P, 
outcome-based P4P, or control contracts.  
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The outcome-based P4P arm received financial rewards contingent on the measured risk 
of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes among their patients: postpartum 
hemorrhage, pre-eclampsia/eclampsia, sepsis, and neonatal mortality. For each maternal health 
outcome, providers were rewarded per percentage point reduction in the estimated risk of the 
complication that they achieved in their patient population relative to a pre-specified 
performance benchmark. The reward payment to provider p for outcome i was calculated as: 
! !!" ! !! !! ! !!" ! !"",  if!!!!" ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!if!!!!" ! !! ! 
where !!" is the measured probability of outcome i in the provider’s patient population; !! is the 
estimated pre-intervention probability of outcome i for the average provider in rural Karnataka 
(!!!!=0.35, !!"=0.20, and !!=0.08); and !! is a constant corresponding to the incremental 
reward (in Rs.) per percentage point reduction, which was predetermined based on available 
budget and the anticipated range of provider performance for outcome i (!!!!=850, !!"=1750, 
and !!=8650). For neonatal death, providers under outcome P4P were given a fixed reward of 
Rs. 15,000 if they achieved zero neonatal deaths in their population.  
The input-based P4P arm instead received rewards based on measures of adherence to 
clinically appropriate processes of care among their patients. Process measures were formulated 
using World Health Organization (WHO) guideline recommendations for basic obstetric care 
(WHO 2009) and included five domain scores: Pregnancy Care, Childbirth Care, Postnatal 
Maternal Care, Newborn Care, and Postnatal Newborn Care.  Domain scores were each 
calculated on a 0 to 1 scale, based on a simple average of binary indicators for specific within-
domain health service inputs (2 to 26 indicators, depending on the domain). Rewards were 
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calculated per percentage point improvement in each domain score versus a pre-specified 
performance benchmark. For each domain k, the reward payment to provider p was: 
! !!" ! !! !!" ! !! ! !"",  if!!!!" ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!if!!!!" ! !! ! 
where !!" is the measured score for domain k in the provider’s patient population; !! is the 
estimated pre-intervention average score for domain k among providers in rural Karnataka 
(!!"=0.85, !!!=0.65, !!"#=0.50, !!"=0.80, and !!"#=0.70); and !! is a constant corresponding 
to the reward (in Rs.) per percentage point improvement (!!"=3700, !!!=750, !!"#=450, !!"=1850, and !!"#=950).  
Providers in the input- and outcome-based P4P arms were informed that inputs or 
outcomes would be measured through household surveys of patients who present to them for 
delivery over a 1-year period. They were told that they could potentially earn up to a maximum 
of roughly Rs. 150,000 (~$2,500 at the time, which is over 15% of a mid-level doctor’s salary). 
To minimize the likelihood that providers selectively turn away high-risk patients, their contracts 
stated that the reward payment would be voided if there is evidence in the local population of 
refusal to provide care (with the exception of medically appropriate referrals to higher-tier 
facilities). Contracts included a similar provision that rewards would be voided if it is found that 
providers selectively reported deliveries that took place in their facility.  
Providers in the control contracts arm were offered no financial incentives for 
performance, but were told about the input and outcome measures and provided with the same 
educational materials as the other arms (the 2009 WHO guidelines and a detailed set of 
guidelines from the Government of India). Additionally, all study arms received three 
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installments of Rs. 2,500 (~$41) for their participation in the program and another payout of Rs. 
1,000 (~$16) for their efforts in transmitting patient lists. 
 
Study procedures  
Study procedures included a total of four in-person provider visits. During the baseline 
visit (Oct 2012 – Jan 2013), the field team collected preliminary data about providers, including 
their volume of deliveries and facility capabilities.  At the first intervention visit (February-April 
2013), providers received educational materials and were randomized to an intervention arm 
after an initial series of questions to confirm eligibility (Figure 3.1). The second intervention visit 
(May-August 2013) included an open-ended interview with providers to discuss any quality 
improvement efforts they had undertaken and other topics. At this visit, the team also arranged 
for biweekly collection of patient lists from the provider. At the third intervention visit 
(September-November 2014), which occurred after the household data collection was complete, 
the team collected follow-up data on facility capabilities and supplies and distributed rewards.  
Performance data was collected via household surveys of patients chosen at random from 
providers’ full patient lists over the course of a year from the second intervention visit. 
Interviews were conducted at approximately two weeks from the delivery to prevent loss of 
recall (Das 2012b). The main household instrument was an approximately 1-hour closed-ended 
questionnaire and included questions pertaining to complication outcomes, input quality, and a 
range of other topics (e.g., demographic and socioeconomic information, detailed birth history, 
general health history, total hospital expenditure for delivery at the provider’s facility, etc.).8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The specific questions used to measure obstetric complications were formulated based on published validation 
studies by Filippi et al. (2000), Stewart & Festin (1995), and Souza et al. (2010). Because no studies had been 
conducted to validate process-of-care measures of maternal health care quality based on patient recall, study 
investigators undertook such a validation study in Gujarat and Karnataka prior to the experiment (forthcoming). The 
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The intent-to-treat population included the 140 providers randomized during the first 
intervention visit (Figure 3.1). Attrition was low and not statistically different between the 
groups. Overall, five providers opted out of the study prior to household data collection (two 
from the input group, three from the control group). The final analytical sample thus included 
135 providers, with a corresponding household survey sample of 2,608 patients. To reduce the 
potential for bias due to provider dropout after randomization, the main estimates of program 
effect in the impact evaluation study and the present cost-effectiveness analysis are risk-adjusted 
using a pre-specified set of patient- and provider-level characteristics. 
 !  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
study used senior nursing students to observe and document whether various indicators of input quality were 
provided, and these data were subsequently compared to responses from interviews with the same mothers 
approximately two weeks later. Measures with high sensitivity and specificity were selected for use during the 
randomized experiment. 
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of participating obstetric care providers 
 
!
 
Model overview 
Using a decision tree approach, the cost-effectiveness model simulates a heterogeneous 
cross-sectional population of pregnant women presenting for delivery at various participating 
provider facilities during the 1-year contract period. The modeling timeframe spans each 
individual’s remaining lifetime, counting from her age at the contract year delivery. The 
hypothetical population is constructed to mirror characteristics in the target population of 
patients and providers in rural Karnataka. Specifically, for each woman included in the original 
household survey sample, the model population includes a clone with identical baseline 
characteristics (e.g., demographics, obstetric history, and pre-contract provider-level factors), but 
140 providers randomized in intent-to-treat sample
208 contacted to arrange first provider intervention 
visit, during which study team confirmed eligibility 
and interest and identified additional eligible 
providers through snowball sampling
39 excluded based on basic demographic and 
infrastructure data collected during 
preliminary field work280 providers included in the baseline study, which 
collected preliminary data about providers (e.g., 
volume of deliveries, facility capabilities) to assess 
study eligibility
53 in outcome contracts arm
38 in input contracts arm
44 in control contracts arm
24 added through 
snowball sampling
72 excluded based on baseline provider data 
collection (had stopped conducting deliveries, 
provided obstetric care services rarely or 
irregularly, or moved from the area)
319 providers identified as potentially eligible based 
on government-commissioned field work
19 declined to respond to interviews or 
participate in study
73 ineligible (performed <2 deliveries per 
month, practiced at large multi-specialty 
hospitals or in urban areas included in error 
earlier, or relocated outside of study regions)
5 dropped out before third study visit and 
household data collection 
2 from input arm
3 from control arm
53 in outcome contracts arm
40 in input contracts arm
47 in control contracts arm
135 providers in analytical sample
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with randomization group reassigned according to the policy scenario being modeled: (i) status 
quo; (ii) input-based P4P; or (iii) outcome-based P4P. 
Within the 1-year contract period, women’s risks of delivery-related complications vary 
depending on both the policy scenario and patient/provider characteristics; I derive these risk 
equations through primary analyses of the trial data. Women who experience complications are 
at risk of maternal mortality, conditional on the type of complication(s). P4P interventions are 
assumed to have no impact on the case fatality rate for a given complication type. Beyond the 
contract period, those who survive the delivery in Year 1 are assumed to live out their remaining 
life expectancy, with future life-years discounted at a rate of 3% per year. Costs are calculated 
from both a societal and program perspective and include average costs per delivery associated 
with program implementation (e.g., costs of performance and participation rewards, meetings 
with providers, data collection, etc.), the medical management of complications, and 
uncompensated provider effort. Health outcomes are similarly expressed per patient delivery and 
include the expected number of maternal complications, number of deliveries with "1 
complication(s), number of maternal deaths (overall and by cause), and discounted life-years. 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are calculated as cost per life year saved, as well as 
cost per maternal complication averted. As recommended by the WHO, I consider interventions 
with ICERs (cost per life year saved) less than gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to be 
very cost-effective, and those with ICERs less than three times GDP per capita to be reasonably 
cost-effective (WHO 2015b). 
Model calculations are deterministic and are performed using SAS version 9.4 (SAS 
Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Because expected health outcomes are subject to patient 
heterogeneity and are calculated through a non-linear function of patient- and provider-level 
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characteristics, the model first performs a separate deterministic calculation for each individual 
in the hypothetical population and then takes the average of expected outcomes and costs across 
individuals (Koerkamp 2011).  
  
Parameter estimation 
Risk of complications and intervention effectiveness 
The model assumes that P4P interventions affect life expectancy within the target 
population solely by changing the occurrence of major obstetric complications that cause 
maternal mortality. Based on the set of maternal complications measured in the household 
survey, I consider three adverse clinical outcomes of delivery9 (postpartum hemorrhage, sepsis, 
and pre-eclampsia/eclampsia) and assume that P4P interventions have no impact on other 
unmeasured complication types.  
Using household survey data from the experiment, I estimate the following logistic 
regression equation to model the absolute risk of each obstetric complication among women who 
present to participating providers for delivery, conditional on treatment arm and exogenous risk 
factors: 
logit P[yip=1|Tp, Xp, Zi] = B0 + B1Tp + B2Xp + B3Zi 
 
Above, yip is an indicator for the complication of interest for patient i seeking delivery assistance 
from provider p, and Tp is a vector of treatment group indicators. Xp is a vector of provider 
characteristics measured before the contract period, including: gender; professional qualifications !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Given the non-differential risk of neonatal mortality across the three randomization arms (Mohanan 2015) and the 
general convention of not incorporating neonatal health outcomes in decision models of maternal health (Goldie 
2010), neonatal death is not considered as a model outcome in the cost-effectiveness analysis. However, program 
expenditures under outcome P4P include the Rs. 15,000 reward given to providers who achieve zero neonatal deaths 
(a reward which nearly all providers received due to the rarity of this outcome). 
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(MBBS, BAMS, or other); number of years in practice; and district where the provider’s facility 
is located. Zi is a vector of the following pre-delivery or time-invariant patient characteristics: 
mother’s age (in years) and age2 at delivery; history of hypertension, diabetes, and stomach 
surgery; whether it is the mother’s first pregnancy; whether the mother has previously had a 
stillbirth or abortion; number of previous children birthed; mother’s education level (illiterate; 
attended primary school only; attended secondary school or higher); household’s caste 
(scheduled caste; scheduled tribe; other backward class; general class or other unspecified caste); 
whether the household owns land; and whether the household owns a Below Poverty Line card 
(i.e., an identifier issued by the state government to households eligible for various assistance 
programs).10  
 The cost-effectiveness model uses the fitted risk equations to obtain predicted 
probabilities of obstetric complications for each woman in the hypothetical cohort under each 
model scenario. I conservatively assume that the adjusted complication probabilities 
corresponding to control arm assignment are representative of the status quo scenario, which 
assumes no incremental benefit from the provider intervention visits, provision of educational 
materials, and participation rewards alone. 
Table 3.1 below presents effect estimates and adjusted outcome probabilities from each 
risk equation. (Detailed regression output is provided in Appendix C.1.) The odds of postpartum 
hemorrhage are 39% lower under input P4P compared to control contracts, which translates to a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This model specification is chosen for consistency with the pre-specified full model used in the main impact 
evaluation, but with the following modifications to better suite the needs of the cost-effectiveness analysis: First, I fit 
logistic rather than linear regression equations to ensure that predicted probabilities are non-negative for all 
individuals in the hypothetical model population. Second, to improve the stability of the fitted equations, I remove 
indicators for comorbidities with low prevalence in the sample (hypo- or hyperthyroidism, asthma) and covariates 
that are closely correlated with other included variables (number of years that the provider’s facility has been in 
practice, number of previous pregnancies, whether the household has no literate adults, and house type). Third, I add 
a quadratic term for the mother’s age to reflect the possibility that both young and advanced maternal age could be 
risk factors for a given maternal complication. 
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9.6 percentage point reduction in absolute risk (p<0.05). Conversely, postpartum hemorrhage 
risk is similar between the outcome P4P and control groups. Risks of pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 
and sepsis do not significantly differ across the treatment groups, but are numerically higher 
under input and outcome P4P compared to control contracts.  
 
Table 3.1: Impact of provider incentives on maternal complication probabilities !
  Postpartum hemorrhage 
Pre-eclampsia/ 
eclampsia Sepsis 
Odds ratio (95% CI)    Input P4P 0.610  (0.30, 0.99) 1.152  (0.52, 2.55) 1.560  (0.61, 3.30) 
Outcome P4P 0.949  (0.59, 1.59) 1.302  (0.69, 2.89) 1.654  (0.87, 3.26) 
Control (ref) (ref) (ref) 
    Provider-level controls Y Y Y 
Patient-level controls Y Y Y 
    Adjusted risk of complication among 
patients presenting for delivery (%)    
Input P4P 28.2%  (19.9, 36.3) 20.3%  (12.6, 29.1) 8.3%  (5.0, 12.5) 
Outcome P4P 36.7%  (30.3, 44.1) 22.1%  (16.8, 29.0) 8.7%  (6.3, 12.8) 
Control 37.8%  (30.9, 45.8) 18.3%  (11.9, 25.0) 5.5%  (3.7, 8.8) 
N 2,608 2,608 2,608 
 
Notes: Logistic regression estimates are based on surveyed households from the randomized experiment. Using the 
fitted risk equations, adjusted complication risks are obtained by predicting each patient's risk under each treatment 
group scenario (input P4P, outcome P4P, or control), and then averaging across all patients for each scenario. 
Confidence intervals are from cluster bootstrapping to account for intra-cluster correlation between respondents 
from the same provider, and are constructed using the percentile method. (Note that because the adjusted risks are 
estimated using the average of individual-level predicted outcomes, rather than using predicted outcomes for a 
hypothetical patient with average covariate values, the odds ratios presented above cannot be precisely retrieved 
using the adjusted complication risks above.)  
 
These results are consistent with the main impact evaluation paper, in which investigators 
also present evidence of behavioral mechanisms that likely contributed to the observed reduction 
in postpartum hemorrhage risk under input P4P (Mohanan et al.; forthcoming). Namely, input 
P4P providers appeared to employ strategies such as uterine massage and active management of 
the third stage of labor more frequently than controls: Based on household survey responses, 
input P4P providers were 10 percentage points more likely to massage the abdomen after 
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delivery, and 6 percentage points more likely to administer oral or parenteral drugs to reduce 
bleeding. Consistent with these patient-reported findings, input P4P providers were 14 
percentage points more likely to have parenteral oxytocic drugs routinely available, based on a 
difference-in-difference analysis of baseline and final visit data from hospital personnel 
interviews. Further consideration of the effectiveness findings can be found in the Discussion. 
 
Natural disease history 
Additional epidemiologic parameters are derived using published sources, including the 
case fatality rates associated with postpartum hemorrhage, pre-eclampsia/eclampsia, and sepsis, 
probability of maternal death due to other causes, and the remaining life expectancies of mothers 
who survive the contract year delivery. 
 The case fatality rate for each maternal complication is defined as the conditional 
probability of a complication-specific death among women who experience that complication. 
Case fatality rates are derived through a disaggregation of overall maternal mortality risk by 
primary cause, as shown in Table 3.2. Column [i] lists the reported proportion of maternal deaths 
attributable to each complication from the Sample Registration System (SRS) Special Survey of 
Deaths, a survey that conducted a detailed enquiry into 1,383 maternal deaths in India during 
2001-2003 (Registrar General, India 2006). Because women in the target population are assumed 
to have survived up to the intrapartum (labor and delivery) stage of their maternity, I renormalize 
these attributable proportions after removing the estimated percentage of all maternal deaths that 
occur antepartum (before onset of delivery) (24.6%; Kassebaum 2014). The renormalized 
attributable proportions (column [ii]) are then multiplied by the overall risk of maternal death 
among women reaching the intrapartum stage, approximated as the maternal mortality ratio for 
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India in 2015 (174 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births; WHO 2015c) reduced by the 
percentage of maternal deaths occurring antepartum.11 The resulting probabilities (column [iii]) 
approximate the risk of death from each complication in the target population under the status 
quo; each of these probabilities is divided by the estimated fraction of the target population that 
experiences the complication under the status quo (column [iv]), yielding the case fatality rate 
(column [v]). 
 Although the occurrence of other obstetric complications is not explicitly modeled, I 
assume that all women in the target population are at risk of maternal mortality from other 
complications (e.g., obstructed labor) and indirect causes (e.g., pre-existing anemia exacerbated 
by pregnancy) (Registrar General, India 2006).  To estimate the risk of maternal mortality from 
other causes, I subtract the unconditional probabilities of death due to postpartum hemorrhage, 
pre-eclampsia/eclampsia, and sepsis (i.e., column [iii] of Table 3.2) from the overall risk of 
maternal mortality under the status quo (i.e., MMR*[1-0.246]). 
 For women who survive the contract year maternity, remaining life expectancy depends 
on age at the time of delivery. Using standard methods, life expectancy by age is derived from 
age-specific all-cause mortality rates for females in India (WHO 2013; see Appendix C.2 for 
calculation details and life expectancy table). 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 To better approximate the true risk of death among women reaching the intrapartum stage, I adjust the numerator 
of the MMR to only include maternal deaths occurring intrapartum or postpartum. I make no adjustment to the 
denominator of the MMR, with the assumption that the number of live births in a given span of time is sufficiently 
close to the number of maternities that reach the delivery stage. Although there is slight under-counting due to 
deliveries that result in stillbirths, this bias is offset by slight over-counting due to multiple births (e.g., twins) from 
the same delivery (Riffe 2010). 
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Table 3.2: Derivation of the case fatality rates associated with maternal complications  !
Maternal 
complication 
Attributable 
proportion of all 
maternal deaths 
[i] 
Attributable proportion of 
intrapartum and postpartum 
maternal deaths 
[ii]=[i]/(1-pante) 
Probability of death from 
complication in target pop 
under Status Quo 
[iii] = [ii]*MMR*(1-pante) 
Probability of 
complication 
under Status Quo 
[iv] 
Case fatality 
rate 
[v]=[iii]/[iv] 
Postpartum 
hemorrhage 0.38 0.50 0.000661 0.378 0.001750 
Pre-eclampsia/ 
eclampsia 0.05 0.07 0.000087 0.183 0.000476 
Sepsis 0.11 0.15 0.000191 0.055 0.003451 
 
Notes by table column: 
[i] Maternal death is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy 
irrespective of the duration and the site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy 
or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes (WHO 2015a). The remaining 46% of maternal 
deaths in India are attributed to: complications of miscarriage or abortion, obstructed labor, other direct causes (e.g., 
embolism, ectopic pregnancy), and indirect causes (i.e., new or pre-existing health conditions aggravated by 
pregnancy, such as anemia in women without hemorrhage) (Registrar General, India 2006). 
[ii] The proportion of maternal deaths occurring antepartum (pante) is estimated at 24.6% in the base-case analyses, 
based on a large meta-analysis by Kassebaum et al. (2014). The formula shown in column [ii] reflects my 
assumption that, in the vast majority of cases, deaths due to the three measured complications would be categorized 
as occurring in the intrapartum or postpartum stages. Although onset of the complication itself may occur before 
labor, the recommended course of action in such cases is often expedited delivery (WHO 2003). 
[iii] The base-case value of the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) is 0.00174 (WHO 2015c). Column [iii] takes 
MMR*(1-pante) as an approximation for the probability of maternal death among pregnant women surviving to the 
intrapartum stage. 
[iv] Complication probabilities are from primary analyses of trial data (see Table 3.1). 
[v] The case fatality rate gives the probability of death due to the specified maternal complication, conditional on 
experiencing that complication. 
 
 
Costs 
Perspective and scope of costs 
Costs are evaluated both from a program perspective and from a societal perspective. The 
program perspective includes accounting costs incurred by donors and the Government of 
Karnataka that are a result of P4P; as described below, program costs are further categorized as 
start-up costs or recurrent costs. In addition to these costs, the societal perspective also takes into 
account the economic costs of maternal complication management (which are typically incurred 
by the patient) and uncompensated provider effort.  
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 In line with recommended practice for cost-effectiveness analyses alongside clinical trials 
(Drummond 2005), my cost calculations exclude costs of the randomized experiment that were 
purely protocol-driven (e.g., costs related to program impact evaluation and other research 
activities); the aim of this model is to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of each intervention under 
the real-world conditions that would be in effect if the intervention is implemented.  
 
Start-up costs 
I use an activity-based approach to estimate program costs (Drummond 2005), first 
identifying the core set of activities that comprise each P4P program and then quantifying the 
accounting costs associated with each activity based on actual spending during the P4P 
experiment (or by consulting with program staff when original financial reports are unavailable).  
Start-up costs capture one-time capital expenses that were necessary to make the P4P 
programs operationally viable. As described in Appendix C.3, start-up activities include the 
development of provider and household survey instruments, identification of rural geographic 
areas to target within Karnataka, and preliminary field work to produce the initial list of 
potentially eligible providers and screen out ineligible providers. Note that, apart from the cost of 
investigators’ time to develop survey instruments, the costs of designing the randomized 
experiment are considered research-related and are therefore not included. I estimate the cost of 
each activity based on project reports, original financial statements from contractors, or 
consultation with key investigators and program staff who oversaw the field work or developed 
the survey instruments.  
In order to apportion program start-up costs at the individual patient level, these costs are 
divided out by the estimated total number of women who seek delivery assistance from 
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participating providers during the 1-year contract period. The number of participating providers 
is assumed to be 135 based on final sample size in the P4P experiment. The average number of 
deliveries per provider during the year (base-case value: 204) is estimated based on the monthly 
volume of deliveries that providers reported at the baseline and third intervention visits. 
 Consistent with other recent economic evaluations of P4P (Meacock 2014; Borghi 2015), 
I report cost-effectiveness results both including and excluding program start-up costs, and focus 
on the societal and program ICERs (excluding start-up costs) as the primary estimates for 
interpreting program cost-effectiveness. Although start-up costs are useful to consider as part of 
an ex post economic evaluation of the P4P initiatives, they represent sunk costs and therefore 
should not influence future decisions about the implementation of these P4P strategies in the 
region (Cellini 2010; Gold 1996). Moreover, one-time costs should ideally be annuitized based 
on the expected lifetime of the program (Drummond 2005), which is unknown for the Karnataka 
P4P interventions. By attributing all start-up costs to the first contract year, my model provides 
an upper limit for the start-up costs that are truly applicable to this 1-year period.  
  
Recurrent program costs 
Recurrent program costs include the costs of payouts to providers, periodic in-person 
visits with providers (four meetings per provider in a contract year), training of field associates 
who conduct the in-person provider visits, performance data collection through household 
interviews, and external field monitoring and support from the impact evaluation team 
(Appendix C.3). I calculate average performance rewards per provider based on actual payments 
to providers in the input and outcome P4P arms. Additional payouts for program participation 
and record-keeping are defined by program design.  
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The costs of training field associates are extracted from invoices submitted by the 
contractor organization that conducted the field work (Sambodhi!Research & Communications 
Pvt. Ltd.). (Due to potentially high turnover of field associates, I categorize training costs as a 
yearly recurrent expenditure rather than as a start-up cost.) The unit costs of visits and 
performance data collection per provider are computed based on total invoiced amount for these 
activities, and capture the expenses associated with: field staff wages, transportation, and 
meals/incidentals; office supplies and printed materials for meetings; dataset compilation; 
administrative support; organizational overhead; and oversight of the field work by managerial 
staff. The unit cost of performance data collection also account for the costs associated with 
recruiting and training household interviewers, a different set of staff members from the field 
associates who conducted in-person provider visits. 
Lastly, the costs of external monitoring per program year includes the annual 
employment costs of a full-time project manager, contracted by the impact evaluation team 
(COHESIVE-India; Duke University) to supplement the efforts of field managers at Sambodhi 
and ensure adherence to data collection protocols. This cost component is measured using 
original invoices from the project manager’s India-based employer, and covers salary/benefits, 
house rent allowance, and transportation expenses.   
To compute total recurrent program cost per patient delivery, the per-provider costs of all 
payouts and field work are divided by the expected number of deliveries per provider over a 1-
year period. Training and external monitoring costs, which I treat as fixed yearly costs, are 
divided by the expected number of deliveries across all participating providers. 
 
Provider effort costs 
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As mentioned by Meacock et al. (2014), providers can incur substantial costs as a result 
of their participation in P4P programs, and these costs may or may not be fully offset by the 
reward payouts. Under the Karnataka P4P programs, providers received an unconditional 
participation reward of Rs. 2,500 per study visit, an amount that likely covered the value of 
providers’ time spent meeting with field staff.12 It is less clear, however, whether the 
performance-based rewards adequately compensated providers for their quality improvement 
efforts. In the base-case analysis, I assume that the average performance reward is equal to the 
true average value of providers’ increased effort, with the rationale that participating providers 
were aware of and accepted the price per incremental improvement listed in their contracts.  
 One potential threat to this assumption is that, under the prevailing payment structure 
(fee-for-service), Karnataka providers could conceivably have accepted the reward contracts 
with the intention of passing along the cost of incentivized services to the patient or insurer. As 
described in Appendix C.4, I explore this possibility through regression analyses of patients’ 
self-reported total bill for their delivery at the participating provider’s facility, and find no 
evidence of higher hospital bills within the input or outcome P4P arms, even when adjusting for 
differential complication risks across the arms. 
 Nevertheless, it is still possible that effort costs exceeded rewards if providers 
systematically overestimated their final payout. For example, in the input P4P contracts, the 
description of input performance measurement was intentionally vague to prevent “teaching to 
the test” (i.e., disproportionately focusing on incentivized services), and to discourage gaming 
attempts. The specific questions used to measure input performance were selected based on each 
input’s observability to patients in an earlier validation study, and captured only a subset of all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This conclusion is based on the estimated OB/GYN specialist salary listed in Appendix C.5, as well as the control 
group providers’ acceptance of these participation rewards as sole compensation for engaging in the study visits. 
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clinically important services. Moreover, each domain score formula gave equal weight to all 
included inputs, regardless of any variation in the cost of delivering different inputs. 
Consequently, providers who focused on unmeasured or undervalued elements of input 
performance may have expected higher rewards than they ultimately received.  
To address this possibility, I conduct an alternative analysis that varies the average cost 
of uncompensated provider effort from the base-case value (i.e., $0) to the maximum possible 
value (i.e., the maximum performance reward specified in providers’ contracts minus the average 
performance reward that providers received). 
 
Complication management costs 
Women who experience obstetric complications are assumed to incur additional medical 
treatment costs beyond the normal costs of delivery, either at the original provider facility or at a 
higher-tier referral facility. This cost component is included under the societal perspective to 
capture the potential cost offsets associated with P4P. Because the per-patient costs of delivery 
are otherwise assumed to be common across all three model scenarios, such costs are omitted 
from the analyses.  
The average cost of managing each complication type is extracted from secondary 
sources. For the base-case analysis, I use the United Nations OneHealth Costing Tool to estimate 
the set of resource inputs needed to manage each maternal complication according to WHO 
treatment protocols (IAWG-Costing 2015). The OneHealth tool follows an ingredients approach 
to calculate the expected cost of drugs and supplies per complication case, first estimating the 
average units of each item needed per case and then valuing these inputs using price listings from 
the Management Sciences for Health (MSH) International Drug Price Indicator Guide and the 
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UNICEF Supply Catalogue. The tool also provides estimates of the health care personnel time 
(minutes per personnel type) and length of hospital stay required per complication case; I value 
these additional resource requirements using country-specific unit costs per hospital bed day 
(which capture the “hotel” portion of hospital costs) and personnel salaries from the WHO 
CHOICE databases (WHO 2015d; see Appendix C.5). 
In order to inform the choice of distributions for these unit costs in the probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis, I extract alternative complication cost estimates from published costing 
studies in developing countries, each of which examined complication management costs 
according to usual practice at the surveyed hospitals (Levin 2003; Borghi 2003; Weissman 
1999). For each of the three measured complications, the base-case unit cost value derived from 
the OneHealth tool is within the range of literature estimates (Appendix C.5). 
 
Currency units 
The reference year for all costs is 2014. Cost estimates that are originally reported in a different 
year are first translated into INR using the currency exchange for that year (if not originally 
reported in INR), inflation-adjusted to 2014 INR using GDP deflators for India, and then 
translated into 2014 USD using the 2014 exchange rate of 61.02951:1. 
 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
Univariate and probabilistic sensitivity analyses 
I conduct univariate sensitivity analyses to identify which parameters have a strong 
influence on model outcomes, and a probabilistic sensitivity analysis to assess the degree of 
certainty that an intervention is cost-effective at varying willingness-to-pay thresholds. For the 
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probabilistic sensitivity analysis, I use the non-parametric approach of bootstrapping to obtain 
500 alternative sets of parameters from the primary trial data. Specifically, I use cluster 
bootstrapping to account for the correlated structure of the household survey data (Field & Welsh 
2007). For each replication, I resample 135 provider clusters with replacement from the original 
set of participating providers, repeat the same parameter estimation steps used in the base-case 
analysis (e.g., fit risk equations for each maternal complication, calculate average performance 
payouts for each P4P strategy), and construct the hypothetical model population using the new 
bootstrap sample. 
 For other model parameters derived from secondary sources (i.e., prior publications, 
financial reports, or consultation with project staff), distributional assumptions are described in 
Table 3.3. I use a Dirichlet distribution to jointly characterize uncertainty around the proportions 
of maternal deaths attributable to different complication types under the status quo. 
Hyperparameters for this distribution are directly based on the counts of maternal deaths by 
primary cause from the SRS Special Survey of Deaths census report (Registrar General of India, 
2006).13 I fit beta distributions to the point estimates and uncertainty intervals (UI) given by the 
WHO for the MMR (India 2015 estimate: 0.00174; 80% UI: 0.00139-0.00217), and by 
Kassebaum et al. (2014) for the fraction of maternal deaths occurring antepartum (global 2013 
estimate: 0.246; 95% UI: 0.241-0.252). I assume that uncertainty in the attributable proportion of 
maternal deaths for each complication is independent of uncertainty in both the overall risk of 
maternal death and the risks of complications under the status quo. However, case fatality rates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Taking advantage of the Dirichlet-multinomial conjugate prior relationship, I use an uninformative prior of 
Dirichlet(%pph=1, %pe=1, %s=1, %oth=1) for the proportions of maternal deaths attributable to different complication 
types, which yields a posterior distribution of Dirichlet(%pph=1+rpph, %pe=1+rpe, %s=1+rs, %oth=1+roth) given an 
observation of ri maternal deaths caused by complication type i in the SRS Special Survey of Deaths. 
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for maternal complications are re-derived from these parameters within each simulation to ensure 
consistency between model output and all epidemiologic parameters. 
 With the exception of provider payouts, program cost components are assigned a Normal 
distribution with a coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to mean) equal to 0.2 (or 
0.3 for costs estimated through consultation with program staff). The values of 0.2-0.3 are 
arbitrary but reflect moderate uncertainty about the program costs that would be incurred in 
repeated iterations of the randomized experiment. Lastly, for the unit cost of managing each 
complication type, I assign gamma distributions with the mean equal to the point estimate from 
the OneHealth costing tool and standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of all 
alternative unit cost estimates (Appendix C.5). 
 In addition to the probabilistic sensitivity analysis, I perform univariate sensitivity 
analyses to identify parameters with a strong influence on model outcomes. The value of each 
parameter is varied one at a time between the lower and upper limits of its plausible range, 
defined as its 95% confidence interval. For each parameter examined in the univariate sensitivity 
analysis, I identify the threshold values at which the strategy is cost-effective at willingness-to-
pay thresholds of GDP per capita and three times GDP per capita, if these threshold values fall 
within the parameter’s plausible range. 
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Table 3.3: Model parameters: Base-case values and distributional assumptions  !
Parameter Base-case value Distribution in PSA Source 
Maternal mortality     
Maternal mortality ratio (maternal 
deaths/100,000 live births) - Status Quo 
0.00174 Beta(%=34, &=19506) WHO estimate of MMR 
India 2015 
Fraction of maternal deaths attributable to 
obstetric complications - Status Quo 
    
Postpartum hemorrhage 0.38 Dirichlet(%pph=527, %pe=70, 
%s=153, %oth=637) 
Registrar General, India - 
SRS Special Survey of 
Deaths - 2001-2003 
Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 0.05 
Sepsis 0.11 
Other complications and indirect causes 0.46 
Fraction of maternal deaths occurring 
antepartum under Status Quo 
0.246 Beta(%=5,781, &=17,719) Kassebaum 2014 
Case fatality rates associated with obstetric 
complications 
    
Postpartum hemorrhage 0.001750 Bootstrap CI: 0.0012-0.0026 Derived from parameters 
above Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 0.000476 Bootstrap CI: 0.0003-0.0009 
Sepsis 0.003451 Bootstrap CI: 0.0019-0.0058 
Probability of maternal death from other 
causes in target population 
0.000372 Bootstrap CI: 0.0003-0.0005 Derived from parameters 
above 
      
Above-treatment program costs     
Start-up costs       
Cost of preparing and validating survey 
instruments 
110,000  Normal(µ=110000, '=33000) Consultation with project 
staff 
Cost of delineating program-eligible  
regions 
25,000  Normal(µ=25000, '=7500) Consultation with project 
staff  
Cost of identifying potentially eligible 
providers 
19,497  Normal(µ=19497, '=5849) Consultation with project 
staff 
Cost of screening out ineligible providers 27,871  Normal(µ=27871, '=5574) Invoices, Sambodhi 
Research & 
Communications Pvt Ltd 
     
Reurrent costs     
Average performance reward per provider     
Input-based contracts 277.18 Bootstrap CI: 186-330 Primary trial data 
Outcome-based contracts 954.28 Bootstrap CI: 836-1,065 Primary trial data 
Participation rewards per provider 122.89 Fixed Defined by program 
Record-keeping reward per provider 16.39 Fixed Defined by program 
Cost of field staff training per contract year 4,229 Normal(µ=4,229, '=845.8) Invoices, Sambodhi 
Research & 
Communications Pvt Ltd  
Cost per in-person visit with provider 122.24 Normal(µ=122.24, '=24.45) 
Cost of performance data collection per 
provider 
1,028 Normal(µ=1,028, '=205.6) 
Cost of external project management and 
field monitoring per contract year 
26,869 Normal(µ=26,869, '=5,374) Invoices, Kelly Services 
Pvt Ltd  
Number of in-person visits per provider 
during contract year 
4 Fixed Defined by program 
      
Size of target population     
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Number of program-eligible obstetric care 
providers in rural Karnataka 
135 Fixed Primary trial data 
Number of deliveries per provider during 
contract year 
204 Bootstrap CI: 190-226 Primary trial data 
      
Treatment costs     
Cost of uncompensated provider effort 0 Fixed Assumption 
Average cost of complication management 
per case 
    
Postpartum hemorrhage 76.03 Gamma(%=2.609, &=29.141) OneHealth costing tool; 
Levin 2003; Borghi 2003; 
Weissman 1999 
Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 107.95 Gamma(%=2.992, &=36.082) 
Sepsis 116.99 Gamma(%=0.959, &=122.043) !
 
Alternative analyses 
I also conduct alternative analyses in which I vary one or more parameters based on 
assumptions that are either more or less conservative than those used in the base case analysis. 
As described earlier, one set of alternative analyses assumes that the costs of providers’ quality 
improvement efforts are not fully offset by the financial incentives, and recalculates the societal 
ICER accordingly.  
In another set of alternative analyses, I assume that the content and/or management of the 
P4P programs can be strategically modified to reduce program spending without altering their 
effects on maternal health outcomes. Three potential modifications are tested: (i) reducing the 
cost of conducting household interviews by 25%; (ii) reducing the number of in-person provider 
visits from four to three visits per contract year; and (iii) eliminating the need for external project 
management and field monitoring. Household interview costs could potentially be reduced by 
shortening the household survey instrument, which during the experiment took approximately 
one hour to administer and contained a number of items beyond those used to calculate 
performance. Further, it may be reasonable to eliminate one of the four in-person provider visits, 
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considering that the baseline visit of the experiment largely functioned as a screening visit and 
could be considered a one-time start-up activity rather than a yearly recurrent activity. The need 
for external support could be gradually reduced by integrating these project management 
functions into the next level of management. 
 
!
RESULTS 
Characteristics of patients, providers, and provider facilities 
Table 3.4 summarizes the baseline characteristics of obstetric care providers and patients 
from the randomized experiment. Just over half of the 135 participating providers were female. 
The large majority (96%) had MBBS or BAMS medical credentials, and the average provider 
had been practicing for approximately twenty years. 
  Figure 3.2 reports the baseline availability of various emergency obstetric services 
among participating facilities, as measured through interviews with hospital staff. The capacity 
to deliver basic emergency obstetric services was high but not universal; for example, 85-89% of 
facilities regularly maintained stocks of parenteral drugs used to prevent and/or treat obstetric 
complications. A smaller majority of facilities (71-77%) offered caesarean section and blood 
transfusion services, which are key elements of comprehensive emergency obstetric care (WHO 
1997).  
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Table 3.4: Baseline characteristics of participating obstetric care providers and surveyed 
patients in rural Karnataka !
a. Provider-level characteristics 
Characteristic All providers (N=135) 
Input  
group 
(N=38) 
Outcome 
group 
(N=53) 
Control  
group 
(N=44) 
Female provider, % 55.6 55.3 56.6 54.5 
Credentials, %     MBBS 79.3 71.1 83.0 81.8 
BAMS 17.0 26.3 15.1 11.4 
Other qualification 3.7 2.6 1.9 6.8 
Years practicing, mean (SD) 19.9 (10.7) 19.7 (10.0) 21.0 (11.0) 18.9 (11.0) 
 
b. Patient-level characteristics  
Characteristic 
All surveyed 
households 
(N=2,608) 
Input  
group 
(N=723) 
Outcome 
group 
(N=1,078) 
Control  
group 
(N=807) 
Demographics     Mother's age (years), mean (SD) 24.3 (3.8) 24.6 (4.0) 24.4 (3.8) 23.9 (3.6) 
Mother's education level, %     Illiterate 13.2 15.6 11.1 13.6 
Primary only 6.1 5.4 6.5 6.3 
Secondary or higher 80.7 79.0 82.4 80.0 
Household's caste, %     General or other 64.3 62.7 64.8 64.9 
Scheduled caste 11.8 9.5 12.7 12.8 
Scheduled tribe 7.5 6.6 7.9 7.7 
Other backward class 16.4 21.2 14.6 14.6 
Household owns land, % 51.7 54.1 51.5 49.9 
Household has Below Poverty 
Line card, % 62.8 65.4 59.1 65.4 
     Clinical characteristics     Mother's first pregnancy, % 49.0 47.4 52.3 45.8 
Number of previous children 
birthed, mean (SD) 1.7 (0.9) 1.7 (0.9) 1.7 (0.9) 1.8 (1.1) 
Mother has had a stillbirth or 
abortion, % 9.5 9.1 9.0 10.7 
Comorbidity history, %     Hypertension 6.0 9.1 5.0 4.5 
Diabetes 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.6 
Previous stomach surgery 11.3 10.0 10.3 13.8 
 
 
! !117 
Figure 3.2: Routine availability of basic and comprehensive emergency obstetric services at 
baseline !
 
Notes: The routine availability of each service type was measured at the baseline or first study visit before contract 
implementation, based on interviews with hospital personnel. Elements of basic emergency obstetric care include 
the availability of parenteral drugs (i.e., those administered via injection or infusion), assisted vaginal delivery, and 
manual removal of placenta and of retained products (not measured). Comprehensive emergency obstetric care also 
includes the availability of caesarean section and blood transfusion (WHO 1997). 
 
Base-case results 
Under both the input and outcome P4P scenarios, program start-up costs are estimated at 
$182,368 for the region, amounting to $1,351 per participating provider (Table 3.5). Under input 
P4P, recurrent program costs are an estimated $292,110 during the 1-year contract period, which 
translates to $2,164 per participating provider or $10.61 per patient delivery. The single largest 
recurrent cost component (performance data generation) comprises 48% of the $292,110/year 
total and is 3.7 times larger than the cost of performance rewards. Recurrent program costs under 
the outcome P4P scenario ($383,518/year) are higher than under input P4P due to substantially 
higher performance rewards ($277.18 versus $954.28 per provider on average).  
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Table 3.5: Financial costs of P4P programs for entire study region, by program activity  !
a. Start-up costs 
Cost component Input P4P   Outcome P4P 
 2014 USD %   2014 USD % 
Production and validation of survey 
instruments for P4P program 110,000 60   110,000 60 
Identification of rural geographic areas to 
target 25,000 14   25,000 14 
Identification of potentially eligible 
providers within targeted regions 19,497 11   19,497 11 
Screening of ineligible providers 27,871 15   27,871 15 
TOTAL START-UP COSTS 182,368 100   182,368 100 
 
b. Recurrent costs during 1-year contract period 
 
Cost component 
Input P4P   Outcome P4P 
2014 USD %   2014 USD % 
Reward and participation payouts           
Participation rewards 16,590 6   16,590 4 
Record-keeping rewards 2,213 1   2,213 1 
Performance rewards 37,419 13   128,828 34 
           
Provider visits & household data collection         
Training of field associates 4,229 1  4,229 1 
In-person provider visits 66,010 23   66,010 17 
Household data collection 138,780 48   138,780 36 
External project management and field 
monitoring 26,869 9   26,869 7 
TOTAL RECURRENT COSTS 292,110 100  383,518 100 
 
Notes: Total program costs for the region are calculated under the hypothetical scenario that all 135 participating 
providers are assigned to the P4P strategy indicated. 
 
Table 3.6a shows expected health outcomes and costs per patient delivery for each modeling 
scenario under base-case parameter assumptions. Incremental costs and effects (() are relative to 
the next less expensive non-dominated scenario. Resulting ICERs (costs per life year saved and 
per complication averted) are presented in Table 3.6b. 
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Under the input P4P scenario, I estimate a reduction of 4.8 maternal complications (and 
4.4 individual cases with "1 complications) per 100 patient deliveries compared to the status 
quo. This reduction in maternal complication risk is expected to result in 6.3 fewer maternal 
deaths, with a corresponding gain of 165 life years, per 100,000 patient deliveries. From a 
program perspective, the incremental cost per life year saved for the input P4P scenario is $6,418 
(or $10,425 with start-up costs included), implying that the intervention is not cost-effective at a 
willingness-to-pay threshold of three times GDP per capita ($4,744.50; World Bank 2015). 
When taking a societal perspective, program costs associated with input P4P are partially offset 
by reductions in the direct medical costs of managing complications, with an estimated $1.91 
saved on medical treatment per woman delivering during the contract period. Nevertheless, base-
case ICERs from the societal perspective ($5,262 and $9,269 excluding or including start-up 
costs, respectively) are above the three times GDP per capita threshold. With input P4P, the cost 
per complication averted ranges from $180 to $356 depending on the perspective and scope of 
costs. 
 As shown, outcome P4P is a dominated strategy regardless of perspective, with higher 
costs and lower health benefits than both the status quo and input P4P scenarios. 
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Table 3.6: Base-case estimates of effects, costs, and incremental cost-effectiveness !
a. Expected health outcomes and costs per patient in the target population 
Outcome 
Status Quo   Input P4P   Outcome P4P 
Estimate   Estimate ) vs.  Status Quo   Estimate 
) vs.  
Input P4P 
Clinical outcomes of delivery        
Risk of obstetric complications        
Postpartum hemorrhage 0.378  0.282 -0.096  0.367 0.085 
Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 0.183  0.203 0.020  0.221 0.018 
Sepsis 0.055  0.083 0.028  0.087 0.004 
Any complication ("1 of the above) 0.510  0.466 -0.044  0.539 0.073 
        Number of complications per patient 0.616  0.568 -0.048  0.676 0.108 
        Mortality and life expectancy        
Risk of maternal death        
Overall 0.001312  0.001249 -0.000063  0.001422 0.000173 
By cause        
Postpartum hemorrhage 0.000661  0.000493 -0.000168  0.000642 0.000149 
Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 0.000087  0.000097 0.000010  0.000105 0.000009 
Sepsis 0.000191  0.000286 0.000095  0.000302 0.000015 
Other causes 0.000372  0.000372 0.000000  0.000372 0.000000 
        Expected life-years (with 3% annual 
discounting) 26.249534  26.251187 0.001653  26.246640 -0.004547 
        Costs per patient (2014 USD)        
Start-up costs 0.00  6.62 6.62  6.62 0.00 
Recurrent program costs 0.00  10.61 10.61  13.93 3.32 
Direct medical costs of complication 
management 54.97  53.06 -1.91  62.04 8.99 
Uncompensated provider effort costs 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
 
Target population includes women who present to participating providers for labor/delivery within the contract year. 
 
 
b. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios by perspective and scope of costs 
 
ICER Status Quo Input P4P Outcome P4P 
Cost per life-year saved    
Societal perspective (excl. start-up costs) - 5,262 Dominated 
Societal perspective (incl. start-up costs) - 9,269 Dominated 
Program perspective (excl. start-up costs) - 6,418 Dominated 
Program perspective (incl. start-up costs) - 10,425 Dominated 
    Cost per complication averted    
Societal perspective (excl. start-up costs) - 180 Dominated 
Societal perspective (incl. start-up costs) - 317 Dominated 
Program perspective (excl. start-up costs) - 219 Dominated 
Program perspective (incl. start-up costs) - 356 Dominated 
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Univariate and probabilistic sensitivity analysis results 
Table 3.7 presents findings from the univariate and threshold sensitivity analyses for both 
the societal perspective (Table 3.7a) and program perspective (Table 3.7b). To highlight 
variables with a strong influence on the cost-effectiveness of input P4P, parameters are sorted 
from widest to narrowest range of ICER values over the plausible range of parameter values. 
(Because outcome P4P is dominated in the base-case analysis and nearly all probabilistic 
simulations, I focus exclusively on input P4P for the univariate sensitivity analyses.)  
The ICER for input P4P is highly sensitive to the intervention’s effectiveness in 
preventing postpartum hemorrhage relative to the status quo. Holding all else constant, input P4P 
is estimated to be cost-effective at a willingness-to-pay threshold of three times GDP per capita 
if the odds ratio of postpartum hemorrhage is at least as low as 0.601 or 0.568 (depending on 
perspective); these threshold parameter values are only slightly lower than the base-case odds 
ratio of 0.610. However, input P4P is a dominated strategy when varying this odds ratio to the 
high end of its plausible range (0.991). From the societal perspective, the cost-effectiveness of 
input P4P is also sensitive to the unit cost of managing postpartum hemorrhage and, to a lesser 
extent, the unit costs of managing other complications. (Complication management costs do not 
impact cost-effectiveness from the program perspective.) 
Other variables that are reasonably influential include the maternal mortality ratio (which 
proportionately affects the estimated mortality burden of each maternal complication), and the 
average volume of deliveries per provider during the contract year (due to economies of scale 
when assuming a higher number of deliveries per provider). However, from both the societal and 
program perspectives, input P4P remains cost-ineffective at the three times GDP per capita 
threshold across the plausible range of average performance rewards per provider. 
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Table 3.7: Univariate and threshold sensitivity analyses !
a. Societal perspective (excluding start-up costs) 
Parameter 
Range of ICERs:  
Input P4P vs. Status Quo 
(2014 USD per LY saved) 
  Plausible Range of Parameter Valuesa,b 
Base- 
case Low High   
At base-
case ICER 
At low 
ICER 
At high 
ICER 
At GDP  
per capita 
At 3*GDP 
per capita 
Odds ratio for postpartum 
hemorrhagec 5,262 50 Dom   0.610 0.301 0.991 0.481 0.601 
Unit cost of managing 
postpartum hemorrhage 5,262 40 8,921   76 166 13 140 85 
Unit cost of managing 
sepsis 5,262 3,364 9,242   117 3 356 n/a 86 
Maternal mortality ratiod 5,262 3,864 7,568   0.00174 0.00237 0.00121 n/a 0.00193 
Unit cost of managing  
pre-eclampsia 5,262 4,219 6,707   108 22 227 n/a 65 
Deliveries per provider in 
contract year 5,262 4,638 5,735   204 226 190 n/a 222 
Average performance 
rewards per provider 5,262 4,992 5,419   277 186 330 n/a n/a 
 
b. Program perspective (excluding start-up costs) 
Parameter 
Range of ICERs:  
Input P4P vs. Status Quo 
(2014 USD per LY saved) 
  Plausible Range of Parameter Valuesa,b 
Base- 
case Low High   
At base-
case ICER 
At low 
ICER 
At high 
ICER 
At GDP  
per capita 
At 3*GDP 
per capita 
Odds ratio for postpartum 
hemorrhagec 6,418 1,582 Dom   0.610 0.301 0.991 0.301 0.568 
Maternal mortality ratiod 6,418 4,712 9,229   0.00174 0.00237 0.00121 n/a 0.00235 
Deliveries per provider in 
contract year 6,418 5,793 6,891   204 226 190 n/a n/a 
Average performance 
rewards per provider 6,418 6,147 6,574   277 186 330 n/a n/a 
 
[a] The plausible range for each parameter corresponds to the 95% confidence interval (based on the empirical 
bootstrap distribution or the parametric distribution specified in Table 3.3).  
[b] A parameter value of 'n/a' at the GDP per capita ($1,582/LY) or three times GDP per capita ($4,745/LY) 
willingness-to-pay threshold indicates that the ICER for input P4P does not fall below this threshold across the range 
of plausible values for that parameter. 
[c] For the univariate sensitivity analysis of the postpartum hemorrhage odds ratio (input P4P vs. status quo), I vary 
the odds ratio value and otherwise leave the risk equation for postpartum hemorrhage unchanged. 
[d] The case fatality rates for all three measured maternal complications change proportionately when the maternal 
mortality ratio (MMR) is varied. 
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Results from the probabilistic sensitivity analysis are summarized through scatter plots of 
simulated incremental cost and effect pairs (Figure 3.3), and cost-effectiveness acceptability 
curves indicating the probability that each policy scenario is cost-effective at various 
willingness-to-pay thresholds (Figure 3.4). As illustrated by the scatterplots, the incremental cost 
of input P4P is subject to far greater uncertainty under the societal perspective than under the 
program perspective. This result is due to uncertainty surrounding the unit costs of complication 
management, given the wide range of literature estimates for these parameters. Nevertheless, at a 
willingness-to-pay threshold of three times GDP per capita, the probability that input P4P is cost-
effective is similar between the societal and program perspectives (49% and 45%, respectively) 
when focusing on recurrent costs only (Figure 3.4a-b). When also including start-up costs, input 
P4P is cost-effective in 33% and 42% of simulations under the societal and program 
perspectives, respectively (Figure 3.4c-d). 
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Figure 3.3: Scatterplot: Joint density of incremental costs and effects under input P4P from 
the probabilistic sensitivity analysis 
 
a. Societal perspective (excluding start-up costs) 
 
b. Program perspective (excluding start-up costs) 
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Figure 3.3 (Continued) 
 
c. Societal perspective (including start-up costs) 
 
 
d. Program perspective (including start-up costs) 
 
 
Notes: Because outcome P4P is nearly always a dominated strategy in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis, 
scatterplots focus on incremental costs and effects for input P4P versus the status quo. Incremental cost and effect 
pairs are cost-effective at the 1* or 3*GDP per capita threshold if they fall below the corresponding threshold line. 
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Figure 3.4: Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves !
a. Societal perspective (excluding start-up costs) 
 
 
 
b. Program perspective (excluding start-up costs) 
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Figure 3.4 (Continued) 
 
c. Societal perspective (including start-up costs) 
 
 
d. Program perspective (including start-up costs) 
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Alternative analysis results 
The base-case and sensitivity analyses above make the simplifying assumption that, on 
average, the total economic cost of providers’ quality improvement effort is equal to 
performance reward payouts. To the extent that there are uncompensated provider effort costs, 
the input P4P strategy becomes less economically attractive from a societal perspective (Table 
3.8). The contracts for input P4P explicitly state that providers can earn up to a maximum of Rs. 
169,750 ($2,781), an amount that is approximately ten times as large as average performance 
payouts under this form of P4P ($277.18). Thus, in Table 3.8, 900% of the average performance 
reward represents the theoretical upper limit for the average cost of uncompensated provider 
effort (assuming that providers do not pass along the cost of quality improvements to patients).  
Under the most conservative assumption that all providers expect to earn the maximum 
and actually expend this value of effort (e.g., through increases in personnel time and medical 
supply usage), the societal cost per life year more than doubles from $5,262 (base-case) to 
$12,662. Conversely, if uncompensated effort cost is similar or smaller in magnitude compared 
to reward payouts (!100% of rewards), the societal ICER for input P4P increases by under 16%. 
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Table 3.8: Alternative analysis: Cost-effectiveness of input P4P under varying levels of 
uncompensated provider effort 
 
Average cost of uncompensated provider 
effort, as a % of average performance 
rewards under input P4P (277.18 USD) 
Incremental costs and effects 
(Input P4P vs. Status Quo)   
ICER (2014 USD per  
life year saved) 
(Recurrent 
program 
costs 
(Treatment 
costs 
(Life 
years   
Societal 
perspective 
Program 
perspective 
0%     (base-case) 10.61 -1.91 0.001653   5,262 6,418 
20%   (55.44 USD) 10.61 -1.64 0.001653  5,427 6,418 50%   (138.59 USD) 10.61 -1.23 0.001653  5,674 6,418 100% (277.18 USD) 10.61 -0.55 0.001653  6,085 6,418 300% (831.54 USD) 10.61 2.17 0.001653  7,729 6,418 900% (2,494.62 USD) 10.61 10.32 0.001653   12,662 6,418 
 
Notes: Uncompensated provider effort cost refers to the total economic cost resulting from a provider’s quality 
improvement effort minus her compensation from performance rewards. As described in the main text, the 
theoretical maximum of average uncompensated effort cost is approximately equal to 900% of the $277.18 average 
performance payout. The cost of uncompensated effort is categorized as a treatment cost (as opposed to an above-
treatment program cost), and therefore does not impact cost-effectiveness from the program perspective. 
 
 
Table 3.9 shows how the cost-effectiveness of input P4P might change if program 
funders can successfully reduce program resource use without adversely affecting maternal 
health outcomes. In the event that all three potential program cutbacks are implemented, the 
societal and program ICERs for input P4P are both estimated to decrease by $1,715, and fall 
below the three times GDP per capita willingness-to-pay threshold. The first cutback alone 
(reducing costs of performance data collection by 25%) is estimated to reduce both ICERs by 
$762, placing the societal ICER for input P4P just below the three times GDP per capita 
threshold. 
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Table 3.9: Alternative analysis: Cost-effectiveness of input P4P following potential 
improvements in program efficiency 
 
Potential program cost reduction 
Incremental costs and effects 
(Input P4P vs. Status Quo)   
ICER (2014 USD per  
life year saved) 
(Recurrent 
program 
costs 
(Treatment 
costs 
(Life 
years   
Societal 
perspective 
Program 
perspective 
No program cutbacks (base-case) 10.61 -1.91 0.001653   5,262 6,418 
(1) Reduce household interview costs by 
25% 9.35 -1.91 0.001653  4,500 5,656 
(2) Reduce number of in-person provider 
visits from 4 to 3 visits per contract year, 
plus (1) 
8.75 -1.91 0.001653  4,138 5,293 
(3) No external project management or 
support, plus (1) & (2) 7.77 -1.91 0.001653   3,547 4,703 
 
DISCUSSION 
Key findings and policy implications 
P4P initiatives have become increasingly common in low- and middle-income countries 
(Witter 2013), but there is little rigorous evidence on the costs or cost-effectiveness of such 
programs. Using data from a cluster-randomized trial conducted in rural Karnataka, India, I 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of two P4P interventions that aim to improve the quality of 
maternal health care by linking financial incentives to either health service inputs or health 
outcomes.! 
Results suggest that the input-based P4P program as currently designed may not be a 
cost-effective strategy for reducing maternal mortality in the region. Under base-case 
assumptions, the societal ICER for input P4P versus the status quo ($5,262 per life year saved) 
slightly exceeds the common willingness-to-pay threshold of three times GDP per capita 
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($4,745). This result is dependent on a number of factors, including assumptions about 
intervention effectiveness, the direct medical costs of managing complications, and the mortality 
burden of complications. In the probabilistic sensitivity analysis, input P4P is cost-effective in 
just under half of the simulations when focusing on recurrent costs only.  
During the experiment, providers assigned to input P4P achieved reductions in the 
occurrence of postpartum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal deaths in India (Registrar 
General, India 2006). However, the lack of improvement on other major obstetric complications 
limits the cost-effectiveness of this incentive scheme. Providers may have intentionally 
prioritized the prevention of postpartum hemorrhage based on perceived need: At baseline, 74% 
of providers reported hemorrhage as the most clinically important outcome to improve (Mohanan 
et al.; forthcoming). Alternatively, the risk of postpartum hemorrhage may have simply been 
more amenable to change through guideline adherence than other complications, given that 
effective primary prevention measures are available for hemorrhage; for example, while timely 
diagnosis and treatment can reduce the risk of progression from pre-eclampsia to eclampsia, 
there is little guidance available on how to prevent pre-eclampsia (WHO 2011).  
Outcome-based P4P is a strongly dominated strategy in the base-case analysis and in 
nearly all probabilistic simulations, as expected given that this strategy did not show health 
benefits in the trial. Interestingly, despite worse maternal health outcomes under outcome P4P, 
expected performance rewards per provider are considerably higher under this strategy compared 
to input P4P. This paradox appears to stem from a usual limitation of outcome-based 
performance measures; namely, such measures give a “noisy” signal of performance because 
adverse outcomes do not always occur when there are quality deficits (Petersen 2006). Due to 
stochastic variability in the outcomes of each provider’s patients, and the fact that rewards can 
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only be zero or positive, average performance rewards are substantial under outcome P4P – even 
though average complication risks under outcome P4P are slightly worse than the pre-specified 
performance benchmarks (the !!’s in the Methods section). In addition to causing high program 
costs, the noisiness of outcome-based performance measures might also explain the 
ineffectiveness of this scheme: If providers are risk-averse and view outcomes as largely beyond 
their control, they may be reluctant to undertake quality improvements out of concern that their 
efforts will go unrewarded  (Miller 2013). 
 Under input P4P, the main driver of program spending is by far the collection of 
performance data, reaffirming earlier arguments that cost-effectiveness analyses of P4P should 
consider a broad scope of program costs beyond just the performance-based incentives (Emmert 
2012; Meacock 2014). Conducting household interviews for the randomized experiment was a 
difficult undertaking that involved over thirty interviewers and seven field associates and 
managers who supervised the interviewer staff, plus office personnel and an additional level of 
oversight from an external project manager. Based on documented expenditures during the 
experiment, performance data collection comprises an estimated 48% of recurrent program costs 
and outweighs input-based performance rewards by a factor of 3.7. In Borghi et al. (2015), a 
study that evaluated the cost-effectiveness of a P4P pilot program in Tanzania, data collection 
accounted for a similarly large proportion of program running costs (36-51% of annual program 
costs, depending on the scenario being modeled). These results highlight a key barrier to 
implementing efficient P4P programs in resource-limited settings without routine health 
information systems already in place. Data collection activities may be a less important cost 
driver in settings that, for example, supported web-based patient reported outcomes. 
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Although input P4P is most likely not a cost-effective program by its current design, it 
may be possible to improve the program’s efficiency by fine-tuning its features and management 
structure. Scenario analyses indicate that the input P4P program is more likely to be cost-
effective if the cost of data collection can be reduced by one-quarter. Such cost savings might be 
achievable by shortening the household survey instrument, which would lessen the personnel 
requirements for conducting interviews, or by dedicating governmental staff within each district 
to conduct household interviews in order to reduce year-to-year turnover of interviewers and 
reduce travel expenditures. The cost-effectiveness of input P4P would further improve if, in 
addition to reducing data collection costs, the Government of Karnataka is able to gradually 
reduce the need for external field monitoring and support. Reducing the number of in-person 
provider visits from four to three per contract year would also help reduce program costs, 
although it would be important to monitor the effects of such a change on provider performance. 
To date, P4P initiatives have predominantly used process-of-care indicators instead of 
health outcomes to measure performance, which could explain the limited consideration of cost-
effectiveness in the P4P literature. Under input-based P4P arrangements, the performance data 
collection may not yield suitably proximate measures of clinical benefit that can be linked to 
typical measures of health benefit in cost-effectiveness analyses (e.g., life-years, quality-adjusted 
life-years). Therefore, one key strength of the present analysis is the availability of clinically 
meaningful outcome measures that are close antecedents of maternal mortality, enabling me to 
conduct a full economic evaluation even for the input P4P strategy. To my knowledge, this study 
is only the second cost-effectiveness analysis of P4P in a resource-limited setting (Borghi et al. 
2015), and the first of such studies to report results using a standard metric (i.e., cost per life year 
saved). 
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Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations, most of which would tend to create a bias 
against performance-based incentives. First, intervention effectiveness parameters in the model 
are based on comparisons against the control group in the randomized experiment, which 
assumes that control group outcomes are reasonably representative of the status quo. The 
denominator of the ICER for input P4P therefore nets out any incremental benefit that may have 
resulted from the in-person provider visits, provision of educational materials, and participation 
rewards alone, even though the cost of these ancillary program features is included in the 
numerator.  
Second, the model assumes that any quality improvements under P4P are temporary and 
only affect the maternal health outcomes of patients who present for delivery during the contract 
year. If input-based P4P produces sustained reductions in postpartum hemorrhage among future 
patients who deliver after the contract period ends, the cost-effectiveness of this strategy could 
be underestimated. 
Third, I assume no potential for benefit from performance-based incentives beyond the 
measured difference in maternal complication risks. For example, the model does not consider 
the potential impact of P4P interventions on the risk of death conditional on experiencing a 
particular complication, which could occur if P4P led to more effective management of 
complications (or more timely referrals to higher-tier facilities, if a provider lacks the capacity to 
deliver comprehensive emergency obstetric care). Further, as noted earlier, trial data suggest that 
input P4P likely encouraged the delivery of uterine massage and administration of oxytocic 
drugs. In addition to preventing postpartum hemorrhage, such clinical actions could conceivably 
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change the composition and severity of hemorrhage cases that do occur, another potential 
mechanism by which financial incentives might affect the case fatality rate. 
Fourth, provider rewards are taken as an approximation of the true economic costs of the 
providers’ increased efforts. To address this limitation, I present sensitivity analyses that assume 
varying levels of uncompensated provider effort costs. Note that while uncompensated provider 
effort does not affect costs from the program perspective during the first contract period, this cost 
burden could eventually shift to program funders if they wish to renew contracts with the same 
providers. To the extent that providers received low compensation relative to effort in previous 
contract periods, funders may need to increase the generosity of rewards to maintain the same 
level of engagement. 
Lastly, as with any cost-effectiveness analysis, results are subject to uncertainty about the 
true value of model parameters. Sensitivity analyses show that the ICER for input P4P is highly 
sensitive to the effectiveness of this strategy in reducing the risk of postpartum hemorrhage. 
Although the trial-based odds ratio of postpartum hemorrhage with input P4P versus controls is 
statistically significant, the confidence interval around this point estimate is wide due to sample 
size limitations. Updated cost-effectiveness analyses are warranted if, through further 
experimentation, new data become available on the effectiveness of this P4P strategy to prevent 
maternal complications. 
 
Conclusions 
During a randomized experiment in rural Karnataka, India, providers who were rewarded 
for adherence to obstetric care guidelines achieved fewer maternal complications compared to 
providers who were offered no performance-based incentives. However, the costs of generating 
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performance data and engaging with providers were substantial in this resource-limited setting. 
Given a willingness-to-pay threshold of three times GDP per capita, the input-based P4P 
program as currently designed may not be a cost-effective strategy for improving the quality of 
maternal health care. In future trials or implementation efforts, it may be possible to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of this strategy if program activities can be adjusted to decrease operating 
costs while maintaining similar quality improvement effects.  
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APPENDIX A: Supplemental material for Paper 1 
A.1: Procedures codes used for sample selection or variable measurement  
Table A.1: List of procedure codes !
Code type /  
Code 
Category /  
Description 
CPT or NDC Procedure or drug codes for HPV vaccines 
90649 Human Papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine, types 6, 11, 16, 18 (quadrivalent), 3 dose schedule, for intramuscular use 
90650 Human Papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine, types 16, 18, bivalent, 3 dose schedule, for intramuscular use 
00006-4045-xx Human Papillomavirus Quadrivalent (Types 6, 11, 16, and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant 
58160-0830-xx Human Papillomavirus Bivalent (Types 16 and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant 
CPT, HCPCS or 
ICD-9 Procedure codes for wellness visits and vaccine administration 
99201-99205, 
99211-99215, 
99241-99245 
Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new or established 
patient 
99381-99385, 
99391-99395 
Initial or periodic comprehensive preventive medicine evaluation and management of an 
individual  
99401-99404, 
99411-99412 
Preventive medicine counseling and/or risk factor reduction intervention(s) provided to an 
individual or individuals in a group setting 
99420 Administration and interpretation of health risk assessment instrument (eg, health hazard appraisal) 
99429 Unlisted preventive medicine service 
S0610, S0612, 
S0613 Annual gynecological examination 
90471, 90472, 
90772, 96372 Vaccine administration 
V04.89 Need for prophylactic vaccination and inoculation against other viral diseases 
V05.8, V05.9 Need for prophylactic vaccination and inoculation against other specified or unspecified disease 
V06.8, V06.9 Need for prophylactic vaccination and inoculation against other combinations of diseases 
V20.2 Routine infant or child health check 
V70.0 Routine general medical examination at a health care facility 
V72.31 Routine gynecological examination 
V76.2 Screening for malignant neoplasms of cervix 
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A.2: Concordance analysis to test the precision of empirical cost-sharing estimates  
 
Figure A.1: Scatterplot: Estimated cost-sharing per HPV dosage in 2009 vs. 2010 
 
a. All study plans (N=1,764) 
 
b. Large plans only (N=156) 
 
 
The weighted Pearson correlation coefficients are weighted by plans’ sample size in 2009. Cost-sharing in either 
year is inflation-adjusted to 2013 USD. In Figure A.1a, the weighted correlation of 0.912 indicates high concordance 
between 2009 and 2010 cost-sharing estimates in the overall sample. The lower unweighted correlation of 0.582 
indicates worse concordance among smaller plan-employer groups. Figure A.1b focuses on large plans only, proxied 
by having "1,000 study subjects enrolled in 2009; this subgroup comprises 77% of the individual-level sample (in 
terms of person-years of enrollment). The scatterplots confirm that the concordance of estimates is especially high in 
large plans, suggesting that cost-sharing levels are precisely estimated in these plans. 
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A.3: Validations of empirical cost-sharing estimates against MarketScan Summary Plan 
Description Extractions  
 
Additional validations are performed using the subset of study plans that appear in the 
Extractions database for any policy year(s) during 2010-2013. The purpose of these analyses is 
to verify that empirical cost-sharing estimates systematically differ between plans with versus 
without cost-sharing for routine vaccinations (as stated in plan materials), and between plans that 
did versus did not claim grandfathered status. 
Among plans that stated zero cost-sharing for annual wellness visits and routine 
vaccinations in a given year, plan-level cost-sharing estimates are $4.75 per dosage on average, 
and are !$10 per dosage for the vast majority (96%) of plans (Table A.2). Among plans that 
indicated non-zero cost-sharing for either/both of these services, cost-sharing estimates are 
$27.75 on average and !$10 for 44% of plans. Most non-zero cost-sharing plans with estimates 
!$10 had merely stated that cost-sharing may apply for the office visit if billed separately from 
the vaccination. Cost-sharing estimates are generally higher in plans that formally imposed cost-
sharing for wellness visits (mean: $15.73; percent !$10: 22%), or had incomplete coverage for 
both vaccination itself and wellness visits (mean: $94.40; percent !$10: 25%). 
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Table A.2: Empirical cost-sharing statistics by level of coverage stated in plan materials 
(2010-2013) 
 
Stated level of coverage for routine vaccinations  
and annual wellness visits 
Plan-
years 
Person-years  
of enrollment 
Empirical cost-sharing  
(USD 2013) 
Average (SD) Percent  "$10 
Free 402 310,960 4.75 (3) 96% 
Ambiguous 75 37,026 8.39 (6) 66% 
Not free 133 103,072 27.75 (44) 44% 
Not free - Office visit cost-sharing may apply 50 37,376 9.32 (5) 81% 
Not free - Office visit cost-sharing applies 50 46,901 15.73 (5) 22% 
Not free - Coverage incomplete for other reasons 33 18,795 94.40 (69) 25% 
 
Table includes study plans appearing in the Extractions database for one or more calendar years during 2010-2013. 
The "plan-years" column counts the number of unique plan and calendar year combinations categorized into each 
level of coverage. To compute the empirical cost-sharing statistics, the cost-sharing estimate for each plan/year is 
weighted by the number of study subjects enrolled in that calendar year. Each plan/year is categorized into the 
following coverage levels based on statements in plan materials: 
"Free": Routine vaccinations and annual wellness visits are fully covered. 
"Ambiguous": Annual wellness visits or preventive services are fully covered, but vaccine coverage is not specified. 
"Not free - office visit cost-sharing may apply": Routine vaccinations are fully covered, but cost-sharing may be 
imposed for the office visit if the visit is billed separately. 
"Not free - office visit cost-sharing applies": Routine vaccinations are fully covered after an office visit charge. 
"Not free - coverage incomplete for other reasons": Other coverage limitations applying to both vaccinations and the 
office visit (e.g., coinsurance applying to both, deductible without exemptions, annual preventive care limit, etc.). 
  
 
Grandfathered status (yes/no) could be determined for 251 plan-years during 2011-2013, 
based on the presence/absence of a grandfathered status disclosure in the full plan benefit booklet 
(Table A.3). Among plans that claimed to be grandfathered (25 plan-years), empirical cost-
sharing is $67.59 on average (percent !$10: 26%). A minority of grandfathered plans (13%) still 
claimed to fully cover routine vaccinations and annual wellness visits. However, empirical cost-
sharing levels are somewhat higher in these plans (mean: $7.96; percent !$10: 82%) than in 
plans without a grandfathered status disclosure (mean: $4.76; percent !$10: 97%). 
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Table A.3: Empirical cost-sharing statistics by grandfathered status & level of coverage 
stated in plan materials (2011-2013; Full booklet extractions only) 
 
Stated grandfathered status / 
Stated level of coverage for routine vaccinations 
and annual wellness visits 
Plan-
years 
Person-
years of 
enrollment 
Empirical cost-sharing  
(USD 2013) 
Average (SD) Percent  "$10 
Non-grandfathered plans 226 228,599 4.76 (3) 97% 
Free 194 215,217 4.66 (2) 97% 
Ambiguous 26 8,847 7.16 (6) 93% 
Not free 6 4,535 5.21 (2) 98% 
Grandfathered plans 25 31,055 62.59 (67) 26% 
Free 10 4,140 7.96 (2) 82% 
Ambiguous 1 28 20.00 (0) 0% 
Not free 14 26,887 71.05 (68) 18% 
 
Table includes study plans appearing in the Extractions database for one or more calendar years during 2011-2013, 
excluding plan-years in which the extracted data was based on a benefit table or summary rather than the full plan 
booklet. (The full plan booklet is needed to reliably determine the presence/absence of a grandfathered status claim.) 
See previous table footnotes for additional details on the empirical cost-sharing statistics and stated levels of 
coverage. 
 !  
! !154 
A.4: Testing alternative functional forms of the cost-sharing policy variable 
 
Below, Table A.4 summarizes results from models of time to vaccine initiation using 
non-linear functions of cost-sharing level, including: a log-transformation of cost-sharing plus 
$1; a quadratic function of cost-sharing; and a dichotomous indicator of “free/near-free” versus 
“not free” vaccination:  
 
Table A.4: Hazard ratios of vaccine initiation and changes in model fit when using 
alternative functional forms of the cost-sharing variable 
 
Functional form of policy variable 
Hazard ratio per  
unit reduction  
(95% CI) 
Change in -2 log L 
(vs. row [i]) 
Linear cost-sharing variable (main analysis): 
  
(i) csip(t) 
1.041*** - 
(1.033, 1.048)   
Log-transformation of cost-sharing plus $1:   
(ii) ln[csip(t)+0.1] 
1.024*** +98.7 
(1.011, 1.037)   
Quadratic function of cost-sharing:   
(iii) 
csip(t) 
1.033*** -1.7 
(1.019, 1.047)  
csip(t)2 
1.0007  (1.000, 1.002)  
Dichotomous indicator of "free/near-free" or 
"not free" (using $10 cutoff):     
(iv) I[csip(t) > 1] 
1.026** +102.5 
(1.010, 1.041)   
 
Note that the linear cost-sharing variable csip(t) is equal to the cost-sharing level (in USD 2013) divided by 10 that 
individual i faces in plan p at age 9+t years. For each cost-sharing variable in the leftmost column, the hazard ratio is 
for a 1-unit reduction in the transformed cost-sharing variable; for example, when using the dichotomous cost-
sharing variable, the hazard ratio of vaccine initiation is 1.026 for cost-sharing levels !$10 (vs. levels >$10). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
Model fit does not significantly improve when a squared cost-sharing term was added to 
the model (based on the decrease of 1.7 in -2 log L on 1 d.f.; chi-square p=0.192), and worsens 
when the linear variable was replaced with a log-transformation (increase of 98.7 in -2 log L) or 
with a dichotomous variable (increase of 102.5 in -2 log L). These results support the use of a 
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linear price variable when modeling demand for HPV vaccination via a Cox proportional hazard 
model. 
 Note that, when using a dichotomous policy variable, the effect size is considerably 
muted compared to the main effect estimate based on a continuous policy variable. Implicitly, 
using a binary policy variable assumes that any reduction in cost-sharing that does not reach the 
“free/near-free” threshold (e.g., $10) is unrelated to the preventive care reforms: Plan-employer 
groups may have large reductions in cost-sharing in post-ACA years, but are still treated as part 
of the control group if estimated cost-sharing levels remain above the threshold. Consequently, 
this approach yields a very conservative estimate of the overall VBID effect among study plans. 
It is likely that even incomplete cost-sharing reductions are directly or indirectly attributable to 
the preventive care reforms (e.g., due to partial compliance among grandfathered plans, caveats 
to free preventive care in non-grandfathered plans, or random measurement error in the cost-
sharing estimates).  
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APPENDIX B: Supplemental material for Paper 2 
B.1: Diagnosis and procedures codes used for sample selection or variable measurement !
Table B.1: List of diagnosis and procedure codes 
 
Code type /  
Code 
Category /  
Description 
CPT or NDC Procedure or drug codes for HPV vaccines 
90649 Human Papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine, types 6, 11, 16, 18 (quadrivalent), 3 dose schedule, for intramuscular use 
90650 Human Papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine, types 16, 18, bivalent, 3 dose schedule, for intramuscular use 
00006-4045-xx Human Papillomavirus Quadrivalent (Types 6, 11, 16, and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant 
58160-0830-xx Human Papillomavirus Bivalent (Types 16 and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant 
ICD-9 Diagnosis codes for cytological abnormalities 
795.00 Abnormal glandular Papanicolaou smear of cervix  (Applies to atypical endocervical, endometrial, or cervical glandular cells NOS) 
795.01 Papanicolaou smear of cervix with atypical squamous cells of undetermined significance (ASC-US) 
795.02 Papanicolaou smear of cervix with atypical squamous cells cannot exclude high grade squamous intraepithelial lesion (ASC-H) 
795.03 Papanicolaou smear of cervix with low grade squamous intraepithelial lesion (LGSIL) 
795.04 Papanicolaou smear of cervix with high grade squamous intraepithelial lesion (HGSIL) 
795.06 Papanicolaou smear of cervix with cytologic evidence of malignancy 
ICD-9 Diagnosis codes for histology grade 
622.10 Dysplasia of cervix, unspecified (Applies to anaplasia of cervix, cervical atypism, or cervical dysplasia NOS) 
622.11 Mild dysplasia of cervix (Applies to cervical intraepithelial neoplasia I [CIN I]) 
622.12 Moderate dysplasia of cervix (Applies to CIN II) 
233.1 Carcinoma in situ of cervix uteri (Applies to CIN III and adenocarcinoma in situ of cervix) 
180.x Malignant neoplasm of cervix uteri 
CPT, HCPCS or 
ICD-9 Procedure codes for Pap cytology procedures 
88141-88145, 
88147-88148, 
88150, 88152-
88155, 88164-
88167, 88174-
88175 
Cytopathology, cervical or vaginal 
G0101 Cervical or vaginal cancer screening; pelvic and clinical breast examination 
G0123-G0124  Screening cytopathology, cervical or vaginal (any reporting system), collected in preservative fluid, automated thin layer preparation 
G0141  Screening cytopathology smears, cervical or vaginal, performed by automated system, with manual rescreening, requiring interpretation by physician 
G0143 
Screening cytopathology, cervical or vaginal (any reporting system), collected in 
preservative fluid, automated thin layer preparation; with manual screening and 
rescreening by cytotechnologist under physician supervision 
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Table B.1 (Continued) 
 
G0144  Screening by automated system, under physician supervision 
G0145  Screening cytopathology smears, cervical or vaginal, performed by automated system, with manual rescreening, requiring interpretation by physician 
G0147  Screening cytopathology smears, cervical or vaginal; performed by automated system under physician supervision 
G0148  Performed by automated system with manual rescreening 
Q0091  Screening Papanicolaou smear; obtaining, preparing and conveyance of cervical or vaginal smear to laboratory 
V72.32 Encounter for Papanicolaou cervical smear to confirm findings of recent normal smear following initial abnormal smear 
V76.2 Screening for malignant neoplasms of cervix 
CPT or HCPCS Procedure codes for histology follow-up 
57420  Colposcopy of the entire vagina, with cervix if present 
57452 Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina 
57421  Colposcopy of the entire vagina, with cervix if present; with biopsy(s) of vagina/cervix 
57455  Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina; with biopsy(s) of the cervix 
57500  Biopsy, single or multiple, or local excision of lesion, with or without fulguration (separate procedure) 
57505  Endocervical curettage 
57454  Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina; with biopsy(s) of the cervix and endocervical curettage 
57456  Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina; with endocervical curettage 
57450 Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina; with loop electrode biopsy(s) of the cervix 
57460 Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina; with loop electrode biopsy(s) of the cervix 
57461  Colposcopy of the cervix including upper/adjacent vagina; with loop electrode conization of the cervix 
57520 Conization of cervix, including cold knife or laser 
57522  Conization of cervix, including cold knife or laser 
57510, 57511, 
57513  Other surgical cautery of cervix 
CPT or ICD-9 Procedure and diagnosis codes related to HPV DNA tests 
87620  Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); papillomavirus, human, direct probe technique 
87621 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); papillomavirus, human, amplified probe technique 
87622  Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); papillomavirus, human, quantification 
V73.81 Special screening examination for Human papillomavirus (HPV) 
795.05 High-risk HPV DNA test positive 
795.09 Other abnormal Papanicolaou smear of cervix and cervical HPV (Applies to cervical low risk HPV DNA test positive) 
CPT or ICD-9 Procedure codes for chlamydia or gonorrhea testing 
86631 Antibody; Chlamydia 
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Table B.1 (Continued) 
 
86632 Antibody; Chlamydia, IgM 
87110 Culture, chlamydia, any source 
87270 Infectious agent antigen detection by immunofluorescent technique; Chlamydia trachomatis 
87320 Infectious agent antigen detection by enzyme immunoassay technique, qualitative or semiquantitative, multiple-step method; Chlamydia trachomatis 
87490 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); Chlamydia trachomatis, direct probe technique 
87491 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); Chlamydia trachomatis, amplified probe technique 
87492 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); Chlamydia trachomatis, quantification 
87810 Infectious agent antigen detection by immunoassay with direct optical observation; Chlamydia trachomatis 
86729 Antibody; lymphogranuloma venereum 
87850 Infectious agent antigen detection by immunoassay with direct optical observation; Neisseria gonorrhoeae 
87590 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); Neisseria gonorrhoeae, direct probe technique 
87591 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); Neisseria gonorrhoeae, amplified probe technique 
87592 Infectious agent detection by nucleic acid (DNA or RNA); Neisseria gonorrhoeae, quantification 
V73.88 Special screening examination for other specified chlamydial diseases 
V73.98 Special screening examination for unspecified chlamydial disease 
V74.5 Screening examination for venereal disease 
ICD-9 Diagnosis codes for chlamydia or gonorrhea 
091.xx-097.xx Syphilis diseases 
098.xx Gonococcal infections 
 
Notes: I search both outpatient and inpatient medical visit records for claims associated with relevant procedure and 
diagnosis codes. I also search prescription drug records for any HPV vaccine doses delivered through outpatient 
pharmacies, although the vast majority of vaccinations in the cohort occurred during medical visits. 
CPT, Current Procedural Terminology; HCPCS, Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System; ICD-9, 
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision; NDC, National Drug Code.!!! !
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B.2: Suitability of claims-based risk proxies 
 
The main analyses use history of testing and diagnosis for chlamydia or gonorrhea as 
claims-based proxies for background HPV exposure risk. These conditions are sexually-
transmitted diseases for which national guidelines recommend routine screening in sexually-
active girls and young women (Workowski 2015).  To assess the suitability of either proxy, I fit 
a logistic regression model to estimate their independent associations with risk of any cytological 
abnormality at the first Pap screening, controlling for vaccine dose level, all demographic and 
socioeconomic covariates, and indicators for all combinations of age and calendar year at the 
first screening. Regression output is presented in Table B.2; as shown, both variables are 
strongly and independently associated with increased cytological abnormality risk (both 
p<0.001). 
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Table B.2: Associations between study covariates and risk of any cytological abnormality at 
first Pap screening: Multivariate logistic regression results 
 
Covariate Odds ratio (95% CI)   
Claim(s) at or before first Pap (yes vs. no)    Chlamydia or gonorrhea testing 1.362 (1.325, 1.400) *** 
Chlamydia or gonorrhea diagnosis 1.858 (1.631, 2.117) *** 
Census division (vs. South Atlantic)    East North Central 0.970 (0.929, 1.012)  East South Central 1.132 (1.072, 1.197) *** 
Middle Atlantic 0.911 (0.856, 0.970) ** 
Mountain 0.924 (0.860, 0.992) * 
New England 0.990 (0.910, 1.077)  Pacific 0.738 (0.701, 0.778) *** 
West North Central 1.038 (0.974, 1.106)  West South Central 0.987 (0.947, 1.030)  Outpatient service use in 2007 (yes vs. no) 0.966 (0.930, 1.004)  Data contributor type (insurer vs. employer) 1.118 (1.084, 1.154) *** 
Plan type (vs. preferred provider organization)    Comprehensive 1.156 (1.062, 1.259) *** 
Exclusive provider organization 0.796 (0.671, 0.944) ** 
Health maintenance organization 0.929 (0.894, 0.965) *** 
Point-of-service (non-capitated) 1.030 (0.987, 1.075)  Point-of-service (with capitation) 1.194 (1.030, 1.385) * 
Consumer-driven health plan 0.885 (0.804, 0.975) * 
Unknown/other 0.895 (0.807, 0.993) * 
Socioeconomic measures by zip code    Median 4-person family income (vs. >400% FPL)     !200% FPL 1.157 (1.085, 1.233) *** 
201-300% FPL 1.142 (1.089, 1.199) *** 
301-400% FPL 1.081 (1.038, 1.126) *** 
Quartiles, % white (vs. 4th quartile)    1  (lowest % white) 1.202 (1.150, 1.257) *** 
2 1.071 (1.029, 1.116) *** 
3 1.060 (1.021, 1.102) ** 
Quartiles, % without high school education 
(vs. 4th quartile)    
1  (highest educational attainment) 0.887 (0.838, 0.938) *** 
2 0.955 (0.909, 1.002)  3 0.962 (0.922, 1.003)   
 
Notes: In addition to the covariates shown, the model controls for vaccination status (zero, one, two, or three doses) 
and for each unique combination of age and calendar year at the first Pap screening. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 !
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B.3: Survival analysis of time to screening initiation 
Table B.3: Cox proportional hazards model of time to first Pap cytology screening 
 
Covariate Hazard ratio (95% CI)   
Number of HPV vaccine doses 
(vs. 3 doses)    
0 dose 0.75 (0.75, 0.76) *** 
1 dose 0.99 (0.98, 1.01)  2 dose 0.98 (0.97, 1.00)  
Census division (vs. South Atlantic)    
East North Central 0.95 (0.94, 0.96) *** 
East South Central 1.08 (1.06, 1.10) *** 
Middle Atlantic 0.87 (0.86, 0.89) *** 
Mountain 0.94 (0.92, 0.96) *** 
New England 0.77 (0.75, 0.79) *** 
Pacific 0.73 (0.72, 0.74) *** 
West North Central 0.99 (0.97, 1.01)  West South Central 1.10 (1.09, 1.12) *** 
Outpatient service use in 2007 (yes vs. no) 1.57 (1.55, 1.59) *** 
Data contributor type (insurer vs. employer) 0.95 (0.94, 0.96) *** 
Plan type (vs. preferred provider organization)    Comprehensive 0.93 (0.91, 0.96) *** 
Exclusive provider organization 1.02 (0.97, 1.07)  Health maintenance organization 1.02 (1.01, 1.03) *** 
Point-of-service (non-capitated) 1.06 (1.05, 1.07) *** 
Point-of-service (with capitation) 1.04 (1.00, 1.10)  Consumer-driven health plan 0.95 (0.92, 0.97) *** 
Unknown/other 0.95 (0.92, 0.98) *** 
Socioeconomic measures by zip code    
Median family income (4-person) 
(vs. >400% FPL)     
!200% FPL 1.14 (1.12, 1.16) *** 
201-300% FPL 1.13 (1.12, 1.15) *** 
301-400% FPL 1.09 (1.08, 1.10) *** 
Quartiles, % white (vs. 4th quartile)    1  (lowest % white) 0.90 (0.89, 0.91) *** 
2 0.94 (0.93, 0.95) *** 
3 0.97 (0.95, 0.98) *** 
Quartiles, % without high school education 
(vs. missing socioeconomic measures)    
1  (highest educational attainment) 0.95 (0.92, 0.97) *** 
2 1.04 (1.01, 1.07) * 
3 1.05 (1.02, 1.08) ** 
4 1.02 (0.99, 1.06)   
Notes: This regression analysis is conducted among 1,226,763 adolescents 9-17 years old in 2007 who were 
continuously enrolled in MarketScan through 2008 or later and screening-naïve as of January 1, 2008. In addition to 
the covariates shown, the regression controls for starting age in 2007 by stratifying the baseline hazard function by 
birth year. Vaccination status corresponds to the number of doses received up to and including each month of 
follow-up. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001!  
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B.4: Summary of vaccine efficacy data from trials 
Table B.4: Reported efficacy of quadrivalent and bivalent HPV vaccines against CIN 
irrespective of HPV type 
 
 
Vaccine type, 
Trial name, 
Months of follow-up, 
First author (year) Endpoint Population[a] N[b] Efficacy (95% CI)[c] 
Quadrivalent vaccine 
   
  
FUTURE I/II, 
Month 42, 
Muñoz (2010) 
CIN1, 
all-cause 
ITT, all ages 17,160 20.3% (12.4, 27.5) 
HPV-naïve, all ages 9,296 29.7% (16.9, 40.6) 
CIN2+, 
all-cause 
ITT, all ages 17,160 19.0% (7.7, 28.9) 
HPV-naïve, all ages 9,296 42.7% (23.7, 57.3) 
CIN3+, 
all-cause 
ITT, all ages 17,160 18% (2, 31) 
HPV-naïve, all ages 9,296 43.0% (13.0, 63.2) 
Bivalent vaccine 
   
  
PATRICIA, 
Month 48, 
Lehtinen (2012) 
CIN2+, 
all-cause 
ITT, all ages 17,402 33.1% (22.2, 42.6) 
HPV-naïve, all ages 10,918 64.9% (52.7, 74.2) 
CIN3+, 
all-cause 
ITT, all ages 17,402 45.6% (28.8, 58.7) 
HPV-naïve, all ages 10,918 93.2% (78.9, 98.7) 
 
[a] Intent-to-treat (ITT) populations in the above trials included a mixed of HPV-exposed and -unexposed women 
(15-26 years-old at vaccine initiation; mean age: 20 years) who received "1 dose. Completion of the three-dose 
vaccine regimen was high in the ITT populations of both FUTURE I/II (97%) and PATRICIA (92%). The generally 
HPV-naïve populations included the ITT subset that tested negative to 14 HPV subtypes at day 1.  
[b] N refers to the combined number of individuals in the vaccine and control groups. 
[c] Vaccine efficacy was defined as (1 - relative risk)*100%, where relative risk refers to the ratio of incidence rates 
(events per person-years at risk) in the vaccine versus placebo groups. Efficacy against CIN1 was not reported in 
Lehtinen (2012). 
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APPENDIX C: Supplemental material for Paper 3 
C.1: Logistic regression analysis of maternal complication risks 
 
Table C.1: Additional output from logistic regressions of maternal complication risk  
 
Variable 
Odds ratio (95% CI), by dependent variable 
Postpartum hemorrhage Sepsis Pre-Eclampsia 
Provider randomization group    Input P4P 0.61  (0.30, 0.99) 1.56  (0.61, 3.30) 1.15  (0.52, 2.55) 
Outcome P4P 0.95  (0.59, 1.59) 1.65  (0.87, 3.26) 1.30  (0.69, 2.89) 
Control (ref) (ref) (ref) 
    Demographics    Mother's age (years) 0.96  (0.80, 1.21) 0.93  (0.69, 1.49) 0.97  (0.77, 1.27) 
Mother's age (years),  
squared 
1.0003   
(0.9961, 1.0038) 
1.0006   
(0.9911, 1.0061) 
1.0006   
(0.9955, 1.0048) 
Mother's education level    Illiterate 1.46  (0.80, 2.37) 0.79  (0.51, 1.73) 0.41  (0.20, 0.84) 
Secondary or higher 1.08  (0.78, 1.60) 0.79  (0.48, 1.43) 1.03  (0.70, 1.62) 
Primary only (ref) (ref) (ref) 
Household's caste    General or other 1.04  (0.68, 1.58) 1.01  (0.52, 2.01) 1.17  (0.73, 1.74) 
Scheduled caste 1.05  (0.63, 1.75) 1.49  (0.72, 3.18) 1.09  (0.69, 1.73) 
Other backward class 1.13  (0.74, 1.93) 1.20  (0.50, 2.70) 1.18  (0.69, 1.85) 
Scheduled tribe (ref) (ref) (ref) 
Household owns land, % 0.87  (0.70, 1.05) 0.89  (0.62, 1.27) 0.97  (0.73, 1.27) 
Household has Below Poverty Line card, 
% 1.16  (0.92, 1.51) 1.11  (0.80, 1.60) 0.97  (0.73, 1.19) 
    Clinical characteristics    Mother's first pregnancy 1.18  (0.90, 1.55) 1.54  (1.00, 2.70) 1.06  (0.75, 1.51) 
Number of previous children birthed 1.02  (0.87, 1.19) 1.25  (1.00, 1.67) 1.01  (0.86, 1.22) 
Mother has had a stillbirth or abortion 1.20  (0.80, 1.68) 1.16  (0.62, 2.03) 0.92  (0.62, 1.43) 
Comorbidity history    Hypertension 1.48  (0.88, 2.46) 0.78  (0.24, 1.30) 1.83  (0.81, 2.76) 
Diabetes 1.19  (0.44, 3.38) 1.55  (0.10, 6.78) 0.86  (0.21, 1.83) 
Previous stomach surgery 1.11  (0.85, 1.41) 1.05  (0.57, 1.79) 1.00  (0.61, 1.43) 
    Provider characteristics    Female provider 0.91  (0.54, 1.39) 0.79  (0.37, 1.50) 1.13  (0.57, 2.11) 
Credentials    MBBS 2.71  (1.19, 8.30) 1.16  (0.33, 13.88) 3.16  (1.43, 12.75) 
BAMS 1.48  (0.48, 5.23) 0.70  (0.13, 9.70) 1.06  (0.22, 6.47) 
Other qualification (ref) (ref) (ref) 
Years practicing 1.01  (0.98, 1.03) 1.00  (0.97, 1.03) 1.00  (0.97, 1.03) 
N 2,608 2,608 2,608 
 
Notes: Logistic regression estimates are based on the household survey sample from the experiment. In addition to 
the covariates listed above, regressions also included indicators for the district in which the provider's facility is 
located. Confidence intervals are from cluster bootstrapping and are constructed using the percentile method.  
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C.2: Calculation of age-specific life expectancies 
 
Table C.2: Life table for females in India, 2013 
 
Interval 
[t, t+1) 
Morality rate in  
[t, t+1) 
 
h(t) 
Cumulative  
hazard at t+1 
 
H(t+1) 
Survival at t+1 
 
 
S(t+1) 
Life expectancy 
from t 
 
LE(t) 
Discounted life 
expectancy from t 
 
disc_LE(t) 
[0, 1) 0.044016 0.044016 0.956939 68.126950 29.750059 
[1, 2) 0.003563 0.047579 0.953535 70.170100 30.018607 
[2, 3) 0.003563 0.051142 0.950144 69.418777 29.921515 
[3, 4) 0.003563 0.054705 0.946764 68.664773 29.822121 
[4, 5) 0.003563 0.058268 0.943397 67.908077 29.720363 
[5, 6) 0.001162 0.059430 0.942301 67.148680 29.615559 
[6, 7) 0.001162 0.060592 0.941207 66.226171 29.485041 
[7, 8) 0.001162 0.061754 0.940114 65.302589 29.350781 
[8, 9) 0.001162 0.062916 0.939022 64.377934 29.212667 
[9, 10) 0.001162 0.064078 0.937932 63.452203 29.070583 
[10, 11) 0.000859 0.064937 0.937127 62.525396 28.924411 
[11, 12) 0.000859 0.065796 0.936322 61.578699 28.770927 
[12, 13) 0.000859 0.066655 0.935518 60.631188 28.612964 
[13, 14) 0.000859 0.067514 0.934715 59.682863 28.450387 
[14, 15) 0.000859 0.068373 0.933912 58.733723 28.283057 
[15, 16) 0.001423 0.069796 0.932584 57.783767 28.110830 
[16, 17) 0.001423 0.071219 0.931258 56.865340 27.939739 
[17, 18) 0.001423 0.072642 0.929934 55.945605 27.763724 
[18, 19) 0.001423 0.074065 0.928611 55.024560 27.582493 
[19, 20) 0.001423 0.075488 0.927291 54.102204 27.395704 
[20, 21) 0.001851 0.077339 0.925576 53.178534 27.203509 
[21, 22) 0.001851 0.079190 0.923864 52.276132 27.010599 
[22, 23) 0.001851 0.081041 0.922156 51.372058 26.812161 
[23, 24) 0.001851 0.082892 0.920451 50.466310 26.608025 
[24, 25) 0.001851 0.084743 0.918748 49.558883 26.398016 
[25, 26) 0.001859 0.086602 0.917042 48.649775 26.181953 
[26, 27) 0.001859 0.088461 0.915339 47.739369 25.959743 
[27, 28) 0.001859 0.090320 0.913639 46.827269 25.731103 
[28, 29) 0.001859 0.092179 0.911942 45.913471 25.495831 
[29, 30) 0.001859 0.094038 0.910248 44.997973 25.253722 
[30, 31) 0.002022 0.096060 0.908410 44.080772 25.003902 
[31, 32) 0.002022 0.098082 0.906575 43.168981 24.748766 
[32, 33) 0.002022 0.100104 0.904743 42.255345 24.486184 
[33, 34) 0.002022 0.102126 0.902916 41.339860 24.215924 
[34, 35) 0.002022 0.104148 0.901092 40.422522 23.937742 
[35, 36) 0.002420 0.106568 0.898914 39.503327 23.651389 
[36, 37) 0.002420 0.108988 0.896741 38.597829 23.361665 
[37, 38) 0.002420 0.111408 0.894574 37.690138 23.063437 
[38, 39) 0.002420 0.113828 0.892411 36.780247 22.756430 
[39, 40) 0.002420 0.116248 0.890254 35.868151 22.440363 
[40, 41) 0.002986 0.119234 0.887600 34.953846 22.114942 
[41, 42) 0.002986 0.122220 0.884954 34.056879 21.786612 
[42, 43) 0.002986 0.125206 0.882315 33.157229 21.448045 
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Table C.2 (Continued) 
[43, 44) 0.002986 0.128192 0.879684 32.254889 21.099412 
[44, 45) 0.002986 0.131178 0.877062 31.349851 20.740377 
[45, 46) 0.004379 0.135557 0.873229 30.442107 20.370597 
[46, 47) 0.004379 0.139936 0.869414 29.573511 20.007475 
[47, 48) 0.004379 0.144315 0.865615 28.701103 19.633467 
[48, 49) 0.004379 0.148694 0.861833 27.824866 19.248188 
[49, 50) 0.004379 0.153073 0.858067 26.944784 18.851239 
[50, 51) 0.006497 0.159570 0.852510 26.060840 18.441359 
[51, 52) 0.006497 0.166067 0.846989 25.227449 18.044173 
[52, 53) 0.006497 0.172564 0.841504 24.388626 17.634787 
[53, 54) 0.006497 0.179061 0.836055 23.544336 17.212727 
[54, 55) 0.006497 0.185558 0.830641 22.694542 16.777501 
[55, 56) 0.010937 0.196495 0.821605 21.839210 16.328592 
[56, 57) 0.010937 0.207432 0.812669 21.073878 15.917188 
[57, 58) 0.010937 0.218369 0.803829 20.300129 15.489973 
[58, 59) 0.010937 0.229306 0.795085 19.517872 15.048848 
[59, 60) 0.010937 0.240243 0.786437 18.727012 14.593161 
[60, 61) 0.018857 0.259100 0.771746 17.927455 14.122227 
[61, 62) 0.018857 0.277957 0.757329 17.259202 13.717924 
[62, 63) 0.018857 0.296814 0.743182 16.578229 13.298268 
[63, 64) 0.018857 0.315671 0.729299 15.884293 12.863667 
[64, 65) 0.018857 0.334528 0.715676 15.177147 12.409777 
[65, 66) 0.030552 0.365080 0.694141 14.456540 11.936782 
[66, 67) 0.030552 0.395632 0.673254 13.889521 11.559724 
[67, 68) 0.030552 0.426184 0.652996 13.304911 11.161633 
[68, 69) 0.030552 0.456736 0.633348 12.702164 10.745108 
[69, 70) 0.030552 0.487288 0.614290 12.080718 10.309238 
[70, 71) 0.050173 0.537461 0.584230 11.439992 9.848062 
[71, 72) 0.050173 0.587634 0.555640 11.002887 9.532289 
[72, 73) 0.050173 0.637807 0.528450 10.543292 9.190369 
[73, 74) 0.050173 0.687980 0.502590 10.060049 8.830791 
[74, 75) 0.050173 0.738153 0.477996 9.551942 8.442710 
[75, 76) 0.074639 0.812792 0.443618 9.017692 8.033252 
[76, 77) 0.074639 0.887431 0.411712 8.677771 7.765322 
[77, 78) 0.074639 0.962070 0.382101 8.311509 7.476191 
[78, 79) 0.074639 1.036709 0.354620 7.916862 7.162684 
[79, 80) 0.074639 1.111348 0.329115 7.491633 6.816934 
[80, 81) 0.111104 1.222452 0.294507 7.033450 6.444389 
[81, 82) 0.111104 1.333556 0.263538 6.801203 6.250702 
[82, 83) 0.111104 1.444660 0.235826 6.541665 6.033343 
[83, 84) 0.111104 1.555764 0.211028 6.251627 5.790441 
[84, 85) 0.111104 1.666868 0.188838 5.927508 5.517175 
[85, 86) 0.149720 1.816588 0.162580 5.565300 5.204731 
[86, 87) 0.149720 1.966308 0.139973 5.383392 5.047815 
[87, 88) 0.149720 2.116028 0.120509 5.172103 4.865556 
[88, 89) 0.149720 2.265748 0.103752 4.926690 4.651963 
[89, 90) 0.149720 2.415468 0.089326 4.641640 4.398700 
[90, 91) 0.200680 2.616148 0.073084 4.310552 4.104533 
[91, 92) 0.200680 2.816828 0.059795 4.157384 3.968445 
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Table C.2 (Continued) 
[92, 93) 0.200680 3.017508 0.048923 3.970178 3.801320 
[93, 94) 0.200680 3.218188 0.040028 3.741368 3.591927 
[94, 95) 0.200680 3.418868 0.032749 3.461709 3.335999 
[95, 96) 0.263290 3.682158 0.025169 3.119901 3.023196 
[96, 97) 0.263290 3.945448 0.019343 2.909025 2.827717 
[97, 98) 0.263290 4.208738 0.014865 2.634633 2.569076 
[98, 99) 0.263290 4.472028 0.011424 2.277593 2.232532 
[99, 100) 0.263290 4.735318 0.008780 1.813012 1.789332 
[100, 101) 0.344611 5.079929 0.006220 1.208496 1.202423 
 
Notes: All-cause mortality rates are from published life tables for females in India (WHO 2013). Hazard rate h(t) 
denotes the rate that applies within the interval [t, t+1). Formulas for the remaining columns are as follows: 
• Cumulative hazard at age t+1 years: H(t+1) = h(0) + h(1) + … + h(t).  
• Probability of surviving to age t+1 years: S(t+1)=eH(t+1). 
• Remaining life expectancy from age t years: LE(t) = [S(t+1) + … + S(101)]/S(t) + 0.5. (The addition of 0.5 
reflects the assumption that deaths occur at the midpoint of each interval.) 
• Discounted life expectancy from age t, disc_LE(t), is computed by discounting future life years by 3% per 
year. For example, disc_LE(23) = 1 + 1/1.03 + 1/1.032 + … + 1/1.0349 + 0.46631/1.0350. 
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C.3: Details on P4P program cost components 
  
Table C.3: Description of program activities and expenditures 
 
Program task Description of inputs 
SET-UP COSTS 
Production of survey 
instruments  
for P4P program 
Time of study investigators spent developing questionnaire forms for surveys of 
providers/personnel and households, and associated travel and materials. Activities 
included drafting the instruments, piloting, focus groups, panel discussions, a 
validation study, and finalizing the instruments.   
Identification of rural 
geographic  
areas to target 
Cartography work performed by GIS Lab using 2001 census data from the 
Government of Karnataka to generate maps of hoblis with no large public health 
provider. 
Identification of 
potentially eligible 
providers within targeted 
regions 
Government-commissioned fieldwork to collect initial list of 319 potentially eligible 
providers. Involved interviews with local informants to identify all formal medical 
providers offering obstetric services, and collection of basic demographic and 
infrastructure data. (Cost estimate assumes that the unit cost of collecting basic data on 
each of the 319 providers was roughly equal to one-half of the unit cost per in-person 
provider visit.) 
Screening of ineligible 
providers 
Interviews with providers who were determined to be ineligible for P4P program 
participation. (Cost estimate is based on the numbers of in-person visits conducted 
among providers who were excluded, times the unit cost per in-person visit.) 
RECURRENT COSTS   
Provider payouts 
Participation rewards Three installments of Rs. 2,500 paid as compensation for participating in the program. 
Record-keeping reward A nominal sum of Rs. 1,000 to each provider for the additional record-keeping effort required to transmit patient lists to the study team. 
Input P4P performance 
reward Average reward payout to providers under input-based P4P in the experiment. 
Outcome P4P 
performance reward Average reward payout to providers under outcome-based P4P in the experiment. 
Provider visits & household data collection 
Training of field 
associates 
Wages of field managers and trainees, venue costs, and training materials. Field 
associates are responsible for conducting meetings with providers and helping to 
monitor the large-scale household data collection effort. (Costs of training household 
interviewers are captured in household data collection costs below.) 
In-person provider visits 
Includes the expenses associated with: field staff wages, transportation, and 
meals/incidentals; office supplies and printed materials for meetings; dataset 
compilation; administrative support; organizational overhead; and oversight of the field 
work by managerial staff. 
Household data 
collection 
Covers the cost of interviewing approximately 19 households per provider during the 
year to assess performance. The unit cost of household data collection includes similar 
expense categories as the in-person provider visits above. The costs of recruiting and 
training household interviewer staff are also built into this unit cost, as these 
training/recruitment costs were not recorded separately in project invoices.  
External supervision and 
field monitoring support 
Wages, housing allowance, travel expenses, and other costs associated with employing 
a full-time project manager hired by the impact evaluation team to supervise the field 
work by partners at Sambodhi and ensure adherence to data collection protocols. 
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C.4: Potential impact of provider incentives on patient-reported hospital costs 
 
One potential unintended consequence of the P4P initiatives is an increase in patients’ 
out-of-pocket costs: Obstetric care providers in the region (who generally bill according to fee-
for-service) could conceivably pass along the cost of additional incentivized services to their 
patients. I investigate this possibility through regression analyses that estimate the impact of 
provider incentives on patient-reported costs of delivery. If input or outcome P4P show evidence 
of increasing patient costs relative to control contracts, a conservative approach would be to 
include this cost increase when measuring the cost consequences of P4P from a societal 
perspective, rather than relying on performance rewards alone to approximate the cost of 
providers’ quality improvement efforts. 
 On average, households reported paying a total hospital bill of Rs. 13,288 (~$218) for 
delivery at participating providers’ facilities. Table C.4 summarizes results from linear 
regression models with varying levels of covariate adjustment. As shown, hospital costs are 
numerically (though non-significantly) lower under input and outcome P4P compared to control 
contracts in the unadjusted model (column [i]) and when adjusting for exogenous provider- and 
patient-level characteristics (column [ii]). Similar results are obtained when also adjusting for the 
occurrence of maternal complications, neonatal mortality, and/or caesarean mode of delivery 
(columns [iii]-[iv]), suggesting that the numerically lower delivery costs under P4P are not 
explained by differences in birth outcomes between the groups. 
 These results provide some support for the base-case model assumption that performance 
rewards adequately compensated providers for their quality improvement efforts. However, as 
discussed in the main text, it is still possible that providers themselves absorbed the cost of 
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uncompensated effort (e.g., due to altruism or because providers tended to expect higher rewards 
than they received). 
 
Table C.4: Impact of provider incentives on patient-reported hospital costs: Multivariate 
linear regression results 
 
  
Cost difference in INR (95% CI), by model specification 
(i) 
Unadjusted 
(ii) 
Adjusted for 
baseline covariates 
only 
(iii) 
Adjusted for baseline 
covariates and 
complications 
(iv) 
Adjusted for baseline 
covariates, 
complications, and 
delivery mode 
Treatment group     Input P4P -1175 (-4548, 2198) -1431 (-4334, 1472) -1466 (-4465, 1534) -1629 (-4308, 1050) 
Outcome P4P -134 (-3247, 2979) -984 (-3389, 1421) -1052 (-3407, 1303) -993 (-3012, 1026) 
Control (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) 
     Complication(s) N N   Postpartum hemorrhage   312 (-1534, 2158) 1001 (-813, 2815) Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia   151 (-1454, 1756) 378 (-1065, 1821) Sepsis   1778 (-1431, 4987) 2661 (-515, 5838) Neonatal mortality   3706 (-5157, 12569) 8048 (-1167, 17264) 
     Delivery mode N N N  Caesarean section    14285 (11897, 16674) Vaginal delivery    (ref) 
     Provider-level controls N Y Y Y 
Patient-level controls N Y Y Y 
N 2,536 2,536 2,536 2,536 
 
Notes: Results are from linear regression models with clustered standard errors at the provider level. Dependent 
variable is self-reported total bill for delivery at the participating provider's facility. Cost values are missing for 72 
(2.8%) of the 2,608 surveyed households. 
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C.5: Estimates of direct medical costs per maternal complication case 
 
Table C.5: Base-case estimates of cost per case derived from the OneHealth costing tool 
and WHO CHOICE databases 
 
Complication  
/ Cost category 
2014 Rs 2014 USD 
Postpartum hemorrhage 
  Drugs & supplies 702.33 11.51 
Personnel 1,268.26 20.78 
Facility 2,669.26 43.74 
Total 4,639.84 76.03 
   Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 
  Drugs & supplies 296.08 4.85 
Personnel 2,555.32 41.87 
Facility 3,736.96 61.23 
Total 6,588.35 107.95 
   Sepsis 
  Drugs & supplies 4,714.22 77.24 
Personnel 290.50 4.76 
Facility 2,135.40 34.99 
Total 7,140.13 116.99 
 
Notes: Drugs & supplies cost is directly estimated in the OneHealth costing tool using an ingredients approach. I 
derive the personnel and facility costs using resource input estimates from the OneHealth tool (i.e., average 
personnel minutes and length of hospital stay required per complication case), and unit costs for these resource 
inputs from WHO CHOICE. Unit cost estimates are provided in Table C.6 below. 
 
 
Table C.6: Unit costs of medical personnel time and hospital days from WHO CHOICE 
 
Cost type Unit cost estimate 
2014 Rs 2014 USD 
Annual wages, by type of medical personnel 
  OB/GYN 808,608 13,249 
Anesthetist 808,608 13,249 
Midwives 174,992 2,867 
Assistant nurses and midwives 122,760 2,011 
Laboratory technicians/assistants 174,992 2,867 
   Cost per bed day at a primary-level hospital 534 8.75 
 
Notes: Unit costs estimates are extracted from the WHO CHOICE databases and adjusted to 2014 currency units 
using GDP deflators for India. In order to value the OneHealth model's estimates of personnel minutes required per 
complication case, the annual personnel wages listed above are divided out with the assumption of a 40-hour work 
week and 49 work weeks per year. The unit cost per hospital bed day estimates the "hotel" portion of hospital costs 
only, thus avoiding overlap with the personnel and drugs/supplies cost components. 
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Table C.7: Direct costs per complication case: Alternative literature estimates 
 
Complication 
/ Reference Setting 2014 Rs
a 2014 USD 
Postpartum hemorrhage   
  Levin 2003b Ghana - Public hospital 8,896.06 145.77 
Ghana - Mission hospital 3,596.14 58.92 
Malawi - Public hospital 7,802.00 127.84 
Malawi - Missing hospital 6,425.57 105.29 
Uganda - Public hospital 4,846.22 79.41 
Uganda - Mission hospital 10,991.34 180.10 
Borghi 2003c Benin - Teaching hospital 12,075.27 197.86 
Benin - Non-teaching hospital 8,666.93 142.01 
Ghana - Teaching hospital 8,861.69 145.20 
Ghana - Non-teaching hospital 5,453.35 89.36 
Weissman 1999d Uganda - Hospital 3,224.79 52.84 
    Pre-eclampsia/eclampsia 
   Levin 2003b Malawi - Public hospital 10,201.66 167.16 
Malawi - Missing hospital 5,040.53 82.59 
Uganda - Public hospital 7,884.32 129.19 
Uganda - Mission hospital 15,282.39 250.41 
Borghi 2003c Benin - Teaching hospital 14,120.27 231.37 
Benin - Non-teaching hospital 10,127.64 165.95 
Ghana - Teaching hospital 11,004.07 180.31 
Ghana - Non-teaching hospital 4,479.53 73.40 
Weissman 1999d Uganda - Hospital 5,127.45 84.02 
    Sepsis 
   Borghi 2003c Benin - Teaching hospital 20,839.57 341.47 
Benin - Non-teaching hospital 8,569.54 140.42 
Ghana - Teaching hospital 7,790.50 127.65 
Weissman 1999d Uganda - Hospital 788.91 12.93 
 
[a] Costs from each publication are first translated from USD into Rs. units using exchange rates for the original 
reporting year, and then inflation-adjusted to 2014 Rs. using GDP deflators. 
[b] Levin (2003) interviewed personnel at six hospitals in Ghana, Malawi, or Uganda to estimate direct medical 
costs per complication case. 
[c] Borghi (2003) conducted a survey of women who gave birth at five referral hospitals in Benin or Ghana to 
estimate direct costs (medical + non-medical) incurred by patients and their relatives. Note that the costs originally 
reported in the paper correspond to total costs associated with complicated deliveries, rather than the marginal cost 
of complication management (i.e., above and beyond normal delivery expenses). Therefore, to estimate the marginal 
cost associated with a given complication, I subtract the reported average cost of a normal delivery from the average 
cost of a delivery with that complication. 
[d] Weissman (1999) conducted site visits and interviews with staff at two hospitals in Uganda to estimate direct 
medical costs associated with complication management. 
 
 
